The Experts below are selected from a list of 3900 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Jonathan Gluck - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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De-identification Methods for Open Health Data: The Case of the Heritage Health Prize Claims Dataset
Journal of medical Internet research, 2012Co-Authors: Khaled El Emam, Luk Arbuckle, Gunes Koru, Benjamin Eze, Lisa Gaudette, Emilio Neri, Sean Rose, Jeremy T. Howard, Jonathan GluckAbstract:Background: There are many benefits to open datasets. However, privacy concerns have hampered the widespread creation of open health data. There is a dearth of documented methods and case studies for the creation of public-use health data. We describe a new methodology for creating a longitudinal public health dataset in the context of the Heritage Health Prize (HHP). The HHP is a global data mining competition to predict, by using claims data, the number of days patients will be hospitalized in a subsequent year. The winner will be the team or individual with the most accurate model past a threshold accuracy, and will receive a US $3 million cash prize. HHP began on April 4, 2011, and ends on April 3, 2013. Objective: To de-identify the claims data used in the HHP competition and ensure that it meets the requirements in the US Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) Privacy Rule. Methods: We defined a threshold risk consistent with the HIPAA Privacy Rule Safe Harbor standard for disclosing the competition dataset. Three plausible re-identification Attacks that can be executed on these data were identified. For each Attack the re-identification probability was evaluated. If it was deemed too high then a new de-identification algorithm was applied to reduce the risk to an acceptable level. We performed an actual evaluation of re-identification risk using simulated Attacks and matching experiments to confirm the results of the de-identification and to test sensitivity to assumptions. The main metric used to evaluate re-identification risk was the probability that a record in the HHP data can be re-identified given an Attempted Attack. Results: An evaluation of the de-identified dataset estimated that the probability of re-identifying an individual was .0084, below the .05 probability threshold specified for the competition. The risk was robust to violations of our initial assumptions. Conclusions: It was possible to ensure that the probability of re-identification for a large longitudinal dataset was acceptably low when it was released for a global user community in support of an analytics competition. This is an example of, and methodology for, achieving open data principles for longitudinal health data. [J Med Internet Res 2012;14(1):e33]
Khaled El Emam - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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De-identification Methods for Open Health Data: The Case of the Heritage Health Prize Claims Dataset
Journal of medical Internet research, 2012Co-Authors: Khaled El Emam, Luk Arbuckle, Gunes Koru, Benjamin Eze, Lisa Gaudette, Emilio Neri, Sean Rose, Jeremy T. Howard, Jonathan GluckAbstract:Background: There are many benefits to open datasets. However, privacy concerns have hampered the widespread creation of open health data. There is a dearth of documented methods and case studies for the creation of public-use health data. We describe a new methodology for creating a longitudinal public health dataset in the context of the Heritage Health Prize (HHP). The HHP is a global data mining competition to predict, by using claims data, the number of days patients will be hospitalized in a subsequent year. The winner will be the team or individual with the most accurate model past a threshold accuracy, and will receive a US $3 million cash prize. HHP began on April 4, 2011, and ends on April 3, 2013. Objective: To de-identify the claims data used in the HHP competition and ensure that it meets the requirements in the US Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) Privacy Rule. Methods: We defined a threshold risk consistent with the HIPAA Privacy Rule Safe Harbor standard for disclosing the competition dataset. Three plausible re-identification Attacks that can be executed on these data were identified. For each Attack the re-identification probability was evaluated. If it was deemed too high then a new de-identification algorithm was applied to reduce the risk to an acceptable level. We performed an actual evaluation of re-identification risk using simulated Attacks and matching experiments to confirm the results of the de-identification and to test sensitivity to assumptions. The main metric used to evaluate re-identification risk was the probability that a record in the HHP data can be re-identified given an Attempted Attack. Results: An evaluation of the de-identified dataset estimated that the probability of re-identifying an individual was .0084, below the .05 probability threshold specified for the competition. The risk was robust to violations of our initial assumptions. Conclusions: It was possible to ensure that the probability of re-identification for a large longitudinal dataset was acceptably low when it was released for a global user community in support of an analytics competition. This is an example of, and methodology for, achieving open data principles for longitudinal health data. [J Med Internet Res 2012;14(1):e33]
Emilio Neri - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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De-identification Methods for Open Health Data: The Case of the Heritage Health Prize Claims Dataset
Journal of medical Internet research, 2012Co-Authors: Khaled El Emam, Luk Arbuckle, Gunes Koru, Benjamin Eze, Lisa Gaudette, Emilio Neri, Sean Rose, Jeremy T. Howard, Jonathan GluckAbstract:Background: There are many benefits to open datasets. However, privacy concerns have hampered the widespread creation of open health data. There is a dearth of documented methods and case studies for the creation of public-use health data. We describe a new methodology for creating a longitudinal public health dataset in the context of the Heritage Health Prize (HHP). The HHP is a global data mining competition to predict, by using claims data, the number of days patients will be hospitalized in a subsequent year. The winner will be the team or individual with the most accurate model past a threshold accuracy, and will receive a US $3 million cash prize. HHP began on April 4, 2011, and ends on April 3, 2013. Objective: To de-identify the claims data used in the HHP competition and ensure that it meets the requirements in the US Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) Privacy Rule. Methods: We defined a threshold risk consistent with the HIPAA Privacy Rule Safe Harbor standard for disclosing the competition dataset. Three plausible re-identification Attacks that can be executed on these data were identified. For each Attack the re-identification probability was evaluated. If it was deemed too high then a new de-identification algorithm was applied to reduce the risk to an acceptable level. We performed an actual evaluation of re-identification risk using simulated Attacks and matching experiments to confirm the results of the de-identification and to test sensitivity to assumptions. The main metric used to evaluate re-identification risk was the probability that a record in the HHP data can be re-identified given an Attempted Attack. Results: An evaluation of the de-identified dataset estimated that the probability of re-identifying an individual was .0084, below the .05 probability threshold specified for the competition. The risk was robust to violations of our initial assumptions. Conclusions: It was possible to ensure that the probability of re-identification for a large longitudinal dataset was acceptably low when it was released for a global user community in support of an analytics competition. This is an example of, and methodology for, achieving open data principles for longitudinal health data. [J Med Internet Res 2012;14(1):e33]
Sean Rose - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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De-identification Methods for Open Health Data: The Case of the Heritage Health Prize Claims Dataset
Journal of medical Internet research, 2012Co-Authors: Khaled El Emam, Luk Arbuckle, Gunes Koru, Benjamin Eze, Lisa Gaudette, Emilio Neri, Sean Rose, Jeremy T. Howard, Jonathan GluckAbstract:Background: There are many benefits to open datasets. However, privacy concerns have hampered the widespread creation of open health data. There is a dearth of documented methods and case studies for the creation of public-use health data. We describe a new methodology for creating a longitudinal public health dataset in the context of the Heritage Health Prize (HHP). The HHP is a global data mining competition to predict, by using claims data, the number of days patients will be hospitalized in a subsequent year. The winner will be the team or individual with the most accurate model past a threshold accuracy, and will receive a US $3 million cash prize. HHP began on April 4, 2011, and ends on April 3, 2013. Objective: To de-identify the claims data used in the HHP competition and ensure that it meets the requirements in the US Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) Privacy Rule. Methods: We defined a threshold risk consistent with the HIPAA Privacy Rule Safe Harbor standard for disclosing the competition dataset. Three plausible re-identification Attacks that can be executed on these data were identified. For each Attack the re-identification probability was evaluated. If it was deemed too high then a new de-identification algorithm was applied to reduce the risk to an acceptable level. We performed an actual evaluation of re-identification risk using simulated Attacks and matching experiments to confirm the results of the de-identification and to test sensitivity to assumptions. The main metric used to evaluate re-identification risk was the probability that a record in the HHP data can be re-identified given an Attempted Attack. Results: An evaluation of the de-identified dataset estimated that the probability of re-identifying an individual was .0084, below the .05 probability threshold specified for the competition. The risk was robust to violations of our initial assumptions. Conclusions: It was possible to ensure that the probability of re-identification for a large longitudinal dataset was acceptably low when it was released for a global user community in support of an analytics competition. This is an example of, and methodology for, achieving open data principles for longitudinal health data. [J Med Internet Res 2012;14(1):e33]
Luk Arbuckle - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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De-identification Methods for Open Health Data: The Case of the Heritage Health Prize Claims Dataset
Journal of medical Internet research, 2012Co-Authors: Khaled El Emam, Luk Arbuckle, Gunes Koru, Benjamin Eze, Lisa Gaudette, Emilio Neri, Sean Rose, Jeremy T. Howard, Jonathan GluckAbstract:Background: There are many benefits to open datasets. However, privacy concerns have hampered the widespread creation of open health data. There is a dearth of documented methods and case studies for the creation of public-use health data. We describe a new methodology for creating a longitudinal public health dataset in the context of the Heritage Health Prize (HHP). The HHP is a global data mining competition to predict, by using claims data, the number of days patients will be hospitalized in a subsequent year. The winner will be the team or individual with the most accurate model past a threshold accuracy, and will receive a US $3 million cash prize. HHP began on April 4, 2011, and ends on April 3, 2013. Objective: To de-identify the claims data used in the HHP competition and ensure that it meets the requirements in the US Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) Privacy Rule. Methods: We defined a threshold risk consistent with the HIPAA Privacy Rule Safe Harbor standard for disclosing the competition dataset. Three plausible re-identification Attacks that can be executed on these data were identified. For each Attack the re-identification probability was evaluated. If it was deemed too high then a new de-identification algorithm was applied to reduce the risk to an acceptable level. We performed an actual evaluation of re-identification risk using simulated Attacks and matching experiments to confirm the results of the de-identification and to test sensitivity to assumptions. The main metric used to evaluate re-identification risk was the probability that a record in the HHP data can be re-identified given an Attempted Attack. Results: An evaluation of the de-identified dataset estimated that the probability of re-identifying an individual was .0084, below the .05 probability threshold specified for the competition. The risk was robust to violations of our initial assumptions. Conclusions: It was possible to ensure that the probability of re-identification for a large longitudinal dataset was acceptably low when it was released for a global user community in support of an analytics competition. This is an example of, and methodology for, achieving open data principles for longitudinal health data. [J Med Internet Res 2012;14(1):e33]