The Experts below are selected from a list of 243 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Luigi Siciliani - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
-
Average-Cost Pricing and Dynamic Selection Incentives in the Hospital Sector.
Health economics, 2016Co-Authors: Mathias Kifmann, Luigi SicilianiAbstract:This study investigates dynamic incentives to select patients for hospitals that are remunerated according to a prospective payment system of the diagnosis-related group (DRG) type. Using a model with patients differing in severity within a DRG, we show that price dynamics depend on the extent of hospital altruism and the relation between patients' severity and benefit. Upwards and downwards price movements over time are both possible. In a steady state, DRG prices are unlikely to give optimal incentives to treat patients. Depending on the level of altruism, too few or too many patients are treated. DRG Pricing may also give incentives to treat low-severity patients even though high-severity patients should be treated. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
-
Average-Cost Pricing and Dynamic Selection Incentives in the Hospital Sector
Social Science Research Network, 2014Co-Authors: Mathias Kifmann, Luigi SicilianiAbstract:This study investigates hospitals’ dynamic incentives to select patients when hospitals are remunerated according to a prospective payment system of the DRG type. Given that prices typically reflect past Average Costs, we use a discrete-time dynamic framework. Patients differ in severity within a DRG. Providers are to some extent altruistic. For low altruism, a downward spiral of prices is possible which induces hospitals to focus on low-severity cases. For high altruism, dynamic price adjustment depends on relation between patients’ severity and benefit. In a steady state, DRG prices are unlikely to give optimal incentives to treat patients.
Ramón J. Torregrosa - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
-
Financing a Nationalized Monopoly: Coase's Versus Hotelling-Lerner's Solution
Public Finance Review, 1998Co-Authors: Ramón J. TorregrosaAbstract:In 1946, Coase rejected Hotelling-Lerner's solution for financing a nationalized monopoly on the grounds that any tax structure could distort relative prices. In monopoly where two-part tariffs are infeasible, Coase suggested Average Cost Pricing as a noninfenor solution to the above policy. This article shows that, in a general equilibrium model, it is possible to choose a distortionary Hotelling-Lerner's tax policy that is superior to Average Cost Pricing.
-
Financing a nationalized monopoly: Coase's versus hotelling-lerner's solution
Research Papers in Economics, 1996Co-Authors: Ramón J. TorregrosaAbstract:Coase (1946) rejected the superiority of Hotelling-Lemer solution upon Average-Cost Pricing in face to fmance a nationalized monopoly due to taxes being distortionary. In this paper, we show that this conjecture is not general1y true. According to the utilitarian criterion, we find a distortionary Hotelling-Lel'l1er tax policy which improves upon the Average Cost Pricing. Coase (1946) rechazo la superioridad de la solucion de Hotelling-Lemer sobre el equilibrio precio-Coste medio debido a la distorsion causada por los impuestos. En este trabajo se muestra que esta conjetura no es cierta en general. Encontrando que, de acuerdo con el criterio utilitarista, es posible una politica fiscal Hotelling-Lel'l1er distorsionante que mejora el equilibrio precio-Coste medio.
Hervé Moulin - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
-
Distributive and Additive Costsharing of an Homogeneous Good
Games and Economic Behavior, 1999Co-Authors: Hervé Moulin, Scott ShenkerAbstract:Abstract Individual users demand different quantities of a homogeneous good produced under variable returns. We describe the family of Costsharing methods that allocate Costs in proportion to demands when returns are constant, and commute with the additivity and composition of Cost functions. Two simple such methods are Average Cost Pricing and incremental Costsharing. All other methods in the family combine elements of the Average Cost and incremental ones. Serial Costsharing stands out prominently in the family, whereas the Shapley–Shubik method, and all values from the associated stand alone cooperative game, are excluded.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: D63, C71.
-
Cost Sharing Under Increasing Returns: A Comparison of Simple Mechanisms
SSRN Electronic Journal, 1997Co-Authors: Hervé MoulinAbstract:A technology with decreasing marginal Costs is used by agents with equal rights. Each agent demands a quantity of output and Costs are divided by means of a fixed formula. Several such mechanisms are compared for the existence of Nash equilibrium demand profiles and for the equity properties of these equilibria. Among three mechanisms, Average Cost Pricing, the Shapley-Shubik Cost sharing and serial Cost-sharing, only the latter two possess at least one Nash equilibrium on a reasonable domain of individual preferences. Only the serial Cost sharing equilibria pass the equity tests of No Envy and Stand Alone Cost.
-
Cost Sharing under Increasing Returns: A Comparison of Simple Mechanisms
Games and Economic Behavior, 1996Co-Authors: Hervé MoulinAbstract:A technology with decreasing marginal Costs is used by agents with equal rights. Each agent demands a quantity of output and Costs are divided by means of a fixed formula. Several such mechanisms are compared for the existence of Nash equilibrium demand profiles and for the equity properties of these equilibria. Among three mechanisms, Average Cost Pricing, the Shapley–Shubik Cost sharing, and serial Cost-sharing, only the latter two possess at least one Nash equilibrium on a reasonable domain of individual preferences. Only the serial Cost sharing equilibria pass the equity tests of No Envy and Stand Alone Cost.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: C72, D63.
-
Three Methods to Share Joint Costs or Surplus
Research Papers in Economics, 1995Co-Authors: Eric J. Friedman, Hervé MoulinAbstract:We study Cost sharing methods with variable demands of heterogeneous goods, additive in the Cost function and meeting the Dummy axiom. We consider four axioms: Scale Invariance (SI); Demand Monotonicity (DM); Upper Bound for Homogeneous Goods (UBH) placing a natural cap on Cost shares when goods are homogeneous; Average Cost Pricing for Homogeneous Goods (ACPH). The random order values based on Stand Alone Costs are characterized by SI and DM. Serial Costsharing, by DM and UB; the Aumann-Shapley Pricing method, by SI and ACPH. No other combination of the four axioms is compatible with Additivity and Dummy.
-
Average Cost Pricing versus Serial Cost Sharing: An Axiomatic Comparison
Journal of Economic Theory, 1994Co-Authors: Hervé Moulin, Scott ShenkerAbstract:Abstract A finite group of agents share a (one output) production function. A Cost sharing rule allocates the total Cost among the users for every conceivable profile of output demands. We investigate the space of possible Cost sharing rules from an axiomatic perspective. We provide two characterizations of Average Cost Pricing, one based on the axioms of Additivity and Monotonicity (both with respect to the Cost function), and the other based on the axioms of Additivity and a version of Consistency. We also provide a characterization of serial Cost sharing based, essentially, on Additivity and a Free Lunch axiom. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D63, D78, C79.
Mathias Kifmann - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
-
Average-Cost Pricing and Dynamic Selection Incentives in the Hospital Sector.
Health economics, 2016Co-Authors: Mathias Kifmann, Luigi SicilianiAbstract:This study investigates dynamic incentives to select patients for hospitals that are remunerated according to a prospective payment system of the diagnosis-related group (DRG) type. Using a model with patients differing in severity within a DRG, we show that price dynamics depend on the extent of hospital altruism and the relation between patients' severity and benefit. Upwards and downwards price movements over time are both possible. In a steady state, DRG prices are unlikely to give optimal incentives to treat patients. Depending on the level of altruism, too few or too many patients are treated. DRG Pricing may also give incentives to treat low-severity patients even though high-severity patients should be treated. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
-
Average-Cost Pricing and Dynamic Selection Incentives in the Hospital Sector
Social Science Research Network, 2014Co-Authors: Mathias Kifmann, Luigi SicilianiAbstract:This study investigates hospitals’ dynamic incentives to select patients when hospitals are remunerated according to a prospective payment system of the DRG type. Given that prices typically reflect past Average Costs, we use a discrete-time dynamic framework. Patients differ in severity within a DRG. Providers are to some extent altruistic. For low altruism, a downward spiral of prices is possible which induces hospitals to focus on low-severity cases. For high altruism, dynamic price adjustment depends on relation between patients’ severity and benefit. In a steady state, DRG prices are unlikely to give optimal incentives to treat patients.
Scott Shenker - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
-
Distributive and Additive Costsharing of an Homogeneous Good
Games and Economic Behavior, 1999Co-Authors: Hervé Moulin, Scott ShenkerAbstract:Abstract Individual users demand different quantities of a homogeneous good produced under variable returns. We describe the family of Costsharing methods that allocate Costs in proportion to demands when returns are constant, and commute with the additivity and composition of Cost functions. Two simple such methods are Average Cost Pricing and incremental Costsharing. All other methods in the family combine elements of the Average Cost and incremental ones. Serial Costsharing stands out prominently in the family, whereas the Shapley–Shubik method, and all values from the associated stand alone cooperative game, are excluded.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: D63, C71.
-
Average Cost Pricing versus Serial Cost Sharing: An Axiomatic Comparison
Journal of Economic Theory, 1994Co-Authors: Hervé Moulin, Scott ShenkerAbstract:Abstract A finite group of agents share a (one output) production function. A Cost sharing rule allocates the total Cost among the users for every conceivable profile of output demands. We investigate the space of possible Cost sharing rules from an axiomatic perspective. We provide two characterizations of Average Cost Pricing, one based on the axioms of Additivity and Monotonicity (both with respect to the Cost function), and the other based on the axioms of Additivity and a version of Consistency. We also provide a characterization of serial Cost sharing based, essentially, on Additivity and a Free Lunch axiom. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D63, D78, C79.
