The Experts below are selected from a list of 32385 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Gustavo Torrens - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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making rules credible divided government and political Budget cycles
Public Choice, 2013Co-Authors: Jorge M Streb, Gustavo TorrensAbstract:Political Budget cycles (PBCs) can result from the credibility problems office-motivated incumbents face under asymmetric information, due to the temptation to manipulate fiscal policy to increase their electoral chances. We analyze the role of rules that limit public debt, because borrowing is a necessary condition for aggregate PBCs. Since the legislature must typically authorize new debt, divided government can make these fiscal rules credible. Commitment is undermined by either unified government or imperfect compliance with the Budget Law, which can help explain why PBCs are stronger in developing countries and in new democracies. When divided government affects efficiency, voters must trade off electoral distortions and government competence.
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making rules credible divided government and political Budget cycles
2009Co-Authors: Jorge M Streb, Gustavo TorrensAbstract:Political Budget cycles (PBCs) result from the credibility problems that office-motivated incumbents face under asymmetric information, due to their temptation to manipulate fiscal policy to increase their electoral chances. We analyze the role of rules that limit debt, crucial for aggregate PBCs to take place. Since the Budget process under separation of powers typically requires that the legislature authorize new debt, divided government can make these fisscal rules credible. Commitment is undermined either by unified government or by imperfect compliance with the Budget Law. When divided government affects efficiency, voters must trade off electoral distortions and government competence.
Jorge M Streb - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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making rules credible divided government and political Budget cycles
Public Choice, 2013Co-Authors: Jorge M Streb, Gustavo TorrensAbstract:Political Budget cycles (PBCs) can result from the credibility problems office-motivated incumbents face under asymmetric information, due to the temptation to manipulate fiscal policy to increase their electoral chances. We analyze the role of rules that limit public debt, because borrowing is a necessary condition for aggregate PBCs. Since the legislature must typically authorize new debt, divided government can make these fiscal rules credible. Commitment is undermined by either unified government or imperfect compliance with the Budget Law, which can help explain why PBCs are stronger in developing countries and in new democracies. When divided government affects efficiency, voters must trade off electoral distortions and government competence.
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making rules credible divided government and political Budget cycles
2009Co-Authors: Jorge M Streb, Gustavo TorrensAbstract:Political Budget cycles (PBCs) result from the credibility problems that office-motivated incumbents face under asymmetric information, due to their temptation to manipulate fiscal policy to increase their electoral chances. We analyze the role of rules that limit debt, crucial for aggregate PBCs to take place. Since the Budget process under separation of powers typically requires that the legislature authorize new debt, divided government can make these fisscal rules credible. Commitment is undermined either by unified government or by imperfect compliance with the Budget Law. When divided government affects efficiency, voters must trade off electoral distortions and government competence.
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separation of powers and political Budget cycles
Public Choice, 2008Co-Authors: Alejandro Saporiti, Jorge M StrebAbstract:Political Budget cycles (PBCs) arise when the electorate is imperfectly informed about the incumbent’s competence and the incumbent has discretion over the Budget. Focusing on the second condition, we study how separation of powers affects PBCs in the composition of government spending. We find that the details of the Budget process, namely, the bargaining rules, the status quo’s location, and the degree of compliance with the Budget Law, are critical for the existence and the amplitudes of PBCs. In particular, when the status quo is determined by the previous Budget and there is high compliance with the Budget Law, separation of powers acts as a commitment device which solves the credibility problems that drive PBCs.
Peter John - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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a general empirical Law of public Budgets a comparative analysis
American Journal of Political Science, 2009Co-Authors: Bryan D Jones, Frank R Baumgartner, Martial Foucault, Abel Francois, Christian Breunig, Christopher Wlezien, Stuart Soroka, Christoffer Greenpedersen, Chris Koski, Peter JohnAbstract:We examine regularities and differences in public Budgeting in comparative perspective. Budgets quantify collective political decisions made in response to incoming information, the preferences of decision makers, and the institutions that structure how decisions are made. We first establish that the distribution of Budget changes in many Western democracies follows a non‐Gaussian distribution, the power function. This implies that Budgets are highly incremental, yet occasionally are punctuated by large changes. This pattern holds regardless of the type of political system—parliamentary or presidential—and for level of government. By studying the power function's exponents we find systematic differences for Budgetary increases versus decreases (the former are more punctuated) in most systems, and for levels of government (local governments are less punctuated). Finally, we show that differences among countries in the coefficients of the general Budget Law correspond to differences in formal institutional structures. While the general form of the Law is probably dictated by the fundamental operations of human and organizational information processing, differences in the magnitudes of the Law's basic parameters are country‐ and institution‐specific.
Jose Emilio Labra Gayo - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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national Budget as linked open data new tools for supporting the sustainability of public finances
Sustainability, 2020Co-Authors: Francisco Cifuentessilva, Daniel Fernandezalvarez, Jose Emilio Labra GayoAbstract:This paper presents the visualization of national Budget, a tool based on Semantic Web technologies that shows by graphic representations the Chilean Budget Law published annually, and their execution by each state agency. We describe the processes for consuming open data from the Budget National Agency, and how this data is transformed and published to linked open data, based on a National Budget Ontology. Although similar initiatives have been developed on transparency and public Budget around the world, we consider that there is no previous experience showing optimized access mechanisms both for human and machine readable, providing in each case the highest level of aggregation, granularity and interoperability, making it understandable and easy to process complex data and legislation. As part of our analysis, we describe a recent scenario of usage in the context of the socio-political crisis in Chile, where we discuss the possible impact of the linked open dataset and data visualizations for distribution and control of funds, on the premise that this type of tools can support the decision making and sustainability of public finances. Finally, we present the results of our Budget knowledge graph and the lessons learned during the development, allowing to replicate the process and enabling potential uses of the published data in other contexts.
Bryan D Jones - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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a general empirical Law of public Budgets a comparative analysis
American Journal of Political Science, 2009Co-Authors: Bryan D Jones, Frank R Baumgartner, Martial Foucault, Abel Francois, Christian Breunig, Christopher Wlezien, Stuart Soroka, Christoffer Greenpedersen, Chris Koski, Peter JohnAbstract:We examine regularities and differences in public Budgeting in comparative perspective. Budgets quantify collective political decisions made in response to incoming information, the preferences of decision makers, and the institutions that structure how decisions are made. We first establish that the distribution of Budget changes in many Western democracies follows a non‐Gaussian distribution, the power function. This implies that Budgets are highly incremental, yet occasionally are punctuated by large changes. This pattern holds regardless of the type of political system—parliamentary or presidential—and for level of government. By studying the power function's exponents we find systematic differences for Budgetary increases versus decreases (the former are more punctuated) in most systems, and for levels of government (local governments are less punctuated). Finally, we show that differences among countries in the coefficients of the general Budget Law correspond to differences in formal institutional structures. While the general form of the Law is probably dictated by the fundamental operations of human and organizational information processing, differences in the magnitudes of the Law's basic parameters are country‐ and institution‐specific.
