The Experts below are selected from a list of 26634 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Ling Tang - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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carbon allowance Auction design of china s emissions trading scheme a multi agent based approach
Energy Policy, 2017Co-Authors: Jiaqian Wu, Ling Tang, Lean YuAbstract:In this paper, a multi-agent-based ETS simulation model is proposed for carbon allowance Auction design in China. In the proposed model, two main agents, i.e., the government (the ETS implementer) and the firms in different sectors (the ETS targets), are considered. Under the ETS policy, all agents make various decisions individually according to their own goals, and interact with each other through three main Markets: the commodity Market, the primary carbon Auction Market and the secondary carbon trading Market. Different popular Auction designs are introduced into the ETS formulation to offer helpful insights into China's ETS design. (1) Generally, the ETS would lead to positive effects on China's carbon mitigation and energy structure improvement, but a negative impact on economy. (2) As for Auction forms, the uniform-price design is relatively moderate, while the discriminative-price design is quite aggressive in both economic damage and emissions reduction. (3) As for carbon price, the uniform-price Auction might generate a slightly higher Market clearing price than the discriminative-price Auction, and the prices under two Auction rules fluctuate about RMB 40 per metric ton. (4) As for carbon cap, the total allowances in the carbon Auction Market should be carefully set to well balance economic growth and mitigation effect.
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carbon allowance Auction design of china s emissions trading scheme a multi agent based approach
Energy Policy, 2017Co-Authors: Jiaqian Wu, Ling Tang, Lean YuAbstract:In this paper, a multi-agent-based ETS simulation model is proposed for carbon allowance Auction design in China. In the proposed model, two main agents, i.e., the government (the ETS implementer) and the firms in different sectors (the ETS targets), are considered. Under the ETS policy, all agents make various decisions individually according to their own goals, and interact with each other through three main Markets: the commodity Market, the primary carbon Auction Market and the secondary carbon trading Market. Different popular Auction designs are introduced into the ETS formulation to offer helpful insights into China's ETS design. (1) Generally, the ETS would lead to positive effects on China's carbon mitigation and energy structure improvement, but a negative impact on economy. (2) As for Auction forms, the uniform-price design is relatively moderate, while the discriminative-price design is quite aggressive in both economic damage and emissions reduction. (3) As for carbon price, the uniform-price Auction might generate a slightly higher Market clearing price than the discriminative-price Auction, and the prices under two Auction rules fluctuate about RMB 40 per metric ton. (4) As for carbon cap, the total allowances in the carbon Auction Market should be carefully set to well balance economic growth and mitigation effect.
Lean Yu - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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carbon allowance Auction design of china s emissions trading scheme a multi agent based approach
Energy Policy, 2017Co-Authors: Jiaqian Wu, Ling Tang, Lean YuAbstract:In this paper, a multi-agent-based ETS simulation model is proposed for carbon allowance Auction design in China. In the proposed model, two main agents, i.e., the government (the ETS implementer) and the firms in different sectors (the ETS targets), are considered. Under the ETS policy, all agents make various decisions individually according to their own goals, and interact with each other through three main Markets: the commodity Market, the primary carbon Auction Market and the secondary carbon trading Market. Different popular Auction designs are introduced into the ETS formulation to offer helpful insights into China's ETS design. (1) Generally, the ETS would lead to positive effects on China's carbon mitigation and energy structure improvement, but a negative impact on economy. (2) As for Auction forms, the uniform-price design is relatively moderate, while the discriminative-price design is quite aggressive in both economic damage and emissions reduction. (3) As for carbon price, the uniform-price Auction might generate a slightly higher Market clearing price than the discriminative-price Auction, and the prices under two Auction rules fluctuate about RMB 40 per metric ton. (4) As for carbon cap, the total allowances in the carbon Auction Market should be carefully set to well balance economic growth and mitigation effect.
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carbon allowance Auction design of china s emissions trading scheme a multi agent based approach
Energy Policy, 2017Co-Authors: Jiaqian Wu, Ling Tang, Lean YuAbstract:In this paper, a multi-agent-based ETS simulation model is proposed for carbon allowance Auction design in China. In the proposed model, two main agents, i.e., the government (the ETS implementer) and the firms in different sectors (the ETS targets), are considered. Under the ETS policy, all agents make various decisions individually according to their own goals, and interact with each other through three main Markets: the commodity Market, the primary carbon Auction Market and the secondary carbon trading Market. Different popular Auction designs are introduced into the ETS formulation to offer helpful insights into China's ETS design. (1) Generally, the ETS would lead to positive effects on China's carbon mitigation and energy structure improvement, but a negative impact on economy. (2) As for Auction forms, the uniform-price design is relatively moderate, while the discriminative-price design is quite aggressive in both economic damage and emissions reduction. (3) As for carbon price, the uniform-price Auction might generate a slightly higher Market clearing price than the discriminative-price Auction, and the prices under two Auction rules fluctuate about RMB 40 per metric ton. (4) As for carbon cap, the total allowances in the carbon Auction Market should be carefully set to well balance economic growth and mitigation effect.
Seow Eng Ong - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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price discovery in real estate Auctions the story of unsuccessful attempts
Social Science Research Network, 2006Co-Authors: Seow Eng OngAbstract:Little is known of the effects of the Auction mechanism in relation to post-Auction Market sales. This empirical study of unsuccessful Auctions shows that approximately half of these properties were eventually sold via private negotiations, at higher prices relative to last bids. The probability of a subsequent postAuction transaction is significantly higher for apartments and terrace houses and when Auction turnout is high; and lower in the absence of any bid and in some years. In addition, downward evisions to the opening bid improve the probability of subsequent sale. Prices of subsequent re-Auctioned and privately negotiated sales decline with time to sale, consistent with the search process explanation.
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price discovery in real estate Auctions the story of unsuccessful attempts
Journal of Real Estate Research, 2006Co-Authors: Seow Eng OngAbstract:Little is known of the effects of the Auction mechanism in relation to post-Auction Market sales. This empirical study of unsuccessful Auctions shows that approximately half of these properties wer...
Robert Wilson - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Supply function equilibrium in a constrained transmission system
2015Co-Authors: Robert WilsonAbstract:Abstract. This paper characterizes equilibrium in an Auction Market constrained by limited capacities of links in a transportation network. The formulation is adapted to a wholesale spot Market for electricity managed by the operator of the transmission system. This paper derives conditions that characterize equilibrium in an Auction Market of the kind conducted by system operators in the electricity industry. These are wholesale spot Markets in which the participants are suppliers (generators) and demanders (utilities and other load-serving entities). Because these participants are spatially distributed, the operator’s allocation of production and consumption of electrical energy is constrained by the capacities of links in the transmission system. Moreover, storage is infeasible, supply must continually match demand, and both net demand and transmission capacities are affected by random shocks. Therefore, participants submit notional supply or demand functions in advance and then in each contingency the operator uses these functions to determine an optimal allocation. 1 Financial settlements in such Markets use locational marginal pricing, also called nodal pricing. The operator chooses the allocation in each contingency to maximize the apparent gain from trade subject to the feasibility constraints imposed by limited transmission capacities. (This is the gain from trade “as bid ” since the operator treats each supply function as though it reflects the actual marginal cost of production.) This optimization results in a vector λ = (p, µ) of Lagrange multipliers on the energy and capacity constraints. Then a supplier j for which each unit of energy output uses u ij units of capacity on transmission link i is paid its “nodal ” price p j = p
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supply function equilibrium in a constrained transmission system
Operations Research, 2008Co-Authors: Robert WilsonAbstract:This paper characterizes a supply function equilibrium in an Auction Market constrained by limited capacities of links in a transportation network and limited input/output capacities of participants. The formulation is adapted to a wholesale spot Market for electricity managed by the operator of the transmission system. The results are derived using the calculus of variations to obtain the Euler conditions and the transversality conditions that characterize a Nash equilibrium in an Auction in which bids are as supply functions, and quantities and payments are based either on nodal prices or pay-as-bid.
Jiaqian Wu - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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carbon allowance Auction design of china s emissions trading scheme a multi agent based approach
Energy Policy, 2017Co-Authors: Jiaqian Wu, Ling Tang, Lean YuAbstract:In this paper, a multi-agent-based ETS simulation model is proposed for carbon allowance Auction design in China. In the proposed model, two main agents, i.e., the government (the ETS implementer) and the firms in different sectors (the ETS targets), are considered. Under the ETS policy, all agents make various decisions individually according to their own goals, and interact with each other through three main Markets: the commodity Market, the primary carbon Auction Market and the secondary carbon trading Market. Different popular Auction designs are introduced into the ETS formulation to offer helpful insights into China's ETS design. (1) Generally, the ETS would lead to positive effects on China's carbon mitigation and energy structure improvement, but a negative impact on economy. (2) As for Auction forms, the uniform-price design is relatively moderate, while the discriminative-price design is quite aggressive in both economic damage and emissions reduction. (3) As for carbon price, the uniform-price Auction might generate a slightly higher Market clearing price than the discriminative-price Auction, and the prices under two Auction rules fluctuate about RMB 40 per metric ton. (4) As for carbon cap, the total allowances in the carbon Auction Market should be carefully set to well balance economic growth and mitigation effect.
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carbon allowance Auction design of china s emissions trading scheme a multi agent based approach
Energy Policy, 2017Co-Authors: Jiaqian Wu, Ling Tang, Lean YuAbstract:In this paper, a multi-agent-based ETS simulation model is proposed for carbon allowance Auction design in China. In the proposed model, two main agents, i.e., the government (the ETS implementer) and the firms in different sectors (the ETS targets), are considered. Under the ETS policy, all agents make various decisions individually according to their own goals, and interact with each other through three main Markets: the commodity Market, the primary carbon Auction Market and the secondary carbon trading Market. Different popular Auction designs are introduced into the ETS formulation to offer helpful insights into China's ETS design. (1) Generally, the ETS would lead to positive effects on China's carbon mitigation and energy structure improvement, but a negative impact on economy. (2) As for Auction forms, the uniform-price design is relatively moderate, while the discriminative-price design is quite aggressive in both economic damage and emissions reduction. (3) As for carbon price, the uniform-price Auction might generate a slightly higher Market clearing price than the discriminative-price Auction, and the prices under two Auction rules fluctuate about RMB 40 per metric ton. (4) As for carbon cap, the total allowances in the carbon Auction Market should be carefully set to well balance economic growth and mitigation effect.
