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Dominic Palmerbrown - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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rumelhart prize to be announced at Cognitive Science society
Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 2001Co-Authors: Dominic PalmerbrownAbstract:The David E. Rumelhart Prize will be awarded for the first time in 2001. The award is for recent, significant contributions to the formal analysis of human cognition and will go either to an individual or to a team. The scope of research eligible for the award includes mathematical modelling of human Cognitive processes, formal analysis of language and other products of human Cognitive activity, and computational analyses of human cognition. The prize, which includes a monetary award of $100,000, will be funded by the Robert J. Glushko and Pamela Samuelson Foundation in San Francisco.The first winner will be announced at the meeting of the Cognitive Science Society in Edinburgh this summer (COGSCI 2001, 1–4 August). The recipient will deliver the Prize Lecture at the subsequent meeting, at George Mason University, in 2002. James L. McClelland chairs the selection panel and full details are available at http://www.cnbc.cmu.edu/derprize/. This site also provides information on David Rumelhart himself and his belief that Cognitive Science should have formal theories, such as those in linguistics, as well as mathematical and computational models.
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rumelhart prize to be announced at Cognitive Science society
Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 2001Co-Authors: Dominic PalmerbrownAbstract:The David E. Rumelhart Prize will be awarded for the first time in 2001. The award is for recent, significant contributions to the formal analysis of human cognition and will go either to an individual or to a team. The scope of research eligible for the award includes mathematical modelling of human Cognitive processes, formal analysis of language and other products of human Cognitive activity, and computational analyses of human cognition. The prize, which includes a monetary award of $100,000, will be funded by the Robert J. Glushko and Pamela Samuelson Foundation in San Francisco.The first winner will be announced at the meeting of the Cognitive Science Society in Edinburgh this summer (COGSCI 2001, 1–4 August). The recipient will deliver the Prize Lecture at the subsequent meeting, at George Mason University, in 2002. James L. McClelland chairs the selection panel and full details are available at http://www.cnbc.cmu.edu/derprize/. This site also provides information on David Rumelhart himself and his belief that Cognitive Science should have formal theories, such as those in linguistics, as well as mathematical and computational models.
Nick Chater - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Cognitive Science as an interface between rational and mechanistic explanation
Topics in Cognitive Science, 2014Co-Authors: Nick ChaterAbstract:Cognitive Science views thought as computation; and computation, by its very nature, can be understood in both rational and mechanistic terms. In rational terms, a computation solves some information processing problem (e.g., mapping sensory information into a description of the external world; parsing a sentence; selecting among a set of possible actions). In mechanistic terms, a computation corresponds to causal chain of events in a physical device (in engineering context, a silicon chip; in biological context, the nervous system). The discipline is thus at the interface between two very different styles of explanation--as the papers in the current special issue well illustrate, it explores the interplay of rational and mechanistic forces.
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what can Cognitive Science say or learn about economic crises
Conference Cognitive Science, 2012Co-Authors: Magda Osman, Nick Chater, Bjorn Meder, Gerd Gigerenzer, Daniel Read, Hansjorg NethAbstract:What Can Cognitive Science Say or Learn about Economic Crises? *Magda Osman (m.osman@qmul.ac.uk) Experimental Biology and Psychology Centre, Queen Mary University London, London, E14NS, UK *Bjorn Meder (meder@mpib-berlin.mpg.de) Gerd Gigerenzer (gigerenzer@mpib-berlin.mpg.de) Center for Adaptive Behavior and Cognition, Max Planck Institute for Human Development, 14195 Berlin, Germany Nick Chater (nick.chater@wbs.ac.uk) Daniel Read (daniel.read@wbs.ac.uk) Warwick Business School, University of Warwick, Coventry, CV4 7AL, UK Hansjorg Neth (hneth@uni-goettingen.de) Department of Psychology, University of Gottingen, Gosslerstr. 14, 37073 Gottingen, Germany Keywords: Cognitive Science, Economics, Decision making, Uncertainty, Behavioral Economics, Rationality, Heuristics Uncertainty can permeate all aspects of a decision problem, from constructing the action space, to inferring probabilities of outcomes and the behavior of other agents in the situation. For instance, politicians need to decide whether to bail out fragile banks and countries under time pressure, with incomplete information about the problem space, and the necessity to manage conflicting goals (e.g., also considering the needs of their won electorate). Turning situations of this kind into lottery type tasks may in fact be a way of translating the unmanageable (uncertainty) into something manageable (risk), but at the same time the evidence may be giving answers to the wrong kind of questions. Additionally, there is an issue of scalability. Neoclassical economics assumes that macro-level behavior can be deduced from modeling agents as rational, utility-maximizing individuals. While this oversimplification is often recognized by economists, scaling up to the aggregate level is a necessity when having to inform policy decision. The crucial challenge in revising the microfoundations of economic behavior is how we can build more realistic models, which nevertheless can be scaled up to the aggregate level. The issue Economic crises bring to the fore deep issues for the economic profession: why are such crises often not foreseen, and what does this entail for economic theory? In this symposium we also adopt a self-critical analysis, by asking the following: what can the Cognitive Science community say or learn about cognition and behavior in the context of economic crises? After all, Cognitive Science shares one of its principle objectives with economics: to investigate and model the principles that underlie and govern human behavior. Challenges The current financial crisis presents us with a real- world example of decision making under uncertainty. Cognitive Science offers a variety of theories and models, from probabilistic models of cognition (Chater & Oaksford, 2008) to heuristic approaches (Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011), each designed to describe decision making under uncertainty. Empirically, the extant methods used to examine this question in both economics and psychology involve simple choice tasks (e.g., lotteries and games with well-defined probabilities and outcomes). But, are the models sufficient to accurately represent uncertainty, and are the tools adequate for the job of capturing decision making under uncertainty? Goals of the Symposium The symposium is themed around the target questions: What can our community say or learn about cognition and behavior in economic crises?
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Why Cognitive Science is not formalized folk psychology
Minds and Machines, 1995Co-Authors: Martin Pickering, Nick ChaterAbstract:It is often assumed that Cognitive Science is built upon folk psychology, and that challenges to folk psychology are therefore challenges to Cognitive Science itself. We argue that, in practice, Cognitive Science and folk psychology treat entirely non-overlapping domains: Cognitive Science considers aspects of mental life which do not depend on general knowledge, whereas folk psychology considers aspects of mental life which do depend on general knowledge. We back up our argument on theoretical grounds, and also illustrate the separation between Cognitive scientific and folk psychological phenomena in a number of Cognitive domains. We consider the methodological and theoretical significance of our arguments for Cognitive Science research.
Shaun Gallagher - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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the phenomenological mind an introduction to philosophy of mind and Cognitive Science
2008Co-Authors: Shaun Gallagher, Dan ZahaviAbstract:1. Introduction: Philosophy of Mind, Cognitive Science, and Phenomenology 2. Methodology 3. Consciousness/Self-consciousness 4. Time 5. Intentionality 6. The Embodied Mind 7. Action 8. How we Know Others 9. Situated and Extended Minds 10. Self and Person
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the phenomenological mind an introduction to philosophy of mind and Cognitive Science
2007Co-Authors: Shaun Gallagher, Dan ZahaviAbstract:The Phenomenological Mind is the first book to properly introduce fundamental questions about the mind from the perspective of phenomenology. Key questions and topics covered include: What is phenomenology? naturalizing phenomenology and the empirical Cognitive Sciences phenomenology and consciousness consciousness and self-consciousness, including perception and action time and consciousness, including William James intentionality the embodied mind action knowledge of other minds situated and extended minds phenomenology and personal identity Interesting and important examples are used throughout, including phantom limb syndrome, blindsight and self-disorders in schizophrenia, making The Phenomenological Mind an ideal introduction to key concepts in phenomenology, Cognitive Science and philosophy of mind.
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philosophical conceptions of the self implications for Cognitive Science
Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 2000Co-Authors: Shaun GallagherAbstract:Abstract Several recently developed philosophical approaches to the self promise to enhance the exchange of ideas between the philosophy of the mind and the other Cognitive Sciences. This review examines two important concepts of self: the ‘minimal self', a self devoid of temporal extension, and the ‘narrative self', which involves personal identity and continuity across time. The notion of a minimal self is first clarified by drawing a distinction between the sense of self-agency and the sense of self-ownership for actions. This distinction is then explored within the neurological domain with specific reference to schizophrenia, in which the sense of self-agency may be disrupted. The convergence between the philosophical debate and empirical study is extended in a discussion of more primitive aspects of self and how these relate to neonatal experience and robotics. The second concept of self, the narrative self, is discussed in the light of Gazzaniga's left-hemisphere ‘interpreter' and episodic memory. Extensions of the idea of a narrative self that are consistent with neurological models are then considered. The review illustrates how the philosophical approach can inform Cognitive Science and suggests that a two-way collaboration may lead to a more fully developed account of the self.
Graham Wood - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Cognitive Science and religious belief
Philosophy Compass, 2011Co-Authors: Graham WoodAbstract:The Cognitive Science of religion draws on insights from evolutionary psychology, and offers explanations of religious belief based on natural Cognitive processes. This article examines a number of competing explanations of religious belief by considering it as a solution to the challenge of cooperation. The challenge of stopping individuals cheating within a cooperative group has been a problem throughout humanity's evolutionary history. Empirical evidence drawn from fields such as anthropology and psychology suggests that religious beliefs are part of an evolved Cognitive system that motivates individuals to cooperate with other members of their group. Three possible evolutionary accounts, the memetic, by-product, and adaptation accounts, are considered as evolved solutions to the challenge of cooperation.
Alvin I. Goldman - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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consciousness folk psychology and Cognitive Science
Consciousness and Cognition, 1993Co-Authors: Alvin I. GoldmanAbstract:Abstract This paper supports the basic integrity of the folk-psychological conception of consciousness and its importance in Cognitive theorizing. Section 1 critically examines some proposed definitions of consciousness and argues that the folk-psychological notion of phenomenal consciousness is not captured by various functional–relational definitions. Section 2 rebuts the arguments of several writers who challenge the very existence of phenomenal consciousness, or the coherence or tenability of the folk-psychological notion of awareness. Section 3 defends a significant role for phenomenal consciousness in the execution of a certain Cognitive task, viz., classification of one′s own mental states. Execution of this task, which is part of folk psychologizing, is taken as a datum in scientific psychology. It is then argued (on theoretical grounds) that the most promising sort of scientific model of the self-ascription of mental states is one that posits the kinds of phenomenal properties invoked by folk psychology. Cognitive Science and neuroScience can of course refine and improve upon the folk understanding of consciousness, awareness, and mental states generally. But the folk-psychological constructs should not be jettisoned; they have a role to play in Cognitive theorizing.
