The Experts below are selected from a list of 33 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform

Yang Wang - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • ICYCS - Collecting Internet Malware Based on Client-Side Honeypot
    2008 The 9th International Conference for Young Computer Scientists, 2008
    Co-Authors: Yang Wang
    Abstract:

    With the improvement of software security, Attacks based on RPC vulnerabilities declined, however, Attacks based on client application software vulnerabilities have increased. Such client application software includes Web browsers, email client and office. The spread of malware using these software vulnerabilities has become a severe threat to todaypsilas Internet. In allusion to this kind of threat, this paper designed an Internet malware collecting system based on Client-Side honeypot. This system can not only collect malware but also detect malicious Web site. It uses a unique network crawler based on Client-Side Attack techniques to collect source of URL, and it collects URL and attachments from emails, then it creates software processes to open URL or files, and uses a device-drive monitor to detect malicious behaviors. It gives an alarm and locates the malicious file, and sends the malware coming through the Internet to the collecting server. We introduce the design and implement of this system and give the results.

  • Collecting Internet Malware Based on Client-Side Honeypot
    2008 The 9th International Conference for Young Computer Scientists, 2008
    Co-Authors: Yang Wang
    Abstract:

    With the improvement of software security, Attacks based on RPC vulnerabilities declined, however, Attacks based on client application software vulnerabilities have increased. Such client application software includes Web browsers, email client and office. The spread of malware using these software vulnerabilities has become a severe threat to todaypsilas Internet. In allusion to this kind of threat, this paper designed an Internet malware collecting system based on Client-Side honeypot. This system can not only collect malware but also detect malicious Web site. It uses a unique network crawler based on Client-Side Attack techniques to collect source of URL, and it collects URL and attachments from emails, then it creates software processes to open URL or files, and uses a device-drive monitor to detect malicious behaviors. It gives an alarm and locates the malicious file, and sends the malware coming through the Internet to the collecting server. We introduce the design and implement of this system and give the results.

Bogdan Ksiezopolski - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • FedCSIS - A New WAF-Based Architecture for Protecting Web Applications Against CSRF Attacks in Malicious Environment
    Proceedings of the 2018 Federated Conference on Computer Science and Information Systems, 2018
    Co-Authors: Michal Srokosz, Damian Rusinek, Bogdan Ksiezopolski
    Abstract:

    Web application firewall is an application firewall for HTTP applications. Typical WAF uses static analysis of HTTP request, defined as a set of rules, to find potentially dangerous payloads in the requests. Generally, these rules cover common Attacks such as cross-site scripting (XSS) and SQL injection which are server-related Attacks. Cross-site scripting is Client-Side Attack however the server is Attacked and forced to return malicious response. Rule-based approach becomes useless when the Attack is client-related, for example employing malware on the banking site. Malware allows to change the transfer data. This scenario is hard to detect because the browser displays valid transfer data and data is changed to the thieves' accounts number at the communication stage. In this paper we introduce a new web-based architecture for protecting web applications against CSRF Attacks in malicious environemnt. In our approach we extend a classic, static WAF approach with historical and behavioral analysis, based on actions performed by the user in the past.

  • A New WAF-Based Architecture for Protecting Web Applications Against CSRF Attacks in Malicious Environment
    2018 Federated Conference on Computer Science and Information Systems (FedCSIS), 2018
    Co-Authors: Michal Srokosz, Damian Rusinek, Bogdan Ksiezopolski
    Abstract:

    Web application firewall is an application firewall for HTTP applications. Typical WAF uses static analysis of HTTP request, defined as a set of rules, to find potentially dangerous payloads in the requests. Generally, these rules cover common Attacks such as cross-site scripting (XSS) and SQL injection which are server-related Attacks. Cross-site scripting is Client-Side Attack however the server is Attacked and forced to return malicious response. Rule-based approach becomes useless when the Attack is client-related, for example employing malware on the banking site. Malware allows to change the transfer data. This scenario is hard to detect because the browser displays valid transfer data and data is changed to the thieves' accounts number at the communication stage. In this paper we introduce a new web-based architecture for protecting web applications against CSRF Attacks in malicious environemnt. In our approach we extend a classic, static WAF approach with historical and behavioral analysis, based on actions performed by the user in the past.

Wouter Joosen - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • sessionshield lightweight protection against session hijacking
    International Conference on Engineering Secure Software and Systems, 2011
    Co-Authors: Nick Nikiforakis, Wannes Meert, Yves Younan, Martin Johns, Wouter Joosen
    Abstract:

    The class of Cross-site Scripting (XSS) vulnerabilities is the most prevalent security problem in the field of Web applications. One of the main Attack vectors used in connection with XSS is session hijacking via session identifier theft. While session hijacking is a Client-Side Attack, the actual vulnerability resides on the server-side and, thus, has to be handled by the website's operator. In consequence, if the operator fails to address XSS, the application's users are defenseless against session hijacking Attacks. In this paper we present SessionShield, a lightweight Client-Side protection mechanism against session hijacking that allows users to protect themselves even if a vulnerable website's operator neglects to mitigate existing XSS problems. SessionShield is based on the observation that session identifier values are not used by legitimate clientside scripts and, thus, need not to be available to the scripting languages running in the browser. Our system requires no training period and imposes negligible overhead to the browser, therefore, making it ideal for desktop and mobile systems.

  • ESSoS - SessionShield: lightweight protection against session hijacking
    Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 2011
    Co-Authors: Nick Nikiforakis, Wannes Meert, Yves Younan, Martin Johns, Wouter Joosen
    Abstract:

    The class of Cross-site Scripting (XSS) vulnerabilities is the most prevalent security problem in the field of Web applications. One of the main Attack vectors used in connection with XSS is session hijacking via session identifier theft. While session hijacking is a Client-Side Attack, the actual vulnerability resides on the server-side and, thus, has to be handled by the website's operator. In consequence, if the operator fails to address XSS, the application's users are defenseless against session hijacking Attacks. In this paper we present SessionShield, a lightweight Client-Side protection mechanism against session hijacking that allows users to protect themselves even if a vulnerable website's operator neglects to mitigate existing XSS problems. SessionShield is based on the observation that session identifier values are not used by legitimate clientside scripts and, thus, need not to be available to the scripting languages running in the browser. Our system requires no training period and imposes negligible overhead to the browser, therefore, making it ideal for desktop and mobile systems.

Michal Srokosz - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • FedCSIS - A New WAF-Based Architecture for Protecting Web Applications Against CSRF Attacks in Malicious Environment
    Proceedings of the 2018 Federated Conference on Computer Science and Information Systems, 2018
    Co-Authors: Michal Srokosz, Damian Rusinek, Bogdan Ksiezopolski
    Abstract:

    Web application firewall is an application firewall for HTTP applications. Typical WAF uses static analysis of HTTP request, defined as a set of rules, to find potentially dangerous payloads in the requests. Generally, these rules cover common Attacks such as cross-site scripting (XSS) and SQL injection which are server-related Attacks. Cross-site scripting is Client-Side Attack however the server is Attacked and forced to return malicious response. Rule-based approach becomes useless when the Attack is client-related, for example employing malware on the banking site. Malware allows to change the transfer data. This scenario is hard to detect because the browser displays valid transfer data and data is changed to the thieves' accounts number at the communication stage. In this paper we introduce a new web-based architecture for protecting web applications against CSRF Attacks in malicious environemnt. In our approach we extend a classic, static WAF approach with historical and behavioral analysis, based on actions performed by the user in the past.

  • A New WAF-Based Architecture for Protecting Web Applications Against CSRF Attacks in Malicious Environment
    2018 Federated Conference on Computer Science and Information Systems (FedCSIS), 2018
    Co-Authors: Michal Srokosz, Damian Rusinek, Bogdan Ksiezopolski
    Abstract:

    Web application firewall is an application firewall for HTTP applications. Typical WAF uses static analysis of HTTP request, defined as a set of rules, to find potentially dangerous payloads in the requests. Generally, these rules cover common Attacks such as cross-site scripting (XSS) and SQL injection which are server-related Attacks. Cross-site scripting is Client-Side Attack however the server is Attacked and forced to return malicious response. Rule-based approach becomes useless when the Attack is client-related, for example employing malware on the banking site. Malware allows to change the transfer data. This scenario is hard to detect because the browser displays valid transfer data and data is changed to the thieves' accounts number at the communication stage. In this paper we introduce a new web-based architecture for protecting web applications against CSRF Attacks in malicious environemnt. In our approach we extend a classic, static WAF approach with historical and behavioral analysis, based on actions performed by the user in the past.

Nick Nikiforakis - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • sessionshield lightweight protection against session hijacking
    International Conference on Engineering Secure Software and Systems, 2011
    Co-Authors: Nick Nikiforakis, Wannes Meert, Yves Younan, Martin Johns, Wouter Joosen
    Abstract:

    The class of Cross-site Scripting (XSS) vulnerabilities is the most prevalent security problem in the field of Web applications. One of the main Attack vectors used in connection with XSS is session hijacking via session identifier theft. While session hijacking is a Client-Side Attack, the actual vulnerability resides on the server-side and, thus, has to be handled by the website's operator. In consequence, if the operator fails to address XSS, the application's users are defenseless against session hijacking Attacks. In this paper we present SessionShield, a lightweight Client-Side protection mechanism against session hijacking that allows users to protect themselves even if a vulnerable website's operator neglects to mitigate existing XSS problems. SessionShield is based on the observation that session identifier values are not used by legitimate clientside scripts and, thus, need not to be available to the scripting languages running in the browser. Our system requires no training period and imposes negligible overhead to the browser, therefore, making it ideal for desktop and mobile systems.

  • ESSoS - SessionShield: lightweight protection against session hijacking
    Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 2011
    Co-Authors: Nick Nikiforakis, Wannes Meert, Yves Younan, Martin Johns, Wouter Joosen
    Abstract:

    The class of Cross-site Scripting (XSS) vulnerabilities is the most prevalent security problem in the field of Web applications. One of the main Attack vectors used in connection with XSS is session hijacking via session identifier theft. While session hijacking is a Client-Side Attack, the actual vulnerability resides on the server-side and, thus, has to be handled by the website's operator. In consequence, if the operator fails to address XSS, the application's users are defenseless against session hijacking Attacks. In this paper we present SessionShield, a lightweight Client-Side protection mechanism against session hijacking that allows users to protect themselves even if a vulnerable website's operator neglects to mitigate existing XSS problems. SessionShield is based on the observation that session identifier values are not used by legitimate clientside scripts and, thus, need not to be available to the scripting languages running in the browser. Our system requires no training period and imposes negligible overhead to the browser, therefore, making it ideal for desktop and mobile systems.