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Choyce Robert - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Post U.S. Afghanistan: An Assessment of How the Withdrawal of U.S. and Coalition Forces from Afghanistan will Impact the U.S. - Taliban Agreement with Supporting Historical Analysis Comparing the Decade after Soviet Withdrawal to Current Conditions in Afghanistan
    Digital Commons @ New Haven, 2021
    Co-Authors: Choyce Robert
    Abstract:

    On February 29th, 2020, the United States and the Taliban signed an agreement to withdraw all U.S. and Coalition Forces from Afghanistan within fourteen months of the announcement of the agreement. In exchange the Taliban will: take certain steps to ensure Afghanistan will not be “used by any group[s] or individual[s]” to “threaten the security of the United States and its allies”; the Taliban will engage in intra-Afghan negotiations with the purpose of establishing a political power sharing settlement involving the Taliban for a post U.S. Afghanistan; and a permanent and comprehensive ceasefire will be on the agenda of the intra-Afghan negotiations (Agreement for Bringing Peace, 2020). This thesis seeks to answer how will the withdrawal of U.S. and Coalition Forces from the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan impact the tenets of the U.S. – Taliban agreement. The assessment will be divided by the three core tenets of the U.S. – Taliban agreement: a permanent and comprehensive ceasefire, intra-Afghan negotiations to establish a political power sharing settlement involving the Taliban for a post U.S. Afghanistan, and counterterrorism guarantees by the Taliban (Agreement for Bringing Peace, 2020). Each tenet will have its own assessment that reflects how that section of the agreement will function in a post U.S. and Coalition Force Afghanistan. The conclusion of each tenet’s assessment will be further supported by historical analysis that compares the operating environment after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan with the current operating environment in Afghanistan to ascertain how the departure of Western Forces from Afghanistan will impact the U.S. – Taliban agreement. The Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, in 1989, resulted in the tumultuous decade of the 1990s: mujahadeen resistance against the communist government in Afghanistan, the collapse of the Communist government, the Afghan civil war, and Taliban support of al-Qaeda culminating in the attacks of September 11th, 2001 (Coll, 2004). Examining the aftereffects of the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan as compared to current conditions in Afghanistan is critical in order to determine if the departure of U.S. and Coalition Forces will have similar effects to the Soviet withdrawal

John Moulton - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • rethinking ied strategies from iraq to afghanistan
    Military review, 2009
    Co-Authors: John Moulton
    Abstract:

    [ILLUSTRATION OMITTED] IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICES (IEDs) have been emblematic of the insurgency in Iraq. Why have so many disparate insurgent groups with varying resource levels chosen the same means to pursue their often-conflicting goals? And, a more important question, what can we do to eliminate IEDs as the leading cause of Coalition Force casualties? Coalition Forces cannot out-armor or out-engineer the problem, although an IED's physical effects can be, and have been, mitigated. The insurgency in Iraq has been a complex problem, the taming of which requires adaptive, comprehensive effort. We will not defeat the IED problem with a single solution. Nor will we likely ever solve it in the literal sense. However, if we counter IED attacks as part of an overarching counterinsurgency strategy, we can reduce an insurgency's ability to gain strategic advantages with IEDs. The first step in understanding how to do this is to examine how the IED's unique nature as a weapon system has benefitted insurgents in Iraq and provided them with the ability to gain strategic advantages. Then, adjusting how counter-IED (CIED) Forces document IED attacks, we can look at more IED attacks forensically and resource CIED partnership programs so they can perform a strategic role in counterinsurgency. The CIED effort can contribute to the overall counterinsurgency effort in both Iraq and Afghanistan by reducing the insurgents' ability to use IEDs to achieve strategic goals. Because They Work The IED has become a widely used weapon for insurgents in Iraq for one reason: it works. The IED's effectiveness as a weapon system largely derives from its ability to detonate in close proximity to a target. The enemy in Iraq does this either by using a suicide operative to initiate the IED or by having its victim or victims unknowingly set off the device. Examples of victim-initiated attacks include using the weight of the victim or vehicle to trigger an electric switch, using landmines to initiate an IED, or using passive infrared systems that detect movement. (1) The IED detonates close to its target and at a predetermined angle. The IED has the same effect as a precision-guided weapon. While victim-initiated IED detonations depend on victims taking actions to initiate them, insurgents have reduced the element of chance by including separate arming and firing systems and by using command initiation systems where a triggerman arms or fires the IED. Typical methods used in Iraq include powering the IED via a copper wire previously laid out between the device and the triggerman, or using commercially available technology such as long-range, cordless telephones or electronic key fobs to transmit an arming or firing signal. (2) By using these methods, the IED's triggerman can physically distance himself from the scene of the attack without reducing its effectiveness. In this manner, IEDs can incorporate the weapon system concept of standoff. By gaining distance, the triggerman limits his chances of death or injury when he detonates the IED, reduces his odds of capture by being further away from his victims, and facilitates his escape. The use of commercially available products in IEDs in Iraq is extensive. By using commercial products, insurgents ingeniously take advantage of the creative power of a global market-based economy. Rather than having to research, design, test, and manufacture their own initiation systems, insurgents rely on the power of consumer demand to entice companies and their research labs to develop and produce smaller, lighter, longer range, less expensive, and increasingly reliable electronic items, which they can use in their IEDs. These constant technical improvements also benefit the insurgent by making it difficult for CIED Forces to adapt. If insurgents find one of their systems is susceptible to IED countermeasures, the multitude of commercially available systems readily provides them with options for switching to other systems. …

Wojciech Kaczkowski - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

Carol Winkler - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

Lindsey Dewick - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.