The Experts below are selected from a list of 250056 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform

M Sweeney - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • bus a browser based user interface service for web based Applications
    Australasian User Interface Conference, 2000
    Co-Authors: M Sweeney
    Abstract:

    The growing complexity of Web based Applications have uncovered software engineering problems in developing and maintaining these systems. The current Web Application development and maintenance environment lacks the architectural models that are used in the development of other systems. The paper introduces a Browser User-interface Service (BUS) that offers an object oriented presentation language to build custom Web user interfaces that dynamically connect to Application Components. The Components are able to reuse HTML, Javascript, and stylesheet content using prototype inheritance and dynamically bind presentation objects with data supplied in XML format. The BUS is designed to be platform, Web server, and browser independent, and use XML messages on TCP sockets to communicate with distributed Application Component processes. The BUS is a flexible Component that is intended to improve consistency and flexibility in Web interface design and Application maintenance. The BUS is also an integration Component that can connect a custom user interface to multiple distributed Application Components.

Brent Byunghoon Kang - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Lord of the x86 Rings: A Portable User Mode Privilege Separation Architecture on x86.
    arXiv: Cryptography and Security, 2018
    Co-Authors: Ho-joon Lee, Chihyun Song, Brent Byunghoon Kang
    Abstract:

    Modern Applications are increasingly advanced and complex, and inevitably contain exploitable software bugs despite the ongoing efforts. The Applications today often involve processing of sensitive information. However, the lack of privilege separation within the user space leaves sensitive Application secret such as cryptographic keys just as unprotected as a "hello world" string. Cutting-edge hardware-supported security features are being introduced. However, the features are often vendor-specific or lack compatibility with older generations of the processors. The situation leaves developers with no portable solution to incorporate protection for the sensitive Application Component. We propose LOTRx86, a fundamental and portable approach for user space privilege separation. Our approach creates a more privileged user execution layer called PrivUser through harnessing the underused intermediate privilege levels on the x86 architecture. The PrivUser memory space, a set of pages within process address space that are inaccessible to user mode, is a safe place for Application secrets and routines that access them. We implement the LOTRx86 ABI that exports the privilege-based, accessing the protected Application secret only requires a change in the privilege, eliminating the need for costly remote procedure calls or change in address space. We evaluated our platform by developing a proof-of-concept LOTRx86-enabled web server that employs our architecture to securely access its private key during SSL connection and thereby mitigating the HeartBleed vulnerability by design. We conducted a set of experiments including a performance measurement on the PoC on both Intel and AMD PCs, and confirmed that LOTRx86 incurs only a limited performance overhead.

Kang, Brent Byunghoon - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Lord of the x86 Rings: A Portable User Mode Privilege Separation Architecture on x86
    2018
    Co-Authors: Lee Hojoon, Song Chihyun, Kang, Brent Byunghoon
    Abstract:

    Modern Applications often involve processing of sensitive information. However, the lack of privilege separation within the user space leaves sensitive Application secret such as cryptographic keys just as unprotected as a "hello world" string. Cutting-edge hardware-supported security features are being introduced. However, the features are often vendor-specific or lack compatibility with older generations of the processors. The situation leaves developers with no portable solution to incorporate protection for the sensitive Application Component. We propose LOTRx86, a fundamental and portable approach for user-space privilege separation. Our approach creates a more privileged user execution layer called PrivUser by harnessing the underused intermediate privilege levels on the x86 architecture. The PrivUser memory space, a set of pages within process address space that are inaccessible to user mode, is a safe place for Application secrets and routines that access them. We implement the LOTRx86 ABI that exports the privcall interface to users to invoke secret handling routines in PrivUser. This way, sensitive Application operations that involve the secrets are performed in a strictly controlled manner. The memory access control in our architecture is privilege-based, accessing the protected Application secret only requires a change in the privilege, eliminating the need for costly remote procedure calls or change in address space. We evaluated our platform by developing a proof-of-concept LOTRx86-enabled web server that employs our architecture to securely access its private key during an SSL connection. We conducted a set of experiments including a performance measurement on the PoC on both Intel and AMD PCs, and confirmed that LOTRx86 incurs only a limited performance overhead

Ho-joon Lee - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Lord of the x86 Rings: A Portable User Mode Privilege Separation Architecture on x86.
    arXiv: Cryptography and Security, 2018
    Co-Authors: Ho-joon Lee, Chihyun Song, Brent Byunghoon Kang
    Abstract:

    Modern Applications are increasingly advanced and complex, and inevitably contain exploitable software bugs despite the ongoing efforts. The Applications today often involve processing of sensitive information. However, the lack of privilege separation within the user space leaves sensitive Application secret such as cryptographic keys just as unprotected as a "hello world" string. Cutting-edge hardware-supported security features are being introduced. However, the features are often vendor-specific or lack compatibility with older generations of the processors. The situation leaves developers with no portable solution to incorporate protection for the sensitive Application Component. We propose LOTRx86, a fundamental and portable approach for user space privilege separation. Our approach creates a more privileged user execution layer called PrivUser through harnessing the underused intermediate privilege levels on the x86 architecture. The PrivUser memory space, a set of pages within process address space that are inaccessible to user mode, is a safe place for Application secrets and routines that access them. We implement the LOTRx86 ABI that exports the privilege-based, accessing the protected Application secret only requires a change in the privilege, eliminating the need for costly remote procedure calls or change in address space. We evaluated our platform by developing a proof-of-concept LOTRx86-enabled web server that employs our architecture to securely access its private key during SSL connection and thereby mitigating the HeartBleed vulnerability by design. We conducted a set of experiments including a performance measurement on the PoC on both Intel and AMD PCs, and confirmed that LOTRx86 incurs only a limited performance overhead.

Lee Hojoon - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Lord of the x86 Rings: A Portable User Mode Privilege Separation Architecture on x86
    2018
    Co-Authors: Lee Hojoon, Song Chihyun, Kang, Brent Byunghoon
    Abstract:

    Modern Applications often involve processing of sensitive information. However, the lack of privilege separation within the user space leaves sensitive Application secret such as cryptographic keys just as unprotected as a "hello world" string. Cutting-edge hardware-supported security features are being introduced. However, the features are often vendor-specific or lack compatibility with older generations of the processors. The situation leaves developers with no portable solution to incorporate protection for the sensitive Application Component. We propose LOTRx86, a fundamental and portable approach for user-space privilege separation. Our approach creates a more privileged user execution layer called PrivUser by harnessing the underused intermediate privilege levels on the x86 architecture. The PrivUser memory space, a set of pages within process address space that are inaccessible to user mode, is a safe place for Application secrets and routines that access them. We implement the LOTRx86 ABI that exports the privcall interface to users to invoke secret handling routines in PrivUser. This way, sensitive Application operations that involve the secrets are performed in a strictly controlled manner. The memory access control in our architecture is privilege-based, accessing the protected Application secret only requires a change in the privilege, eliminating the need for costly remote procedure calls or change in address space. We evaluated our platform by developing a proof-of-concept LOTRx86-enabled web server that employs our architecture to securely access its private key during an SSL connection. We conducted a set of experiments including a performance measurement on the PoC on both Intel and AMD PCs, and confirmed that LOTRx86 incurs only a limited performance overhead