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Adam H Rosenzweig - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Anachronisms in subchapter k of the internal revenue code is it time to part with section 736
Northwestern University Law Review, 2006Co-Authors: Philip F Postlewaite, Adam H RosenzweigAbstract:Brutus: Peace! Count the clock. Cassius: The clock hath stricken three. Trebonius: 'Tis time to part. -William Shakespeare, The Tragedy of Julius Caesar1 On this occasion of the one-hundredth anniversary of the Northwestern University Law Review, the editorial board has called for a reflective view on the development of the law by its law school faculty. Appropriately, for purposes of this Essay, we have combined the divergent perspectives of two faculty members of the Tax Program at Northwestern University School of Law to scrutinize the evolution of a portion of tax law over the past fifty years. One of us, in the winter of his career, possesses a somewhat cynical view in light of his numerous years of teaching and writing in the field. The other, as a neophyte beginning his first year, brings an accompanying optimism.2 From this dual perspective, we do not address the evolution of the Code3 in its entirety (a daunting task even in its description), but rather Anachronisms in the same. More specifically, we focus on section 736, a provision of Subchapter K of the Code, enacted originally in 1954 to settle the tax treatment of payments by a partnership to a retiring partner or to the successor of a deceased partner in liquidation of the partner's interest. Regardless that we approach section 736 from our divergent perspectives, the conclusion is the same: time has passed section 736 by, and, rather than serve its initial purpose, section 736 survives as an Anachronism preventing the coherent evolution of the Code. Section 736 thus serves as a warning of the dangers inherent in the rise of Anachronisms both in Subchapter K and the Code as a whole. An Anachronism is officially defined as "1: an error in chronology; esp: a chronological misplacing of persons, events, objects, or customs in regard to each other. 2: a person or a thing that is chronologically out of place; esp: one from a former age that is incongruous in the present."4 Regardless of where we encounter it-in the course of reading great literature or while surveying the Code-an Anachronism should always give us pause, prompting us to ask: why is it there?5 To return to the literary reference that began this piece: did Shakespeare simply stumble in Grafting his plot, forgetting that clocks did not exist at the time of Caesar? Or, as we strongly suspect, did he have a higher purpose, perhaps to drive home the point that time stops for no person, regardless of position?6 Just as we scrutinize Shakespeare's intentions, in this Essay we speculate about the intentions of Congress (another kind of author) with its own great play of life (the Code) and that author's decision to retain statutory provisions in the Code that appear chronologically out of place. Do these provisions continue as a mere oversight or do they persist by design? If attributable to oversight, such Code provisions would be distressing enough from a tax policy standpoint in that subsequent statutory enactments should have called into question their continued vitality. Of greater concern, however, are those Anachronisms that have been revisited and amended by Congress and yet remain in place. These anachronistic provisions are more perplexing because the obvious explanation for their existenceoversight-is less plausible. As an example of this phenomenon, this Essay will evaluate section 736 of the Code, which unlike our reference to the clock by Brutus and Cassius, we assert is an example of the more indefensible type of Anachronism.7 Not only has section 736's raison d'etre been fundamentally undermined by Congress as part of the continuing evolution of the statutory framework of the Code, but Congress has specifically revisited the provision and yet failed to integrate these new Congressional directives into the antiquated text.8 How could a provision such as section 736, with limited utility, devastating complexity, and confusing (at best) policy implications, remain in the Internal Revenue Code? …
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Anachronisms in subchapter K of the internal revenue code: Is it time to part with section 736?
Northwestern University Law Review, 2006Co-Authors: Philip F Postlewaite, Adam H RosenzweigAbstract:Brutus: Peace! Count the clock. Cassius: The clock hath stricken three. Trebonius: 'Tis time to part. -William Shakespeare, The Tragedy of Julius Caesar1 On this occasion of the one-hundredth anniversary of the Northwestern University Law Review, the editorial board has called for a reflective view on the development of the law by its law school faculty. Appropriately, for purposes of this Essay, we have combined the divergent perspectives of two faculty members of the Tax Program at Northwestern University School of Law to scrutinize the evolution of a portion of tax law over the past fifty years. One of us, in the winter of his career, possesses a somewhat cynical view in light of his numerous years of teaching and writing in the field. The other, as a neophyte beginning his first year, brings an accompanying optimism.2 From this dual perspective, we do not address the evolution of the Code3 in its entirety (a daunting task even in its description), but rather Anachronisms in the same. More specifically, we focus on section 736, a provision of Subchapter K of the Code, enacted originally in 1954 to settle the tax treatment of payments by a partnership to a retiring partner or to the successor of a deceased partner in liquidation of the partner's interest. Regardless that we approach section 736 from our divergent perspectives, the conclusion is the same: time has passed section 736 by, and, rather than serve its initial purpose, section 736 survives as an Anachronism preventing the coherent evolution of the Code. Section 736 thus serves as a warning of the dangers inherent in the rise of Anachronisms both in Subchapter K and the Code as a whole. An Anachronism is officially defined as "1: an error in chronology; esp: a chronological misplacing of persons, events, objects, or customs in regard to each other. 2: a person or a thing that is chronologically out of place; esp: one from a former age that is incongruous in the present."4 Regardless of where we encounter it-in the course of reading great literature or while surveying the Code-an Anachronism should always give us pause, prompting us to ask: why is it there?5 To return to the literary reference that began this piece: did Shakespeare simply stumble in Grafting his plot, forgetting that clocks did not exist at the time of Caesar? Or, as we strongly suspect, did he have a higher purpose, perhaps to drive home the point that time stops for no person, regardless of position?6 Just as we scrutinize Shakespeare's intentions, in this Essay we speculate about the intentions of Congress (another kind of author) with its own great play of life (the Code) and that author's decision to retain statutory provisions in the Code that appear chronologically out of place. Do these provisions continue as a mere oversight or do they persist by design? If attributable to oversight, such Code provisions would be distressing enough from a tax policy standpoint in that subsequent statutory enactments should have called into question their continued vitality. Of greater concern, however, are those Anachronisms that have been revisited and amended by Congress and yet remain in place. These anachronistic provisions are more perplexing because the obvious explanation for their existenceoversight-is less plausible. As an example of this phenomenon, this Essay will evaluate section 736 of the Code, which unlike our reference to the clock by Brutus and Cassius, we assert is an example of the more indefensible type of Anachronism.7 Not only has section 736's raison d'etre been fundamentally undermined by Congress as part of the continuing evolution of the statutory framework of the Code, but Congress has specifically revisited the provision and yet failed to integrate these new Congressional directives into the antiquated text.8 How could a provision such as section 736, with limited utility, devastating complexity, and confusing (at best) policy implications, remain in the Internal Revenue Code? …
Philip F Postlewaite - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Anachronisms in subchapter k of the internal revenue code is it time to part with section 736
Northwestern University Law Review, 2006Co-Authors: Philip F Postlewaite, Adam H RosenzweigAbstract:Brutus: Peace! Count the clock. Cassius: The clock hath stricken three. Trebonius: 'Tis time to part. -William Shakespeare, The Tragedy of Julius Caesar1 On this occasion of the one-hundredth anniversary of the Northwestern University Law Review, the editorial board has called for a reflective view on the development of the law by its law school faculty. Appropriately, for purposes of this Essay, we have combined the divergent perspectives of two faculty members of the Tax Program at Northwestern University School of Law to scrutinize the evolution of a portion of tax law over the past fifty years. One of us, in the winter of his career, possesses a somewhat cynical view in light of his numerous years of teaching and writing in the field. The other, as a neophyte beginning his first year, brings an accompanying optimism.2 From this dual perspective, we do not address the evolution of the Code3 in its entirety (a daunting task even in its description), but rather Anachronisms in the same. More specifically, we focus on section 736, a provision of Subchapter K of the Code, enacted originally in 1954 to settle the tax treatment of payments by a partnership to a retiring partner or to the successor of a deceased partner in liquidation of the partner's interest. Regardless that we approach section 736 from our divergent perspectives, the conclusion is the same: time has passed section 736 by, and, rather than serve its initial purpose, section 736 survives as an Anachronism preventing the coherent evolution of the Code. Section 736 thus serves as a warning of the dangers inherent in the rise of Anachronisms both in Subchapter K and the Code as a whole. An Anachronism is officially defined as "1: an error in chronology; esp: a chronological misplacing of persons, events, objects, or customs in regard to each other. 2: a person or a thing that is chronologically out of place; esp: one from a former age that is incongruous in the present."4 Regardless of where we encounter it-in the course of reading great literature or while surveying the Code-an Anachronism should always give us pause, prompting us to ask: why is it there?5 To return to the literary reference that began this piece: did Shakespeare simply stumble in Grafting his plot, forgetting that clocks did not exist at the time of Caesar? Or, as we strongly suspect, did he have a higher purpose, perhaps to drive home the point that time stops for no person, regardless of position?6 Just as we scrutinize Shakespeare's intentions, in this Essay we speculate about the intentions of Congress (another kind of author) with its own great play of life (the Code) and that author's decision to retain statutory provisions in the Code that appear chronologically out of place. Do these provisions continue as a mere oversight or do they persist by design? If attributable to oversight, such Code provisions would be distressing enough from a tax policy standpoint in that subsequent statutory enactments should have called into question their continued vitality. Of greater concern, however, are those Anachronisms that have been revisited and amended by Congress and yet remain in place. These anachronistic provisions are more perplexing because the obvious explanation for their existenceoversight-is less plausible. As an example of this phenomenon, this Essay will evaluate section 736 of the Code, which unlike our reference to the clock by Brutus and Cassius, we assert is an example of the more indefensible type of Anachronism.7 Not only has section 736's raison d'etre been fundamentally undermined by Congress as part of the continuing evolution of the statutory framework of the Code, but Congress has specifically revisited the provision and yet failed to integrate these new Congressional directives into the antiquated text.8 How could a provision such as section 736, with limited utility, devastating complexity, and confusing (at best) policy implications, remain in the Internal Revenue Code? …
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Anachronisms in subchapter K of the internal revenue code: Is it time to part with section 736?
Northwestern University Law Review, 2006Co-Authors: Philip F Postlewaite, Adam H RosenzweigAbstract:Brutus: Peace! Count the clock. Cassius: The clock hath stricken three. Trebonius: 'Tis time to part. -William Shakespeare, The Tragedy of Julius Caesar1 On this occasion of the one-hundredth anniversary of the Northwestern University Law Review, the editorial board has called for a reflective view on the development of the law by its law school faculty. Appropriately, for purposes of this Essay, we have combined the divergent perspectives of two faculty members of the Tax Program at Northwestern University School of Law to scrutinize the evolution of a portion of tax law over the past fifty years. One of us, in the winter of his career, possesses a somewhat cynical view in light of his numerous years of teaching and writing in the field. The other, as a neophyte beginning his first year, brings an accompanying optimism.2 From this dual perspective, we do not address the evolution of the Code3 in its entirety (a daunting task even in its description), but rather Anachronisms in the same. More specifically, we focus on section 736, a provision of Subchapter K of the Code, enacted originally in 1954 to settle the tax treatment of payments by a partnership to a retiring partner or to the successor of a deceased partner in liquidation of the partner's interest. Regardless that we approach section 736 from our divergent perspectives, the conclusion is the same: time has passed section 736 by, and, rather than serve its initial purpose, section 736 survives as an Anachronism preventing the coherent evolution of the Code. Section 736 thus serves as a warning of the dangers inherent in the rise of Anachronisms both in Subchapter K and the Code as a whole. An Anachronism is officially defined as "1: an error in chronology; esp: a chronological misplacing of persons, events, objects, or customs in regard to each other. 2: a person or a thing that is chronologically out of place; esp: one from a former age that is incongruous in the present."4 Regardless of where we encounter it-in the course of reading great literature or while surveying the Code-an Anachronism should always give us pause, prompting us to ask: why is it there?5 To return to the literary reference that began this piece: did Shakespeare simply stumble in Grafting his plot, forgetting that clocks did not exist at the time of Caesar? Or, as we strongly suspect, did he have a higher purpose, perhaps to drive home the point that time stops for no person, regardless of position?6 Just as we scrutinize Shakespeare's intentions, in this Essay we speculate about the intentions of Congress (another kind of author) with its own great play of life (the Code) and that author's decision to retain statutory provisions in the Code that appear chronologically out of place. Do these provisions continue as a mere oversight or do they persist by design? If attributable to oversight, such Code provisions would be distressing enough from a tax policy standpoint in that subsequent statutory enactments should have called into question their continued vitality. Of greater concern, however, are those Anachronisms that have been revisited and amended by Congress and yet remain in place. These anachronistic provisions are more perplexing because the obvious explanation for their existenceoversight-is less plausible. As an example of this phenomenon, this Essay will evaluate section 736 of the Code, which unlike our reference to the clock by Brutus and Cassius, we assert is an example of the more indefensible type of Anachronism.7 Not only has section 736's raison d'etre been fundamentally undermined by Congress as part of the continuing evolution of the statutory framework of the Code, but Congress has specifically revisited the provision and yet failed to integrate these new Congressional directives into the antiquated text.8 How could a provision such as section 736, with limited utility, devastating complexity, and confusing (at best) policy implications, remain in the Internal Revenue Code? …
Georgi Verbeeck - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Anachronism and the rewriting of history: the South Africa case
The Journal for Transdisciplinary Research in Southern Africa, 2006Co-Authors: Georgi VerbeeckAbstract:The use and abuse of Anachronism is often seen as the quintessence of the writing of history. Historians tend to conceive it as the hardcore of their metier to avoid Anachronism. It designates a confusion in order of time, especially the mistake of placing an event, attitude, or circumstance too early. The awareness of historical Anachronism is omnipresent in times of a radical rewriting of history, in particular as a result of political transformation. History reflects the needs and ambitions of a political context, and the sense of what is deemed historically significant does not remain unattached hereby. Chronology and Anachronism are essential to particular conceptions of history, and if history is in a process of being rewritten, they are the first items to be addressed by the defenders of the old system and the advocates of a new discourse. In political debates on the use or abuse of history Anachronism is often seen as ultimate proof of the (un-)reliability of new insights and conceptions. As Anachronism is defined as a way of transferring contemporary sets of values, assumptions and interpretative categories, every political reorientation inevitably provokes a discussion on that level. If a 'new nation' is in search of a 'new past', a new reflection on the basic categories of historical thinking becomes necessary. The changing discourses in South African historiography since the end of Apartheid serve here as an illuminative example.
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Anachronism and the Rewriting of History in South Africa
The Journal for Transdisciplinary Research in Southern Africa, 2006Co-Authors: Georgi VerbeeckAbstract:The use and abuse of Anachronism is often seen as the quintessence of the writing of history. Historians tend to conceive it as the hardcore of their m?tier to avoid Anachronism. It designates a confusion in order of time, especially the mistake of placing an event, attitude, or circumstance too early. The awareness of historical Anachronism is omnipresent in times of a radical rewriting of history, in particular as a result of political transformation. History reflects the needs and ambitions of a political context, and the sense of what is deemed historically significant does not remain unattached hereby. Chronology and Anachronism are essential to particular conceptions of history, and if history is in a process of being rewritten, they are the first items to be addressed by the defenders of the old system and the advocates of a new discourse. In political debates on the use or abuse of history Anachronism is often seen as ultimate proof of the (un-)reliability of new insights and conceptions. As Anachronism is defined as a way of transferring contemporary sets of values, assumptions and interpretative categories, every political reorientation inevitably provokes a discussion on that level. If a ?new nation? is in search of a ?new past?, a new reflection on the basic categories of historical thinking becomes necessary. The changing discourses in South African historiography since the end of Apartheid serve here as an illuminative example.
Dominic Lash - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Distance Listening: Musical Anachronism in Stanley Kubrick’s Barry Lyndon
2017Co-Authors: Dominic LashAbstract:It has long been recognised that Barry Lyndon deploys a range of Anachronisms both visual and musical. The visual Anachronisms have been the subject of serious and stimulating investigation by scholars including Ralf Michael Fischer and Tatjana Ljujic, but I will argue that there is a much richer deployment of musical Anachronism in the film than the critical discourse has recognised thus far. The many and varied musical Anachronisms to be found in Barry Lyndon , which I will present in detail, in fact make a significant contribution to the film’s explorations of history, representation and the relation between appearance and reality. Anachronism undermines the claim of a fictional work to represent a past time by underlining the fact that it was constructed at a later date – it presents an apparent contradiction. This fact means that an examination of musical Anachronism in Barry Lyndon also provides an opportunity to investigate the way Kubrick’s film deliberately puts multiple apparent contradictions into play. These include the relations between immediacy and distance, performance and intimacy, and also completion and incompletion. All these contradictions support the film’s pervasive theme, which, I will argue, is that of pretence. Despite their subtlety, then, anachronistic musical effects in Barry Lyndon can be shown to bear upon the very heart of what the film is about.
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distance listening musical Anachronism in stanley kubrick s barry lyndon
Cinergie – Il Cinema e le altre Arti, 2017Co-Authors: Dominic LashAbstract:It has long been recognised that Barry Lyndon deploys a range of Anachronisms both visual and musical. The visual Anachronisms have been the subject of serious and stimulating investigation by scholars including Ralf Michael Fischer and Tatjana Ljujic, but I will argue that there is a much richer deployment of musical Anachronism in the film than the critical discourse has recognised thus far. The many and varied musical Anachronisms to be found in Barry Lyndon , which I will present in detail, in fact make a significant contribution to the film’s explorations of history, representation and the relation between appearance and reality. Anachronism undermines the claim of a fictional work to represent a past time by underlining the fact that it was constructed at a later date – it presents an apparent contradiction. This fact means that an examination of musical Anachronism in Barry Lyndon also provides an opportunity to investigate the way Kubrick’s film deliberately puts multiple apparent contradictions into play. These include the relations between immediacy and distance, performance and intimacy, and also completion and incompletion. All these contradictions support the film’s pervasive theme, which, I will argue, is that of pretence. Despite their subtlety, then, anachronistic musical effects in Barry Lyndon can be shown to bear upon the very heart of what the film is about.
Bruce Beaubouef - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Defending the Strategic Petroleum Reserve: response to the Cato Institute essay ‘The case against the Strategic Petroleum Reserve’
International Journal of Regulation and Governance, 2006Co-Authors: Bruce BeaubouefAbstract:In November 2005, the Cato Institute issued ‘The Case Against the Strategic Petroleum Reserve’. Its authors, Jerry Taylor and Peter Van Doren, argued that the Strategic Petroleum Reserve had become an Anachronism, and that the government should terminate the programme and sell all the oil. Unfortunately, their arguments and evidence were often flawed and sometimes erroneous, and their conclusion, coming as it does in an era of increasing energy insecurity, could not be more misplaced.