The Experts below are selected from a list of 273 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Pablo Sánchez - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Simulation of attacks for security in wireless sensor network
Sensors (Switzerland), 2016Co-Authors: Alvaro Diaz, Pablo SánchezAbstract:The increasing complexity and low-power constraints of current Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN) require efficient methodologies for network simulation and embedded software performance analysis of nodes. In addition, security is also a very important feature that has to be addressed in most WSNs, since they may work with sensitive data and operate in hostile unattended environments. In this paper, a methodology for security analysis of Wireless Sensor Networks is presented. The methodology allows designing attack-aware embedded software/firmware or attack countermeasures to provide security in WSNs. The proposed methodology includes Attacker Modeling and attack simulation with performance analysis (node's software execution time and power consumption estimation). After an analysis of different WSN attack types, an Attacker Model is proposed. This Model defines three different types of Attackers that can emulate most WSN attacks. In addition, this paper presents a virtual platform that is able to Model the node hardware, embedded software and basic wireless channel features. This virtual simulation analyzes the embedded software behavior and node power consumption while it takes into account the network deployment and topology. Additionally, this simulator integrates the previously mentioned Attacker Model. Thus, the impact of attacks on power consumption and software behavior/execution-time can be analyzed. This provides developers with essential information about the effects that one or multiple attacks could have on the network, helping them to develop more secure WSN systems. This WSN attack simulator is an essential element of the attack-aware embedded software development methodology that is also introduced in this work.
Wassim Itani - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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centera a centralized trust based efficient routing protocol with authentication for wireless sensor networks
Sensors, 2015Co-Authors: Ayman Tajeddine, Ayman Kayssi, Ali Chehab, Imad H Elhajj, Wassim ItaniAbstract:In this paper, we present CENTERA, a CENtralized Trust-based Efficient Routing protocol with an appropriate authentication scheme for wireless sensor networks (WSN). CENTERA utilizes the more powerful base station (BS) to gather minimal neighbor trust information from nodes and calculate the best routes after isolating different types of “bad” nodes. By periodically accumulating these simple local observations and approximating the nodes' battery lives, the BS draws a global view of the network, calculates three quality metrics—maliciousness, cooperation, and compatibility—and evaluates the Data Trust and Forwarding Trust values of each node. Based on these metrics, the BS isolates “bad”, “misbehaving” or malicious nodes for a certain period, and put some nodes on probation. CENTERA increases the node's bad/probation level with repeated “bad” behavior, and decreases it otherwise. Then it uses a very efficient method to distribute the routing information to “good” nodes. Based on its target environment, and if required, CENTERA uses an authentication scheme suitable for severely constrained nodes, ranging from the symmetric RC5 for safe environments under close administration, to pairing-based cryptography (PBC) for hostile environments with a strong Attacker Model. We simulate CENTERA using TOSSIM and verify its correctness and show some energy calculations.
Mohammad Torabi Dashti - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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complexity of fairness constraints for the dolev yao Attacker Model
ACM Symposium on Applied Computing, 2011Co-Authors: Jan Cederquist, Mohammad Torabi DashtiAbstract:Liveness properties do, in general, not hold in the Dolev-Yao Attacker Model, unless we assume that certain communication channels are resilient, i.e. they do not lose messages. The resilient channels assumption can be seen as a fairness constraint for the Dolev-Yao Attacker Model. Here we study the complexity of expressing such fairness constraints for the most common interpretation of the Dolev-Yao Model, in which the Attacker is the communication medium. We give reference Models which describe how resilient channels behave, with unbounded and bounded communication buffers. Then we show that, for checking liveness security requirements, any fairness constraint that makes this common interpretation of the Dolev-Yao Model sound and complete w.r.t. the unbounded (resp. bounded) reference Model is not an ω-regular (resp. locally testable) language. These results stem from the complexity of precisely capturing the behavior of resilient channels, and indicate that verification of liveness security requirements in this interpretation of the Dolev-Yao Model cannot be automated efficiently.
Alvaro Diaz - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Simulation of attacks for security in wireless sensor network
Sensors (Switzerland), 2016Co-Authors: Alvaro Diaz, Pablo SánchezAbstract:The increasing complexity and low-power constraints of current Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN) require efficient methodologies for network simulation and embedded software performance analysis of nodes. In addition, security is also a very important feature that has to be addressed in most WSNs, since they may work with sensitive data and operate in hostile unattended environments. In this paper, a methodology for security analysis of Wireless Sensor Networks is presented. The methodology allows designing attack-aware embedded software/firmware or attack countermeasures to provide security in WSNs. The proposed methodology includes Attacker Modeling and attack simulation with performance analysis (node's software execution time and power consumption estimation). After an analysis of different WSN attack types, an Attacker Model is proposed. This Model defines three different types of Attackers that can emulate most WSN attacks. In addition, this paper presents a virtual platform that is able to Model the node hardware, embedded software and basic wireless channel features. This virtual simulation analyzes the embedded software behavior and node power consumption while it takes into account the network deployment and topology. Additionally, this simulator integrates the previously mentioned Attacker Model. Thus, the impact of attacks on power consumption and software behavior/execution-time can be analyzed. This provides developers with essential information about the effects that one or multiple attacks could have on the network, helping them to develop more secure WSN systems. This WSN attack simulator is an essential element of the attack-aware embedded software development methodology that is also introduced in this work.
Jérémy Thibault - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Journey Beyond Full Abstraction: Exploring Robust Property Preservation for Secure Compilation
2019 IEEE 32nd Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF), 2019Co-Authors: Carmine Abate, Roberto Blanco, Catalin Hritcu, Marco Patrignani, Deepak Garg, Jérémy ThibaultAbstract:Good programming languages provide helpful abstractions for writing secure code, but the security properties of the source language are generally not preserved when compiling a program and linking it with adversarial code in a low-level target language (e.g., a library or a legacy application). Linked target code that is compromised or malicious may, for instance, read and write the compiled program's data and code, jump to arbitrary memory locations, or smash the stack, blatantly violating any source-level abstraction. By contrast, a fully abstract compilation chain protects source-level abstractions all the way down, ensuring that linked adversarial target code cannot observe more about the compiled program than what some linked source code could about the source program. However, while research in this area has so far focused on preserving observational equivalence, as needed for achieving full abstraction, there is a much larger space of security properties one can choose to preserve against linked adversarial code. And the precise class of security properties one chooses crucially impacts not only the supported security goals and the strength of the Attacker Model, but also the kind of protections a secure compilation chain has to introduce. We are the first to thoroughly explore a large space of formal secure compilation criteria based on robust property preservation, i.e., the preservation of properties satisfied against arbitrary adversarial contexts. We study robustly preserving various classes of trace properties such as safety, of hyperproperties such as noninterference, and of relational hyperproperties such as trace equivalence. This leads to many new secure compilation criteria, some of which are easier to practically achieve and prove than full abstraction, and some of which provide strictly stronger security guarantees. For each of the studied criteria we propose an equivalent “property-free” characterization that clarifies which proof techniques apply. For relational properties and hyperproperties, which relate the behaviors of multiple programs, our formal definitions of the property classes themselves are novel. We order our criteria by their relative strength and show several collapses and separation results. Finally, we adapt existing proof techniques to show that even the strongest of our secure compilation criteria, the robust preservation of all relational hyperproperties, is achievable for a simple translation from a statically typed to a dynamically typed language.