The Experts below are selected from a list of 5880 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform

Gary Burtless - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • international trade and the rise in earnings inequality
    Journal of Economic Literature, 1995
    Co-Authors: Gary Burtless
    Abstract:

    FREE TRADE is one of the most cherished goals of American economists. The theory of comparative advantage, taught in every introductory economics course, is regarded as a triumph of scientific reason and a compelling argument to reduce legal barriers to international trade. When making the case for adopting the Uruguay round of GATT, officials in the Clinton Administration claimed that trade liberalization under the new treaty would add $5 trillion to world output over the course of a decade. According to calculations by Administration economists, the United States is one of the main beneficiaries of the treaty. Liberalized trade can confer important benefits on a nation's economy but still reduce the incomes of selected producers. As U.S. trade restrictions have been eased over the postwar period, numerous industries have sought tariff and quota protection to keep producer profits and wages higher than they would be under a regime of unrestricted free trade. Although petitions for protection are often successful, most authorities on international trade believe that tariffs, quotas, and other legal impediments to trade have fallen over time, not only in the United States but throughout the world. World Bank tabulations show that tariff barriers on manufactured goods entering developed countries fell from an average of 40 percent in the late 1940s to less than seven percent by the late

July Powell Robert - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Nuclear Deterrence Theory, Nuclear Proliferation, and National Missile Defense
    International Security, 2003
    Co-Authors: July Powell Robert
    Abstract:

    On December 17, 2002, President George W. Bush ordered the deployment of a national missile defense (NMD). Proponents of missile defenses, both inside and outside the Bush Administration, argue that, absent NMD, the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the greater U.S. vulnerability that this entails will signiŽcantly limit the United States ability to secure it foreign policy goals. “A policy of intentional vulnerability by the Western nations,” Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld argues, “could give rogue states the power to hold our people hostage to nuclear blackmail—in an effort to prevent us from projecting force to stop aggression.”1 Similarly, Walter Slocombe as undersecretary of defense in the Clinton Administration asserted, “Without defenses, potential aggressors might think that the threat of strikes against U.S. cities could coerce the United States into failing to meet its commitments.”2 To what extent do the spread of nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them threaten U.S. interests and impede the United States ability to pursue its Nuclear Deterrence Theory

Steve Fetter - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • national missile defense and the future of u s nuclear weapons policy
    International Security, 2001
    Co-Authors: Charles L Glaser, Steve Fetter
    Abstract:

    National Miss ile Defens e If U.S. national missile defense (NMD) were only about countering ballistic missiles deployed by rogue states,1 then whether to deploy limited NMD would be a “normal” national security issue. The military-technical question would concern feasibility: Would the missile defense work against the small missile forces that a few states may eventually deploy? The military-political questions would concern the risks to the United States of being vulnerable to rogue-state missiles and the amount Washington should be willing to pay for insurance against these risks. What makes NMD special is its unavoidable connection to U.S. strategic nuclear policy and to the United States’ political relationships with Russia and China. Both states view U.S. NMD as a threat to their strategic nuclear capabilities and their relationship with the United States. If technically successful, even the limited NMD planned by the Clinton Administration might in some scenarios undermine the capability of Russian nuclear forces. Russia will Žnd limited NMD still more worrisome, anticipating that initial U.S. deployments would be followed by larger ones. The NMD system under development poses a larger and more immediate challenge to Chinese nuclear capabilities, which currently include only about 20 single-warhead intercontinental-range missiles. The Bush Administration has called for more robust and ambitious NMD—possibly increasing the number of ground-based interceptors and adding seaand space-based interceptors—which promises to make it still more threatening.2 Moreover, some proponents favor deploying NMD not only against rogue states, but also against China and possibly Russia. For example,

Charles L Glaser - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • national missile defense and the future of u s nuclear weapons policy
    International Security, 2001
    Co-Authors: Charles L Glaser, Steve Fetter
    Abstract:

    National Miss ile Defens e If U.S. national missile defense (NMD) were only about countering ballistic missiles deployed by rogue states,1 then whether to deploy limited NMD would be a “normal” national security issue. The military-technical question would concern feasibility: Would the missile defense work against the small missile forces that a few states may eventually deploy? The military-political questions would concern the risks to the United States of being vulnerable to rogue-state missiles and the amount Washington should be willing to pay for insurance against these risks. What makes NMD special is its unavoidable connection to U.S. strategic nuclear policy and to the United States’ political relationships with Russia and China. Both states view U.S. NMD as a threat to their strategic nuclear capabilities and their relationship with the United States. If technically successful, even the limited NMD planned by the Clinton Administration might in some scenarios undermine the capability of Russian nuclear forces. Russia will Žnd limited NMD still more worrisome, anticipating that initial U.S. deployments would be followed by larger ones. The NMD system under development poses a larger and more immediate challenge to Chinese nuclear capabilities, which currently include only about 20 single-warhead intercontinental-range missiles. The Bush Administration has called for more robust and ambitious NMD—possibly increasing the number of ground-based interceptors and adding seaand space-based interceptors—which promises to make it still more threatening.2 Moreover, some proponents favor deploying NMD not only against rogue states, but also against China and possibly Russia. For example,

Annatina Müller-germanà - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • United States’ Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Era: An Exploration of International Legitimacy
    2018
    Co-Authors: Annatina Müller-germanà
    Abstract:

    The thesis provides a systematic analysis of the international legitimacy of US foreign policy (US International Legitimacy, USIL) in the post-Cold War era (1989-2017), a topic not comprehensively addressed in scholarly literature. The thesis examines the extent to which US foreign policy can be considered legitimate in the post-Cold War era from an academic/scholarly perspective. It develops a framework consisting of four key elements (‘International Values and Norms’, ‘Inter-national Order’, ‘International Consensus’ and ‘International Society’), and combines this with the use of a ‘Family Resemblance Concept (FRC)’1 approach to analyse and compare these elements across US presidential Administrations. This framework is utilised as a lens to evaluate the extent that each US Administration’s foreign policy can be considered legitimate. The thesis makes five arguments and contributions to the scholarly literature: First, the thesis argues that the understanding of USIL evolved in the post-Cold War era. This was influenced by multiple different factors. Second, it shows that US foreign policy didn’t necessarily have to meet each of the four elements of the thesis’ framework to be considered legitimate. Third, it explains that in terms of USIL, there are differences between the various US Administrations: The foreign policies of the George H.W. Bush and Obama Administrations can be considered mostly legitimate, of the Clinton Administration partially legitimate and of the George W. Bush Administration weakly legitimate. Fourth, it illustrates that for hegemonic states like the US, USIL acts both as a constraining and enabling component of US foreign policy. Finally, the thesis concludes that US foreign policy can be considered relatively legitimate in the post-Cold War era