The Experts below are selected from a list of 2259 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Kryvoi Yaraslau - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Procedural fairness as a precondition for immunity of international organizations
'Brill', 2016Co-Authors: Kryvoi YaraslauAbstract:This article analyses the notion and role of fairness in the procedural rules and practice of international Administrative Tribunals. After reviewing decisions of international Administrative Tribunals dealing with the notion of fairness, it shows that Tribunals rely on the concept of fairness to limit discretion of decision-makers, to fill gaps in law and to override written law to ensure fairness. The article makes suggestions as to how to reconcile the different visions and roles of fairness in international Administrative law. It argues that with the further development of international Administrative law, Tribunals should as much as possible rely on rules and principles formulated by external bodies rather than on their personal understanding of fairness
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Fairness in international Administrative law
Brill, 2015Co-Authors: Kryvoi YaraslauAbstract:This Article analyses the notion and role of fairness in the procedural rules and practice of international Administrative Tribunals. After reviewing decisions of international Administrative Tribunals dealing with the notion of fairness it shows that Tribunals rely on the concept of fairness to limit discretion of decision-makers, to fill gaps in law and to override written law to ensure fairness. \ud \ud The Article makes suggestions as to how to reconcile the different visions and roles of fairness in international Administrative law. It argues that with the further development of international Administrative law Tribunals should as much as possible rely on rules and principles formulated by external bodies rather than on their personal understanding of fairness
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The law applied by international Administrative Tribunals: from autonomy to hierarchy
George Washington University, 2015Co-Authors: Kryvoi YaraslauAbstract:This Article examines the law applied by the Administrative Tribunals of international organizations when resolving disputes between international organizations and international civil servants. The analysis suggests that international Administrative Tribunals primarily rely on employment contracts and internal law of international organisations while only rarely referencing international law. \ud \ud This Article argues that international Administrative Tribunals should specifically define in their relevant statutes the sources of law applicable to international Administrative disputes and that they should distinguish such sources from non-legal norms. The Article further notes the modern trend of international Administrative Tribunals of giving more weight to general principles of law. \ud \ud It ultimately argues that these Tribunals should establish the supremacy of international law, particularly fundamental principles of international labor law, over the internal law of international organizations. The establishment of such a hierarchy will make international Administrative law more legitimate, coherent, and predictable
Cass R Sunstein - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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extremism and social learning
Journal of Legal Analysis, 2009Co-Authors: Edward L Glaeser, Cass R SunsteinAbstract:When members of deliberating groups speak with one another, their predeliberation tendencies often become exacerbated as their views become more extreme. The resulting phenomenon — group polarization — has been observed in many settings, and it bears on the actions of juries, Administrative Tribunals, corporate boards, and other institutions. Polarization can result from rational Bayesian updating by group members, but in many contexts, this rational interpretation of polarization seems implausible. We argue that people are better seen as Credulous Bayesians, who insufficiently adjust for idiosyncratic features of particular environments and put excessive weight on the statements of others in situations of (1) common sources of information; (2) highly unrepresentative group membership; (3) statements that are made to obtain approval; and (4) statements that are designed to manipulate. Credulous Bayesianism can produce extremism and significant blunders — the folly of crowds. We discuss the implications of Credulous Bayesianism for law and politics, including media policy and cognitive diversity on Administrative agencies and courts.
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extremism and social learning
National Bureau of Economic Research, 2008Co-Authors: Edward L Glaeser, Cass R SunsteinAbstract:When members of deliberating groups speak with one another, their predeliberation tendencies often become exacerbated as their views become more extreme. The resulting phenomenon -- group polarization – has been observed in many settings, and it bears on the actions of juries, Administrative Tribunals, corporate boards, and other institutions. Polarization can result from rational Bayesian updating by group members, but in many contexts, this rational interpretation of polarization seems implausible. We argue that people are better seen as Credulous Bayesians, who insufficiently adjust for idiosyncratic features of particular environments and put excessive weight on the statements of others where there are 1) common sources of information; 2) highly unrepresentative group membership; 3) statements that are made to obtain approval; and 4) statements that are designed to manipulate. Credulous Bayesianism can produce extremism and significant blunders. We discuss the implications of Credulous Bayesianism for law and politics, including media policy and cognitive diversity on Administrative agencies and courts.
Edward L Glaeser - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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extremism and social learning
Journal of Legal Analysis, 2009Co-Authors: Edward L Glaeser, Cass R SunsteinAbstract:When members of deliberating groups speak with one another, their predeliberation tendencies often become exacerbated as their views become more extreme. The resulting phenomenon — group polarization — has been observed in many settings, and it bears on the actions of juries, Administrative Tribunals, corporate boards, and other institutions. Polarization can result from rational Bayesian updating by group members, but in many contexts, this rational interpretation of polarization seems implausible. We argue that people are better seen as Credulous Bayesians, who insufficiently adjust for idiosyncratic features of particular environments and put excessive weight on the statements of others in situations of (1) common sources of information; (2) highly unrepresentative group membership; (3) statements that are made to obtain approval; and (4) statements that are designed to manipulate. Credulous Bayesianism can produce extremism and significant blunders — the folly of crowds. We discuss the implications of Credulous Bayesianism for law and politics, including media policy and cognitive diversity on Administrative agencies and courts.
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extremism and social learning
National Bureau of Economic Research, 2008Co-Authors: Edward L Glaeser, Cass R SunsteinAbstract:When members of deliberating groups speak with one another, their predeliberation tendencies often become exacerbated as their views become more extreme. The resulting phenomenon -- group polarization – has been observed in many settings, and it bears on the actions of juries, Administrative Tribunals, corporate boards, and other institutions. Polarization can result from rational Bayesian updating by group members, but in many contexts, this rational interpretation of polarization seems implausible. We argue that people are better seen as Credulous Bayesians, who insufficiently adjust for idiosyncratic features of particular environments and put excessive weight on the statements of others where there are 1) common sources of information; 2) highly unrepresentative group membership; 3) statements that are made to obtain approval; and 4) statements that are designed to manipulate. Credulous Bayesianism can produce extremism and significant blunders. We discuss the implications of Credulous Bayesianism for law and politics, including media policy and cognitive diversity on Administrative agencies and courts.
Ullrich Gerhard - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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The law of the international civil service: institutional law and practice in international organisations
'Duncker & Humblot GmbH', 2018Co-Authors: Ullrich GerhardAbstract:Gerhard Ullrich provides an overall review of the employment law of international intergovernmental organisations. In the first part of the book, he explains the basics of employment law and provides statistical data. He comments extensively on the privileges and immunities of international officials. The core of the book is dedicated to the examination of the legal sources for international civil service law. Here, the international Administrative Tribunals' case law on the general principles of law occupies a particularly broad area. A second legal source are the structures and elements of the statutory employment in international organisations. The author finally comments on the system of legal protection for the staff of the international civil service
Daly Paul - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Struggling Towards Coherence in Canadian Administrative Law? Recent Cases on Standard of Review and Reasonableness
'Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD)', 2019Co-Authors: Daly PaulAbstract:Although the Supreme Court of Canada’s seminal decision in Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick has now been cited more than 10,000 times by Canadian courts and Administrative Tribunals, many of its key features remain obscure. In this article, the author analyzes recent cases decided under the Dunsmuir framework with a view to determining where Canadian courts might usefully go next. The author’s argument is that the two important principles said to underlie the Dunsmuir framework—the rule of law and democracy—can provide guidance to courts in simplifying and clarifying judicial review of Administrative action. In Part I, the author explains how the relationship between Dunsmuir’s categorical approach and the contextual approach that it replaced is uncertain and causes significant confusion, and explores the potential utility of the two underlying principles in simplifying the law. The application of the reasonableness standard of review is the focus of Part II, in which the author criticizes the general approach to reasonableness review in Canada, but suggests that the rule of law and democracy may assist in clarifying the law, by setting the boundaries of the “range” of reasonable outcomes and structuring the analytical framework for identifying unreasonable Administrative decisions. Finally, the author draws the strands of Parts I and II together by arguing for the adoption of a unified, context-sensitive reasonableness standard, underpinned by the rule of law and democracy, with the aim of providing clarity and simplicity to Canadian Administrative law in a manner faithful to the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Dunsmuir
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Struggling Towards Coherence in Canadian Administrative Law? Recent Cases on Standard of Review and Reasonableness
'Consortium Erudit', 2016Co-Authors: Daly PaulAbstract:Although the Supreme Court of Canada’s seminal decision in Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick has now been cited more than 10,000 times by Canadian courts and Administrative Tribunals, many of its key features remain obscure. In this article, the author analyzes recent cases decided under the Dunsmuir framework with a view to determining where Canadian courts might usefully go next. The author’s argument is that the two important principles said to underlie the Dunsmuir framework—the rule of law and democracy—can provide guidance to courts in simplifying and clarifying judicial review of Administrative action. In Part I, the author explains how the relationship between Dunsmuir’s categorical approach and the contextual approach that it replaced is uncertain and causes significant confusion, and explores the potential utility of the two underlying principles in simplifying the law. The application of the reasonableness standard of review is the focus of Part II, in which the author criticizes the general approach to reasonableness review in Canada, but suggests that the rule of law and democracy may assist in clarifying the law, by setting the boundaries of the “range” of reasonable outcomes and structuring the analytical framework for identifying unreasonable Administrative decisions. Finally, the author draws the strands of Parts I and II together by arguing for the adoption of a unified, context-sensitive reasonableness standard, underpinned by the rule of law and democracy, with the aim of providing clarity and simplicity to Canadian Administrative law in a manner faithful to the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Dunsmuir.Bien que la décision de la Cour suprême du Canada dans Dunsmuir c. Nouveau-Brunswick ait maintenant été citée plus de 10 000 fois par les cours de justice et les tribunaux administratifs, un nombre important de ses caractéristiques principales demeurent obscures. Dans le présent article, l’auteur analyse les décisions récentes jugées suivant Dunsmuir afin de déterminer le parcours que les cours de justice devraient emprunter. L’auteur maintient que les deux principes fondamentaux censés sous-tendre le cadre d’analyse de Dunsmuir — la primauté du droit et la démocratie — peuvent fournir des directives aux tribunaux en vue de simplifier et de clarifier le contrôle judiciaire des actes de l’Administration. Dans la partie I, l’auteur explique comment la relation entre l’approche catégorielle de Dunsmuir et l’approche contextuelle qui l’a remplacée est incertaine, provoquant ainsi une confusion majeure, et explore l’utilité potentielle des deux principes fondamentaux en vue de simplifier le droit. L’application de la norme de contrôle de la raisonnabilité est au coeur de la partie II, dans laquelle l’auteur critique l’approche générale du contrôle judiciaire de la raisonnabilité au Canada, mais suggère que la primauté du droit et la démocratie pourraient aider à clarifier le droit en définissant les limites des issues raisonnables et en structurant le cadre d’analyse permettant d’identifier les décisions Administratives déraisonnables. Enfin, l’auteur resserre le lien entre les parties I et II en soutenant l’adoption d’une norme de raisonnabilité unifiée et contextuelle qui repose sur la primauté du droit et sur la démocratie, et qui confère clarté et simplicité au droit administratif canadien tout en restant fidèle à la décision de la Cour suprême du Canada dans l’arrêt Dunsmuir