Bioethics

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Ivar R Hannikainen - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • experimental philosophical Bioethics
    Social Science Research Network, 2020
    Co-Authors: Brian D Earp, Joanna Demareecotton, Michael Dunn, Vilius Dranseika, Jim A C Everett, Adam Feltz, Gail Geller, Ivar R Hannikainen
    Abstract:

    There is a rich tradition in Bioethics of gathering empirical data to inform, supplement, or test the implications of normative ethical analysis. To this end, bioethicists have drawn on diverse methods, including qualitative interviews, focus groups, ethnographic studies, and opinion surveys to advance understanding of key issues in Bioethics. In so doing, they have developed strong ties with neighboring disciplines such as anthropology, history, law, and sociology. Collectively, these lines of research have flourished in the broader field of “empirical Bioethics” for more than 30 years. More recently, philosophers from outside the field of Bioethics have similarly employed empirical methods — drawn primarily from psychology, the cognitive sciences, economics, and related disciplines — to advance theoretical debates. This approach, which has come to be called experimental philosophy (or x-phi), relies primarily on controlled experiments to interrogate the concepts, intuitions, reasoning, implicit mental processes, and empirical assumptions about the mind that play a role in traditional philosophical arguments. Within the moral domain, for example, experimental philosophy has begun to contribute to long-standing debates about the nature of moral judgment and reasoning; the sources of our moral emotions and biases; the qualities of a good person or a good life; and the psychological basis of moral theory itself. We believe that experimental philosophical Bioethics — or “bioxphi” — can similarly contribute to bioethical scholarship and debate. Here, we introduce this emerging discipline, explain how it is distinct from empirical Bioethics more broadly construed, and attempt to characterize how it might advance theory and practice in this area.

  • experimental philosophical Bioethics
    AJOB empirical bioethics, 2020
    Co-Authors: Brian D Earp, Joanna Demareecotton, Michael Dunn, Vilius Dranseika, Jim A C Everett, Adam Feltz, Gail Geller, Ivar R Hannikainen
    Abstract:

    There is a rich tradition in Bioethics of gathering empirical data to inform, supplement, or test the implications of normative ethical analysis. To this end, bioethicists have drawn on diverse methods, including qualitative interviews, focus groups, ethnographic studies, and opinion surveys to advance understanding of key issues in Bioethics. In so doing, they have developed strong ties with neighboring disciplines such as anthropology, history, law, and sociology. Collectively, these lines of research have flourished in the broader field of “empirical Bioethics” for more than 30 years (Sugarman & Sulmasy 2010). More recently, philosophers from outside the field of Bioethics have similarly employed empirical methods—drawn primarily from psychology, the cognitive sciences, economics, and related disciplines—to advance theoretical debates. This approach, which has come to be called experimental philosophy (or x-phi), relies primarily on controlled experiments to interrogate the concepts, intuitions, reasoning, implicit mental processes, and empirical assumptions about the mind that play a role in traditional philosophical arguments (Knobe et al. 2012). Within the moral domain, for example, experimental philosophy has begun to contribute to long-standing debates about the nature of moral judgment and reasoning; the sources of our moral emotions and biases; the qualities of a good person or a good life; and the psychological basis of moral theory itself (Alfano, Loeb, & Plakias 2018). We believe that experimental philosophical Bioethics—or “bioxphi”—can similarly explain how it is distinct from empirical Bioethics more broadly construed, and attempt to characterize how it might advance theory and practice in this area.

Raymond De Vries - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • a question of social justice how policies of profit negate engagement of developing world bioethicists and undermine global Bioethics
    American Journal of Bioethics, 2017
    Co-Authors: Subrata Chattopadhyay, Catherine Myser, Tiffany Moxham, Raymond De Vries
    Abstract:

    We identify the ways the policies of leading international Bioethics journals limit the participation of researchers working in the resource-constrained settings of low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) in the development of the field of Bioethics. Lack of access to essential scholarly resources makes it extremely difficult, if not impossible, for many LMIC bioethicists to learn from, meaningfully engage in, and further contribute to the global Bioethics discourse. Underrepresentation of LMIC perspectives in leading journals sustains the hegemony of Western Bioethics, limits the presentation of diverse moral visions of life, health, and medicine, and undermines aspirations to create a truly “global” Bioethics. Limited attention to this problem indicates a lack of empathy and moral imagination on the part of bioethicists in high-income countries, raises questions about the ethics of Bioethics, and highlights the urgent need to find ways to remedy this social injustice.

  • retracted article imperialism in Bioethics how policies of profit negate engagement of developing world bioethicists and undermine global Bioethics
    Journal of Bioethical Inquiry, 2015
    Co-Authors: Subrata Chattopadhyay, Catherine Myser, Raymond De Vries
    Abstract:

    How do Bioethics gatekeepers located in wealthy nations treat Bioethics workers from developing countries? Can the policies of leading international bioeth- ics journals—based on a concern for profit that effectively restrictsaccessfor mostresearchersfrom developingcoun- tries—be ethically justified? We examined these policies focusing on the way they influence the ability of re- searchers in resource-poor countries to participate in the development of the field of Bioethics. Eight of the fourteen leading Bioethics journals are published by three transna- tional publishing houses, all of which are based in wealthy nations. None of these eight journals participates in the Health InterNetwork Access to Research Initiative (HINARI) of the World Health Organization, a program that provides free or very low-cost online access to the major journals by researchers in developing countries. Lack of access to these essential resources makes it ex- tremely difficult, if not impossible, for bioethicists in de- veloping countries to learn from, and engage in, the global Bioethics dialogue. Thus, exclusionary practices of leading Bioethics journals sustain the hegemony of Western bio- ethics, raising serious questions about professed aspira- tions to create a truly Bglobal^ Bioethics. This phenome- non indicates lack of empathy and moral imagination of

Catherine Myser - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • a question of social justice how policies of profit negate engagement of developing world bioethicists and undermine global Bioethics
    American Journal of Bioethics, 2017
    Co-Authors: Subrata Chattopadhyay, Catherine Myser, Tiffany Moxham, Raymond De Vries
    Abstract:

    We identify the ways the policies of leading international Bioethics journals limit the participation of researchers working in the resource-constrained settings of low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) in the development of the field of Bioethics. Lack of access to essential scholarly resources makes it extremely difficult, if not impossible, for many LMIC bioethicists to learn from, meaningfully engage in, and further contribute to the global Bioethics discourse. Underrepresentation of LMIC perspectives in leading journals sustains the hegemony of Western Bioethics, limits the presentation of diverse moral visions of life, health, and medicine, and undermines aspirations to create a truly “global” Bioethics. Limited attention to this problem indicates a lack of empathy and moral imagination on the part of bioethicists in high-income countries, raises questions about the ethics of Bioethics, and highlights the urgent need to find ways to remedy this social injustice.

  • retracted article imperialism in Bioethics how policies of profit negate engagement of developing world bioethicists and undermine global Bioethics
    Journal of Bioethical Inquiry, 2015
    Co-Authors: Subrata Chattopadhyay, Catherine Myser, Raymond De Vries
    Abstract:

    How do Bioethics gatekeepers located in wealthy nations treat Bioethics workers from developing countries? Can the policies of leading international bioeth- ics journals—based on a concern for profit that effectively restrictsaccessfor mostresearchersfrom developingcoun- tries—be ethically justified? We examined these policies focusing on the way they influence the ability of re- searchers in resource-poor countries to participate in the development of the field of Bioethics. Eight of the fourteen leading Bioethics journals are published by three transna- tional publishing houses, all of which are based in wealthy nations. None of these eight journals participates in the Health InterNetwork Access to Research Initiative (HINARI) of the World Health Organization, a program that provides free or very low-cost online access to the major journals by researchers in developing countries. Lack of access to these essential resources makes it ex- tremely difficult, if not impossible, for bioethicists in de- veloping countries to learn from, and engage in, the global Bioethics dialogue. Thus, exclusionary practices of leading Bioethics journals sustain the hegemony of Western bio- ethics, raising serious questions about professed aspira- tions to create a truly Bglobal^ Bioethics. This phenome- non indicates lack of empathy and moral imagination of

  • differences from somewhere the normativity of whiteness in Bioethics in the united states
    American Journal of Bioethics, 2003
    Co-Authors: Catherine Myser
    Abstract:

    I argue that there has been inadequate attention to and questioning of the dominance and normativity of whiteness in the cultural construction of Bioethics in the United States. Therefore we risk reproducing white privilege and white supremacy in its theory, method, and practices. To make my argument, I define whiteness and trace its broader social and legal history in the United States. I then begin to mark whiteness in U.S. Bioethics, recasting Renee Fox's sociological marking of its American-ness as an important initial marking of its whiteness/WASP ethos. Furthermore, I consider the attempts of social scientists to highlight sociocultural diversity as a corrective in U.S. Bioethics. I argue that because they fail to problematize white dominance and normativity and the white-other dualism when they describe the standpoints of African-American, Asian-American, and Native-American others, their work merely inoculates difference and creates or maintains minoritized spaces. Accordingly, the dominant white center of mainstream U.S. Bioethics must be problematized and displaced for diversity research to make a difference. In conclusion, I give several examples of how we might advance the recommended endeavor of exploring our own ethnicity, class, and other social positioning and norms operating in U.S. Bioethics, briefly highlighting "white talk" as one challenge.

Bruce Jennings - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • reconceptualizing autonomy a relational turn in Bioethics
    Hastings Center Report, 2016
    Co-Authors: Bruce Jennings
    Abstract:

    History's judgment on the success of Bioethics will not depend solely on the conceptual creativity and innovation in the field at the level of ethical and political theory, but this intellectual work is not insignificant. One important new development is what I shall refer to as the relational turn in Bioethics. This development represents a renewed emphasis on the ideographic approach, which interprets the meaning of right and wrong in human actions as they are inscribed in social and cultural practices and in structures of lived meaning and interdependence; in an ideographic approach, the task of Bioethics is to bring practice into theory, not the other way around. The relational turn in Bioethics may profoundly affect the critical questions that the field asks and the ethical guidance it offers society, politics, and policy. The relational turn provides a way of correcting the excessive atomism of many individualistic perspectives that have been, and continue to be, influential in Bioethics. Nonetheless, I would argue that most of the work reflecting the relational turn remains distinctively liberal in its respect for the ethical significance of the human individual. It moves away from individualism, but not from the value of individuality.In this review essay, I shall focus on how the relational turn has manifested itself in work on core concepts in Bioethics, especially liberty and autonomy. Following a general review, I conclude with a brief consideration of two important recent books in this area: Jennifer Nedelsky's Law's Relations and Rachel Haliburton's Autonomy and the Situated Self.

  • ethics and public health forging a strong relationship
    American Journal of Public Health, 2002
    Co-Authors: Daniel Callahan, Bruce Jennings
    Abstract:

    The field of Bioethics arose in the late 1960s in response to the emerging ethical dilemmas of that era. The field for many years focused in general on the dilemmas generated by high-technology medicine rather than on issues of population health and the ethical problems of public health programs and regulations. The time has come to more fully integrate the ethical problems of public health into the field of public health and, at the same time, into the field of Bioethics. Public health raises a number of moral problems that extend beyond the earlier boundaries of Bioethics and require their own form of ethical analysis.

Vilius Dranseika - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • experimental philosophical Bioethics
    Social Science Research Network, 2020
    Co-Authors: Brian D Earp, Joanna Demareecotton, Michael Dunn, Vilius Dranseika, Jim A C Everett, Adam Feltz, Gail Geller, Ivar R Hannikainen
    Abstract:

    There is a rich tradition in Bioethics of gathering empirical data to inform, supplement, or test the implications of normative ethical analysis. To this end, bioethicists have drawn on diverse methods, including qualitative interviews, focus groups, ethnographic studies, and opinion surveys to advance understanding of key issues in Bioethics. In so doing, they have developed strong ties with neighboring disciplines such as anthropology, history, law, and sociology. Collectively, these lines of research have flourished in the broader field of “empirical Bioethics” for more than 30 years. More recently, philosophers from outside the field of Bioethics have similarly employed empirical methods — drawn primarily from psychology, the cognitive sciences, economics, and related disciplines — to advance theoretical debates. This approach, which has come to be called experimental philosophy (or x-phi), relies primarily on controlled experiments to interrogate the concepts, intuitions, reasoning, implicit mental processes, and empirical assumptions about the mind that play a role in traditional philosophical arguments. Within the moral domain, for example, experimental philosophy has begun to contribute to long-standing debates about the nature of moral judgment and reasoning; the sources of our moral emotions and biases; the qualities of a good person or a good life; and the psychological basis of moral theory itself. We believe that experimental philosophical Bioethics — or “bioxphi” — can similarly contribute to bioethical scholarship and debate. Here, we introduce this emerging discipline, explain how it is distinct from empirical Bioethics more broadly construed, and attempt to characterize how it might advance theory and practice in this area.

  • experimental philosophical Bioethics
    AJOB empirical bioethics, 2020
    Co-Authors: Brian D Earp, Joanna Demareecotton, Michael Dunn, Vilius Dranseika, Jim A C Everett, Adam Feltz, Gail Geller, Ivar R Hannikainen
    Abstract:

    There is a rich tradition in Bioethics of gathering empirical data to inform, supplement, or test the implications of normative ethical analysis. To this end, bioethicists have drawn on diverse methods, including qualitative interviews, focus groups, ethnographic studies, and opinion surveys to advance understanding of key issues in Bioethics. In so doing, they have developed strong ties with neighboring disciplines such as anthropology, history, law, and sociology. Collectively, these lines of research have flourished in the broader field of “empirical Bioethics” for more than 30 years (Sugarman & Sulmasy 2010). More recently, philosophers from outside the field of Bioethics have similarly employed empirical methods—drawn primarily from psychology, the cognitive sciences, economics, and related disciplines—to advance theoretical debates. This approach, which has come to be called experimental philosophy (or x-phi), relies primarily on controlled experiments to interrogate the concepts, intuitions, reasoning, implicit mental processes, and empirical assumptions about the mind that play a role in traditional philosophical arguments (Knobe et al. 2012). Within the moral domain, for example, experimental philosophy has begun to contribute to long-standing debates about the nature of moral judgment and reasoning; the sources of our moral emotions and biases; the qualities of a good person or a good life; and the psychological basis of moral theory itself (Alfano, Loeb, & Plakias 2018). We believe that experimental philosophical Bioethics—or “bioxphi”—can similarly explain how it is distinct from empirical Bioethics more broadly construed, and attempt to characterize how it might advance theory and practice in this area.