The Experts below are selected from a list of 51 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Hari Mohan Pandey - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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secure medical data transmission using a fusion of Bit Mask oriented genetic algorithm encryption and steganography
Future Generation Computer Systems, 2020Co-Authors: Hari Mohan PandeyAbstract:Abstract This paper presents a Bit Mask oriented genetic algorithm based secure medical data transmission mechanism. A Bit Mask oriented genetic algorithm (BMOGA) is utilized to reduce the replication of medical tests data which are transferred across organizations. Medical data is considered very sensitive, therefore secure medical data transmission is must. BMOGA is a variant of the traditional genetic algorithm. Literature reveals that it can avoid premature convergence – a situation when optimization algorithms get stuck at local optimum. BOMGA utilizes Boolean based Mask-fill operators and performs reproduction operations in two different phases that helps to avoid premature convergence. Cryptographic features are integrated with the BMOGA for secure data transmission. The encrypted data is embedded into the medical images through 1-level and 2-level Discrete Wavelet Transform (DWT). The reverse process of the BMOGA is implemented for the extraction of secret message from the encrypted one. Numerical experiments are conducted to determine the performance of the proposed algorithm. Results reveals that the proposed algorithm is capable of secure data transmission. Performance comparison is done with the state-of-the-art algorithm with respect to the datasets. Comparative results indicated the superiority of the proposed algorithm in terms of various statistical measures such as peak signal to noise ratio (PSNR), correlation, structural content (SC), structure similarity (SSIM) and mean square error (MSE) to report the results.
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Bit Mask oriented genetic algorithm for grammatical inference and premature convergence
International Journal of Bio-inspired Computation, 2018Co-Authors: Hari Mohan Pandey, Ankit Chaudhary, Deepti MehrotraAbstract:In this paper, a Bit Mask-oriented genetic algorithm (BMOGA) is presented for grammatical inference (GI). GI is techniques to infer context free grammar from a set of corpora. The BMOGA combines the traditional genetic algorithm with a Bit-Mask oriented data structure and Boolean-based procedure (uses Boolean operators) that can exploit an optimum offspring. Extensive parameters tuning is done that makes the BMOGA more robust, statistically sound, and quickly convergent. The BMOGA is applied over the context free as well as regular languages of varying complexities. The results show that BMOGA finds optimal or close-to-optimal solution. The Boolean operators introduce diversity in the population that helps in exploring the search space adequately that helps to alleviate premature convergence. First, we evaluate the performance of the BMOGA against three algorithms: the genetic algorithm, particle swarm optimisation and simulated annealing. Then, the BMOGA is tested against two different offspring generation algorithms: random offspring generation and elite mating pool approach. Statistical tests are conducted that indicate the superiority of the proposed algorithm over others.
Jeanluc Danger - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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formal analysis of the entropy security trade off in first order Masking countermeasures against side channel attacks
International Conference on Cryptology in India, 2011Co-Authors: Maxime Nassar, Sylvain Guilley, Jeanluc DangerAbstract:Several types of countermeasures against side-channel attacks are known. The one called Masking is of great interest since it can be applied to any protocol and/or algorithm, without nonetheless requiring special care at the implementation level. Masking countermeasures are usually studied with the maximal possible entropy for the Masks. However, in practice, this requirement can be viewed as too costly. It is thus relevant to study how the security evolves when the number of Mask values decreases. In this article, we study a first-order Masking scheme, that makes use of one n -Bit Mask taking values in a strict subset of $\mathbb{F}_2^n$ . For a given entropy budget, we show that the security does depend on the choice of the Mask values. More specifically, we explore the space of Mask sets that resist first and second-order correlation analysis (CPA and 2O-CPA), using exhaustive search for word size $n \leqslant 5$ Bit and a SAT-solver for n up to 8 Bit. We notably show that it is possible to protect algorithms against both CPA and 2O-CPA such as AES with only 12 Mask values. If the general trend is that more entropy means less leakage, some particular Mask subsets can leak less (or on the contrary leak remarkably more). Additionally, we exhiBit such Mask subsets that allows a minimal leakage.
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formal analysis of the entropy security trade off in first order Masking countermeasures against side channel attacks
IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive, 2011Co-Authors: Maxime Nassar, Sylvain Guilley, Jeanluc DangerAbstract:Several types of countermeasures against side-channel attacks are known. The one called Masking is of great interest since it can be applied to any protocol and/or algorithm, without nonetheless requiring special care at the implementation level. Masking countermeasures are usually studied with the maximal possible entropy for the Masks. However, in practice, this requirement can be viewed as too costly. It is thus relevant to study how the security evolves when the number of Mask values decreases. In this article, we study a first-order Masking scheme, that makes use of one n-Bit Mask taking values in a strict subset of Fn2 . For a given entropy budget, we show that the security does depend on the choice of the Mask values. More specifically, we explore the space of Mask sets that resist firstand second-order correlation analysis (CPA and 2O-CPA), using exhaustive search for word size n 6 5 Bit and a SAT-solver for n up to 8 Bit. We notably show that it is possible to protect algorithms against both CPA and 2O-CPA such as AES with only 12 Mask values. If the general trend is that more entropy means less leakage, some particular Mask subsets can leak less (or on the contrary leak remarkably more). Additionally, we exhiBit such Mask subsets that allows for a minimal leakage.
Maxime Nassar - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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formal analysis of the entropy security trade off in first order Masking countermeasures against side channel attacks
International Conference on Cryptology in India, 2011Co-Authors: Maxime Nassar, Sylvain Guilley, Jeanluc DangerAbstract:Several types of countermeasures against side-channel attacks are known. The one called Masking is of great interest since it can be applied to any protocol and/or algorithm, without nonetheless requiring special care at the implementation level. Masking countermeasures are usually studied with the maximal possible entropy for the Masks. However, in practice, this requirement can be viewed as too costly. It is thus relevant to study how the security evolves when the number of Mask values decreases. In this article, we study a first-order Masking scheme, that makes use of one n -Bit Mask taking values in a strict subset of $\mathbb{F}_2^n$ . For a given entropy budget, we show that the security does depend on the choice of the Mask values. More specifically, we explore the space of Mask sets that resist first and second-order correlation analysis (CPA and 2O-CPA), using exhaustive search for word size $n \leqslant 5$ Bit and a SAT-solver for n up to 8 Bit. We notably show that it is possible to protect algorithms against both CPA and 2O-CPA such as AES with only 12 Mask values. If the general trend is that more entropy means less leakage, some particular Mask subsets can leak less (or on the contrary leak remarkably more). Additionally, we exhiBit such Mask subsets that allows a minimal leakage.
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formal analysis of the entropy security trade off in first order Masking countermeasures against side channel attacks
IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive, 2011Co-Authors: Maxime Nassar, Sylvain Guilley, Jeanluc DangerAbstract:Several types of countermeasures against side-channel attacks are known. The one called Masking is of great interest since it can be applied to any protocol and/or algorithm, without nonetheless requiring special care at the implementation level. Masking countermeasures are usually studied with the maximal possible entropy for the Masks. However, in practice, this requirement can be viewed as too costly. It is thus relevant to study how the security evolves when the number of Mask values decreases. In this article, we study a first-order Masking scheme, that makes use of one n-Bit Mask taking values in a strict subset of Fn2 . For a given entropy budget, we show that the security does depend on the choice of the Mask values. More specifically, we explore the space of Mask sets that resist firstand second-order correlation analysis (CPA and 2O-CPA), using exhaustive search for word size n 6 5 Bit and a SAT-solver for n up to 8 Bit. We notably show that it is possible to protect algorithms against both CPA and 2O-CPA such as AES with only 12 Mask values. If the general trend is that more entropy means less leakage, some particular Mask subsets can leak less (or on the contrary leak remarkably more). Additionally, we exhiBit such Mask subsets that allows for a minimal leakage.
Deepti Mehrotra - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Bit Mask oriented genetic algorithm for grammatical inference and premature convergence
International Journal of Bio-inspired Computation, 2018Co-Authors: Hari Mohan Pandey, Ankit Chaudhary, Deepti MehrotraAbstract:In this paper, a Bit Mask-oriented genetic algorithm (BMOGA) is presented for grammatical inference (GI). GI is techniques to infer context free grammar from a set of corpora. The BMOGA combines the traditional genetic algorithm with a Bit-Mask oriented data structure and Boolean-based procedure (uses Boolean operators) that can exploit an optimum offspring. Extensive parameters tuning is done that makes the BMOGA more robust, statistically sound, and quickly convergent. The BMOGA is applied over the context free as well as regular languages of varying complexities. The results show that BMOGA finds optimal or close-to-optimal solution. The Boolean operators introduce diversity in the population that helps in exploring the search space adequately that helps to alleviate premature convergence. First, we evaluate the performance of the BMOGA against three algorithms: the genetic algorithm, particle swarm optimisation and simulated annealing. Then, the BMOGA is tested against two different offspring generation algorithms: random offspring generation and elite mating pool approach. Statistical tests are conducted that indicate the superiority of the proposed algorithm over others.
Sylvain Guilley - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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formal analysis of the entropy security trade off in first order Masking countermeasures against side channel attacks
International Conference on Cryptology in India, 2011Co-Authors: Maxime Nassar, Sylvain Guilley, Jeanluc DangerAbstract:Several types of countermeasures against side-channel attacks are known. The one called Masking is of great interest since it can be applied to any protocol and/or algorithm, without nonetheless requiring special care at the implementation level. Masking countermeasures are usually studied with the maximal possible entropy for the Masks. However, in practice, this requirement can be viewed as too costly. It is thus relevant to study how the security evolves when the number of Mask values decreases. In this article, we study a first-order Masking scheme, that makes use of one n -Bit Mask taking values in a strict subset of $\mathbb{F}_2^n$ . For a given entropy budget, we show that the security does depend on the choice of the Mask values. More specifically, we explore the space of Mask sets that resist first and second-order correlation analysis (CPA and 2O-CPA), using exhaustive search for word size $n \leqslant 5$ Bit and a SAT-solver for n up to 8 Bit. We notably show that it is possible to protect algorithms against both CPA and 2O-CPA such as AES with only 12 Mask values. If the general trend is that more entropy means less leakage, some particular Mask subsets can leak less (or on the contrary leak remarkably more). Additionally, we exhiBit such Mask subsets that allows a minimal leakage.
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formal analysis of the entropy security trade off in first order Masking countermeasures against side channel attacks
IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive, 2011Co-Authors: Maxime Nassar, Sylvain Guilley, Jeanluc DangerAbstract:Several types of countermeasures against side-channel attacks are known. The one called Masking is of great interest since it can be applied to any protocol and/or algorithm, without nonetheless requiring special care at the implementation level. Masking countermeasures are usually studied with the maximal possible entropy for the Masks. However, in practice, this requirement can be viewed as too costly. It is thus relevant to study how the security evolves when the number of Mask values decreases. In this article, we study a first-order Masking scheme, that makes use of one n-Bit Mask taking values in a strict subset of Fn2 . For a given entropy budget, we show that the security does depend on the choice of the Mask values. More specifically, we explore the space of Mask sets that resist firstand second-order correlation analysis (CPA and 2O-CPA), using exhaustive search for word size n 6 5 Bit and a SAT-solver for n up to 8 Bit. We notably show that it is possible to protect algorithms against both CPA and 2O-CPA such as AES with only 12 Mask values. If the general trend is that more entropy means less leakage, some particular Mask subsets can leak less (or on the contrary leak remarkably more). Additionally, we exhiBit such Mask subsets that allows for a minimal leakage.