Banking Regulation

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Luca Amorello - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • beyond the horizon of Banking Regulation what to expect from basel iv
    Social Science Research Network, 2016
    Co-Authors: Luca Amorello
    Abstract:

    Since its inception, the Basel III international regulatory framework for banks has manifested a number of weaknesses in tackling the idiosyncratic and systemic risks arising from highly leveraged credit institutions. The continuing reliance on internal rating models to calculate capital requirements and the loss-absorbing capacity of prudential buffers have come under severe scrutiny by competent authorities. Against this backdrop, rumors of new structural reforms in Banking Regulation have started spreading into the G20 financial markets. The re-modulation of international capital and disclosure requirements for global banks — already labeled the “Basel IV package” — seems to be emerging, and the potential impact on the industry as a whole is likely to be significant. Sketching what might be the major elements of this new regulatory proposal is therefore critical for predicting how global banks will need to adjust their risk management and governance structure in the upcoming years.

Adam B Ashcraft - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • shadow Banking Regulation
    Review of Financial Economics, 2012
    Co-Authors: Tobias Adrian, Adam B Ashcraft
    Abstract:

    Shadow banks conduct credit intermediation without direct, explicit access to public sources of liquidity and credit guarantees. Shadow banks contributed to the credit boom in the early 2000s and collapsed during the financial crisis of 2007–2009. We review the quickly growing literature on shadow Banking and provide a conceptual framework of shadow Banking Regulation. Since the collapse, regulatory reform efforts have aimed at strengthening the stability of the shadow Banking system. We review these reform efforts for shadow funding sources including asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP), tri-party repurchase agreements (repos), money market mutual funds (MMMFs), and securitization. Despite significant effort by lawmakers, regulators, and accountants, there has been uneven progress in achieving a more stable shadow Banking system.

  • shadow Banking Regulation
    Research Papers in Economics, 2012
    Co-Authors: Tobias Adrian, Adam B Ashcraft
    Abstract:

    Shadow banks conduct credit intermediation without direct, explicit access to public sources of liquidity and credit guarantees. Shadow banks contributed to the credit boom in the early 2000s and collapsed during the financial crisis of 2007-09. We review the rapidly growing literature on shadow Banking and provide a conceptual framework for its Regulation. Since the financial crisis, regulatory reform efforts have aimed at strengthening the stability of the shadow Banking system. We review the implications of these reform efforts for shadow funding sources including asset-backed commercial paper, triparty repurchase agreements, money market mutual funds, and securitization. Despite significant efforts by lawmakers, regulators, and accountants, we find that progress in achieving a more stable shadow Banking system has been uneven.

Tobias Adrian - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • shadow Banking Regulation
    Review of Financial Economics, 2012
    Co-Authors: Tobias Adrian, Adam B Ashcraft
    Abstract:

    Shadow banks conduct credit intermediation without direct, explicit access to public sources of liquidity and credit guarantees. Shadow banks contributed to the credit boom in the early 2000s and collapsed during the financial crisis of 2007–2009. We review the quickly growing literature on shadow Banking and provide a conceptual framework of shadow Banking Regulation. Since the collapse, regulatory reform efforts have aimed at strengthening the stability of the shadow Banking system. We review these reform efforts for shadow funding sources including asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP), tri-party repurchase agreements (repos), money market mutual funds (MMMFs), and securitization. Despite significant effort by lawmakers, regulators, and accountants, there has been uneven progress in achieving a more stable shadow Banking system.

  • shadow Banking Regulation
    Research Papers in Economics, 2012
    Co-Authors: Tobias Adrian, Adam B Ashcraft
    Abstract:

    Shadow banks conduct credit intermediation without direct, explicit access to public sources of liquidity and credit guarantees. Shadow banks contributed to the credit boom in the early 2000s and collapsed during the financial crisis of 2007-09. We review the rapidly growing literature on shadow Banking and provide a conceptual framework for its Regulation. Since the financial crisis, regulatory reform efforts have aimed at strengthening the stability of the shadow Banking system. We review the implications of these reform efforts for shadow funding sources including asset-backed commercial paper, triparty repurchase agreements, money market mutual funds, and securitization. Despite significant efforts by lawmakers, regulators, and accountants, we find that progress in achieving a more stable shadow Banking system has been uneven.

Bertrand Candelon - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • sovereign rating news and financial markets spillovers evidence from the european debt crisis
    Social Science Research Network, 2011
    Co-Authors: Rabah Arezki, Bertrand Candelon
    Abstract:

    This paper examines the spillover effects of sovereign rating news on European financial markets during the period 2007-2010. Our main finding is that sovereign rating downgrades have statistically and economically significant spillover effects both across countries and financial markets. The sign and magnitude of the spillover effects depend both on the type of announcements, the source country experiencing the downgrade and the rating agency from which the announcements originates. However, we also find evidence that downgrades to near speculative grade ratings for relatively large economies such as Greece have a systematic spillover effects across Euro zone countries. Rating-based triggers used in Banking Regulation, CDS contracts, and investment mandates may help explain these results.

Iftekhar Hasan - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • enforcement of Banking Regulation and the cost of borrowing
    Journal of Banking and Finance, 2019
    Co-Authors: Yota Deli, Manthos D Delis, Iftekhar Hasan, Liuling Liu
    Abstract:

    Abstract We show that borrowing firms benefit substantially from important enforcement actions issued on U.S. banks for safety and soundness reasons. Using hand-collected data on such actions from the main three U.S. regulators and syndicated loan deals over the years 1997–2014, we find that enforcement actions decrease the total cost of borrowing by approximately 22 basis points (or $4.6 million interest for the average loan). We attribute our finding to a competition-reputation effect that works over and above the lower risk of punished banks post-enforcement and survives in a number of sensitivity tests. We also find that this effect persists for approximately four years post-enforcement.

  • enforcement of Banking Regulation and the cost of borrowing
    Social Science Research Network, 2018
    Co-Authors: Yota Deli, Manthos D Delis, Iftekhar Hasan, Liuling Liu
    Abstract:

    We show that borrowing firms benefit substantially from important enforcement actions issued on U.S. banks for safety and soundness reasons. Using hand-collected data on such actions from the main three U.S. regulators and syndicated loan deals over the years 1997-2014, we find that enforcement actions decrease the total cost of borrowing by approximately 22 basis points (or $4.6 million interest for the average loan). We attribute our finding to a competition-reputation effect that forces banks to lower their cost of credit, irrespective of other changes in their business models after the enforcement action.

  • the effects of ratings contingent Regulation on international bank lending behavior evidence from the basel 2 accord
    World Scientific Book Chapters, 2018
    Co-Authors: Iftekhar Hasan, Eliza Wu
    Abstract:

    We investigate the effects of credit ratings-contingent financial Regulation on foreign bank lending behavior. We examine the sensitivity of international bank flows to debtor countries’ sovereign credit rating changes before and after the implementation of the Basel 2 risk-based capital regulatory rules. We study the quarterly bilateral flows from G-10 creditor Banking systems to 77 recipient countries over the period Q4:1999 to Q2:2013. We find direct evidence that sovereign credit re-ratings that lead to changes in risk-weights for capital adequacy requirements have become more significant since the implementation of Basel 2 rules for assessing banks’ credit risk under the standardized approach. This evidence is consistent with global banks acting via their international lending decisions to minimize required capital charges associated with the use of ratings-contingent Regulation. We find no evidence to suggest that Banking Regulation induced foreign lending has heightened the perceived sovereign credit risks of recipient countries.