The Experts below are selected from a list of 27 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform

Kieran Mclaughlin - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Obfuscation: The hidden malware
    IEEE Security and Privacy, 2011
    Co-Authors: Philip Okane, Sakir Sezer, Kieran Mclaughlin
    Abstract:

    A cyberwar exists between malware writers and Antimalware researchers. At this war's heart rages a weapons race that originated in the 80s with the first computer virus. Obfuscation is one of the latest strategies to camouflage the telltale signs of malware, undermine Antimalware Software, and thwart malware analysis. Malware writers use packers, polymorphic techniques, and metamorphic techniques to evade intrusion detection systems. The need exists for new Antimalware approaches that focus on what malware is doing rather than how it's doing it.

Klaus Brunnstein - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • from antivirus to Antimalware Software and beyond another approach to the protection of customers from dysfunctional system behaviour
    1999
    Co-Authors: Klaus Brunnstein
    Abstract:

    As users tend to rely on systems of growing complexity without themselves being able to understand or control malevolent behaviour, threats contained in Software must be well understood. The paper deals with different aspects of malicious Software (malware), both self-replicating (aka viruses and worms) and "pure" payloads (aka Trojan Horses) which are understood as additional though unwished and unspecified features of systems of programs; such system or Software features are regarded as " dysfunctional". As traditional definitions somewhat lack consistency which is prerequisite to describing complex dysfunctionalties, and as they are partially self-contradicting and incomplete concerning recent threats, a definition is developed which distinguishes "normal" dysfunctionalties (produced through weaknesses of contemporary Software Engineering) from "intentionally malevolent" ones. Complex real threats may be built from two atomic types, namely self-replicating and Trojanic elements, each of which may act under some trigger condition. Based on experiences collected from tests, Antimalware methods need further developments, both concerning classification of newly experienced threats and concerning online detection in user systems.

Philip Okane - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Obfuscation: The hidden malware
    IEEE Security and Privacy, 2011
    Co-Authors: Philip Okane, Sakir Sezer, Kieran Mclaughlin
    Abstract:

    A cyberwar exists between malware writers and Antimalware researchers. At this war's heart rages a weapons race that originated in the 80s with the first computer virus. Obfuscation is one of the latest strategies to camouflage the telltale signs of malware, undermine Antimalware Software, and thwart malware analysis. Malware writers use packers, polymorphic techniques, and metamorphic techniques to evade intrusion detection systems. The need exists for new Antimalware approaches that focus on what malware is doing rather than how it's doing it.

Matt Bishop - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Antimalware Software: Do we measure resilience?
    2013 Workshop on Anti-malware Testing Research, 2013
    Co-Authors: Richard Ford, Marco Carvalho, Liam M. Mayron, Matt Bishop
    Abstract:

    There is great interest in the topic of resilient cyber systems, especially with respect to attacks by malicious Software. The challenges of measuring the actual resilience of a system and the ambiguity of the term “resilience” itself cloud much of the accompanying research. In this paper, we examine some of the lessons learned in defining resilience metrics. We argue that such metrics are highly contextual and that a general, quantitative set of metrics for resilience of cyber systems is impractical. Instead, a set of considerations and guidelines for building metrics that are helpful for a particular system are provided. We then consider these metrics in the light of current anti-malware Software tests and argue that testing efforts have been primarily directed toward robust systems, not resilient ones. As such, current anti-malware tests tend to push the market toward existing solutions geared toward prevention rather than mitigation and survivability.

Macdonald Calen - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Malicious Software Threats
    'Springer Science and Business Media LLC', 2020
    Co-Authors: Ngo, Fawn T., Agarwal Anurag, Govindu Ramakrishna, Macdonald Calen
    Abstract:

    Malicious Software, or malware for short, is Software designed with a nefarious intent of harming the computer user. There are many types of malware, depending on how they are spread and the nature of harm they intend. Some examples of malware include – viruses, worms, Trojan horses, spyware, keyloggers, botnets, rootkits, ransomware, scareware, and drive-by downloads. To date, over a million different viruses and other malware have been detected. Some have caused significant damage to individuals and organizations, sometimes in the order of billions of US dollars. Some notable viruses, in chronological order, include the Morris worm in 1988, the Melissa virus in 1999, the ILOVEYOU virus in 2000, the Anna Kournikova virus in 2001, The code Red worm in 2001, the Slammer virus in 2003, the Mydoom worm in 2004, the Sasser and Netsky worms in 2004, the Storm worm in 2007, the Mirai malware in 2016, and the WannaCry ransomware in 2017. The malware with the most damage known to date have been the Sasser and Netsky worms with an estimated damage of $31 billion. Sometimes, even governments tend to use malware for espionage and other political motives. Malware can be prevented by using appropriate security Software such as firewalls, antivirus Software, and antispyware. In addition, researchers have employed criminological theories, in particular, self-control and routine activity theories, to determine factors that may increase the risks of malware infection victimization. The extant evidence indicates that irresponsible use of the Internet, such as failing to use a security Software or clicking on questionable websites, can also lead to malware infection victimization. Accordingly, to effectively address malware, the technical aspects of the problem as well as the human side of the issue must be jointly considered and targeted. Malware developers are getting smarter in terms of their ability to develop malware that goes undetected by Antimalware Software, and Antimalware developers need to constantly remain innovative to combat smarter malware