The Experts below are selected from a list of 972 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform

B S Sahota - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • an overview of the Certifying Authority s independent safety assessment of riser esd valves in accordance with si 1029 1989
    1991
    Co-Authors: D R Prentice, L A Khan, B S Sahota
    Abstract:

    Following the Piper Alpha disaster, the UK Department of Energy issued regulation SI 1989/1029 which requires that all pipeline risers of internal diameter greater than 40 mm used for the transportation of toxic or flammable fluids be provided with a topside emergency shutdown valve (ESDV). Part of the role of the Certifying Authority has been to review the ESDV installations' protection against any significant damage arising from fire, explosion impact or ship collision for a period sufficient to allow safe evacuation. This paper will define and assess the accident events which are normally considered when defining credible hazards. Potential hazards are jet and pool fires, blast over pressures, projectiles (including missiles from explosion), boat impact and damage from dropped objects. A logical approach to investigating the effects of the hazards on the protection, in order to safeguard the integrity of the structure, is described.

  • AN OVERVIEW OF THE Certifying Authority'S INDEPENDENT SAFETY ASSESSMENT OF RISER ESD VALVES, IN ACCORDANCE WITH SI 1029/1989
    1991
    Co-Authors: D R Prentice, L A Khan, B S Sahota
    Abstract:

    Following the Piper Alpha disaster, the UK Department of Energy issued regulation SI 1989/1029 which requires that all pipeline risers of internal diameter greater than 40 mm used for the transportation of toxic or flammable fluids be provided with a topside emergency shutdown valve (ESDV). Part of the role of the Certifying Authority has been to review the ESDV installations' protection against any significant damage arising from fire, explosion impact or ship collision for a period sufficient to allow safe evacuation. This paper will define and assess the accident events which are normally considered when defining credible hazards. Potential hazards are jet and pool fires, blast over pressures, projectiles (including missiles from explosion), boat impact and damage from dropped objects. A logical approach to investigating the effects of the hazards on the protection, in order to safeguard the integrity of the structure, is described.

Sulata Mitra - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Cooperative Revocation of Misbehaving Vehicles from VANET
    Advances in Intelligent Systems and Computing, 2015
    Co-Authors: Sulata Mitra
    Abstract:

    The present work is the detection and revocation of misbehaving vehicles in vehicular ad-hoc network. In the present work vehicles are within the coverage area of base stations and the base stations are within the coverage area of Certifying Authority. Each vehicle detects misbehaving vehicles from its neighbors, creates a certificate revocation list by mentioning the identification of the misbehaving vehicles and sends this list to its parent base station. Each base station creates a certificate revocation list after receiving the certificate revocation lists from the vehicles within its coverage area and sends it to the Certifying Authority. The Certifying Authority creates a final certificate revocation list after receiving the certificate revocation lists from the base stations within its coverage area and broadcasts it among the vehicles within its coverage area through base stations. The independent operations of vehicle, base station and Certifying Authority are divided into a few blocks for parallel execution which helps to reduce the time of detection and revocation of misbehaving vehicles from vehicular ad-hoc network. The performance of the proposed scheme outperforms the existing schemes.

  • Detection and Revocation of Misbehaving Vehicles from VANET
    Lecture Notes in Electrical Engineering, 2014
    Co-Authors: Atanu Mondal, Sulata Mitra
    Abstract:

    The present work is the detection and revocation of misbehaving vehicles in vehicular ad hoc network. In the present work vehicles are within the coverage area of base stations and the base stations are within the coverage area of Certifying Authority. Each vehicle detects misbehaving vehicles from its neighbors, creates a certificate revocation list by mentioning the identification of the misbehaving vehicles and sends this list to its parent base station. Each base station creates a certificate revocation list after receiving the certificate revocation lists from the vehicles within its coverage area and sends it to the Certifying Authority. The Certifying Authority creates a final certificate revocation list after receiving the certificate revocation lists from the base stations within its coverage area and broadcasts it among the vehicles within its coverage area. The qualitative and quantitative performance of the proposed scheme outperforms the existing schemes.

  • ICACCI - Identification, authentication and tracking algorithm for vehicles using VIN in distributed VANET
    Proceedings of the International Conference on Advances in Computing Communications and Informatics - ICACCI '12, 2012
    Co-Authors: Sulata Mitra, Atanu Mondal
    Abstract:

    Identification and authentication of vehicles is a challenging research issue in the VANET environment. The VANET should allow only the authentic vehicles to participate in the system for efficient utilization of its available resources. In case of inter-vehicle communication or communication through infrastructure vehicle identification is a fundamental security issue as it helps to process the messages from legitimate senders only during communication. The present work uses vehicle identification number for identification and authentication of a vehicle in the VANET environment. The proposed system architecture is a four level hierarchy in which the Certifying Authority is at the root level and also at the first level, base stations are at the second level and vehicles are at the leaf level. Each vehicle broadcasts its vehicle identification number in encrypted form after entering into the coverage area of a base station. The base station starts initial registration phase of a vehicle by sending the received vehicle identification number to its parent Certifying Authority at the first level of the hierarchy. The parent Certifying Authority of the base station sends the vehicle identification number to the Certifying Authority at the root level. The Certifying Authority at the root level verifies the authentication of this vehicle, generates the digital signature for this vehicle if it is authentic and sends this digital signature to the parent Certifying Authority of the base station at the first level of the hierarchy. The parent Certifying Authority of the base station broadcasts digital signature to all the base stations under its coverage area. The base station within which that vehicle is currently moving assigns the digital signature and allocates a channel to that vehicle. The channel remains busy as long as the vehicle is within the coverage area of this base station. So the base station is able to track an authentic vehicle within its coverage area by sensing the channel. The performance of the proposed scheme is studied qualitatively in terms of communication and storage overhead per vehicle. It is also studied quantitatively by observing the variation of vehicle identification number processing time as a function of the number of vehicles in the proposed VANET environment and its associate parameters for authentication of vehicle as a function of the size of encrypted vehicle identification number.

  • Identification, Authentication and Tracking Algorithm for Vehicles Using VIN in Centralized VANET
    Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering, 2012
    Co-Authors: Atanu Mondal, Sulata Mitra
    Abstract:

    The VANET should allow only the authentic vehicles to participate in the system for efficient utilization of its available resources. The proposed system architecture contains multiple base stations in the coverage area of a Certifying Authority. The base station verifies the identification of the vehicle and the Certifying Authority verifies the authentication of the vehicle using its vehicle identification number. The Certifying Authority also generates a digital signature for each authentic vehicle and assigns it to the corresponding vehicle through base station. The base station allocates a channel to each authentic vehicle. The channel remains busy as long as the vehicle is within the coverage area of this base station. So the base station is able to track an authentic vehicle by sensing the allocated channel within its coverage area.

Carolyn Fischer - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Project-based mechanisms for emissions reductions: balancing trade-offs with baselines
    Energy Policy, 2005
    Co-Authors: Carolyn Fischer
    Abstract:

    Project-based mechanisms for emissions reductions credits, like the Clean Development Mechanism, pose important challenges for policy design because of several inherent characteristics. Participation is voluntary, so it will not occur without sufficient credits. Evaluating reductions requires assigning an emissions baseline for a counterfactual that cannot be measured. Some investments have both economic and environmental benefits and might occur anyway. Uncertainty surrounds both emissions and investment returns, and parties to the project are likely to have more information than the Certifying Authority. The Certifying agent is limited in its ability to design a contract that would reveal investment intentions. As a result, rules for benchmarking emissions may be systematically biased to overallocate, and they also risk creating inefficient investment incentives. This paper evaluates, in a situation with asymmetric information, the efficacy of the main baseline rules currently under consideration: historical emissions, an average industry emissions standard, and expected emissions.

  • Determining Project-Based Emissions Baselines with Incomplete Information
    2002
    Co-Authors: Carolyn Fischer
    Abstract:

    Project-based mechanisms for emissions reductions credits, like the Clean Development Mechanism, pose important challenges for policy design because of several inherent characteristics. Participation is voluntary. Evaluating reductions requires assigning a baseline for a counterfactual that cannot be measured. Some investments have both economic and environmental benefits and might occur anyway. Uncertainty surrounds both emissions and investment returns. Parties to the project are likely to have more information than the Certifying Authority. The Certifying agent is limited in its ability to design a contract that would reveal investment intentions. As a result, rules for baseline determination may be systematically biased to overallocate, and they also risk creating inefficient investment incentives. This paper evaluates, in a situation with asymmetric information, the efficacy of the main baseline rules currently under consideration: historical emissions, average industry emissions, and expected emissions.

D R Prentice - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • an overview of the Certifying Authority s independent safety assessment of riser esd valves in accordance with si 1029 1989
    1991
    Co-Authors: D R Prentice, L A Khan, B S Sahota
    Abstract:

    Following the Piper Alpha disaster, the UK Department of Energy issued regulation SI 1989/1029 which requires that all pipeline risers of internal diameter greater than 40 mm used for the transportation of toxic or flammable fluids be provided with a topside emergency shutdown valve (ESDV). Part of the role of the Certifying Authority has been to review the ESDV installations' protection against any significant damage arising from fire, explosion impact or ship collision for a period sufficient to allow safe evacuation. This paper will define and assess the accident events which are normally considered when defining credible hazards. Potential hazards are jet and pool fires, blast over pressures, projectiles (including missiles from explosion), boat impact and damage from dropped objects. A logical approach to investigating the effects of the hazards on the protection, in order to safeguard the integrity of the structure, is described.

  • AN OVERVIEW OF THE Certifying Authority'S INDEPENDENT SAFETY ASSESSMENT OF RISER ESD VALVES, IN ACCORDANCE WITH SI 1029/1989
    1991
    Co-Authors: D R Prentice, L A Khan, B S Sahota
    Abstract:

    Following the Piper Alpha disaster, the UK Department of Energy issued regulation SI 1989/1029 which requires that all pipeline risers of internal diameter greater than 40 mm used for the transportation of toxic or flammable fluids be provided with a topside emergency shutdown valve (ESDV). Part of the role of the Certifying Authority has been to review the ESDV installations' protection against any significant damage arising from fire, explosion impact or ship collision for a period sufficient to allow safe evacuation. This paper will define and assess the accident events which are normally considered when defining credible hazards. Potential hazards are jet and pool fires, blast over pressures, projectiles (including missiles from explosion), boat impact and damage from dropped objects. A logical approach to investigating the effects of the hazards on the protection, in order to safeguard the integrity of the structure, is described.

Atanu Mondal - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Detection and Revocation of Misbehaving Vehicles from VANET
    Lecture Notes in Electrical Engineering, 2014
    Co-Authors: Atanu Mondal, Sulata Mitra
    Abstract:

    The present work is the detection and revocation of misbehaving vehicles in vehicular ad hoc network. In the present work vehicles are within the coverage area of base stations and the base stations are within the coverage area of Certifying Authority. Each vehicle detects misbehaving vehicles from its neighbors, creates a certificate revocation list by mentioning the identification of the misbehaving vehicles and sends this list to its parent base station. Each base station creates a certificate revocation list after receiving the certificate revocation lists from the vehicles within its coverage area and sends it to the Certifying Authority. The Certifying Authority creates a final certificate revocation list after receiving the certificate revocation lists from the base stations within its coverage area and broadcasts it among the vehicles within its coverage area. The qualitative and quantitative performance of the proposed scheme outperforms the existing schemes.

  • ICACCI - Identification, authentication and tracking algorithm for vehicles using VIN in distributed VANET
    Proceedings of the International Conference on Advances in Computing Communications and Informatics - ICACCI '12, 2012
    Co-Authors: Sulata Mitra, Atanu Mondal
    Abstract:

    Identification and authentication of vehicles is a challenging research issue in the VANET environment. The VANET should allow only the authentic vehicles to participate in the system for efficient utilization of its available resources. In case of inter-vehicle communication or communication through infrastructure vehicle identification is a fundamental security issue as it helps to process the messages from legitimate senders only during communication. The present work uses vehicle identification number for identification and authentication of a vehicle in the VANET environment. The proposed system architecture is a four level hierarchy in which the Certifying Authority is at the root level and also at the first level, base stations are at the second level and vehicles are at the leaf level. Each vehicle broadcasts its vehicle identification number in encrypted form after entering into the coverage area of a base station. The base station starts initial registration phase of a vehicle by sending the received vehicle identification number to its parent Certifying Authority at the first level of the hierarchy. The parent Certifying Authority of the base station sends the vehicle identification number to the Certifying Authority at the root level. The Certifying Authority at the root level verifies the authentication of this vehicle, generates the digital signature for this vehicle if it is authentic and sends this digital signature to the parent Certifying Authority of the base station at the first level of the hierarchy. The parent Certifying Authority of the base station broadcasts digital signature to all the base stations under its coverage area. The base station within which that vehicle is currently moving assigns the digital signature and allocates a channel to that vehicle. The channel remains busy as long as the vehicle is within the coverage area of this base station. So the base station is able to track an authentic vehicle within its coverage area by sensing the channel. The performance of the proposed scheme is studied qualitatively in terms of communication and storage overhead per vehicle. It is also studied quantitatively by observing the variation of vehicle identification number processing time as a function of the number of vehicles in the proposed VANET environment and its associate parameters for authentication of vehicle as a function of the size of encrypted vehicle identification number.

  • Identification, Authentication and Tracking Algorithm for Vehicles Using VIN in Centralized VANET
    Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering, 2012
    Co-Authors: Atanu Mondal, Sulata Mitra
    Abstract:

    The VANET should allow only the authentic vehicles to participate in the system for efficient utilization of its available resources. The proposed system architecture contains multiple base stations in the coverage area of a Certifying Authority. The base station verifies the identification of the vehicle and the Certifying Authority verifies the authentication of the vehicle using its vehicle identification number. The Certifying Authority also generates a digital signature for each authentic vehicle and assigns it to the corresponding vehicle through base station. The base station allocates a channel to each authentic vehicle. The channel remains busy as long as the vehicle is within the coverage area of this base station. So the base station is able to track an authentic vehicle by sensing the allocated channel within its coverage area.