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Michael J. Beran - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Chimpanzees, cooking, and a more Comparative Psychology
    Learning & Behavior, 2016
    Co-Authors: Michael J. Beran, Lydia M. Hopper, Frans B. M. Waal, Sarah F. Brosnan, Ken Sayers
    Abstract:

    A recent report suggested that chimpanzees demonstrate the cognitive capacities necessary to understand cooking (Warneken & Rosati, 2015 ). We offered alternative explanations and mechanisms that could account for the behavioral responses of those chimpanzees, and questioned the manner in which the data were used to examine human evolution (Beran, Hopper, de Waal, Sayers, & Brosnan, 2015 ). Two commentaries suggested either that we were overly critical of the original report’s claims and methodology (Rosati & Warneken, 2016 ), or that, contrary to our statements, early biological thinkers contributed little to questions concerning the evolutionary importance of cooking (Wrangham, 2016 ). In addition, both commentaries took issue with our treatment of chimpanzee referential models in human evolutionary studies. Our response offers points of continued disagreement as well as points of conciliation. We view Warneken and Rosati’s general conclusions as a case of affirming the consequent—a logical conundrum in which, in this case, a demonstration of a partial list of the underlying abilities required for a cognitive trait/suite (understanding of cooking) are suggested as evidence for that ability. And although we strongly concur with both Warneken and Rosati ( 2015 ) and Wrangham ( 2016 ) that chimpanzee research is invaluable and essential to understanding humanness, it can only achieve its potential via the holistic inclusion of all available evidence—including that from other animals, evolutionary theory, and the fossil and archaeological records.

  • Commentary: A crisis in Comparative Psychology: where have all the undergraduates gone?
    Frontiers in psychology, 2015
    Co-Authors: Michael J. Beran, Brielle T. James, Sara E. Futch, Audrey E. Parrish
    Abstract:

    Abramson (2015) has offered an interesting target article, and we are pleased to engage in the debate. Our authors consist of a senior researcher with 20 years of experience working in Comparative Psychology (MJB), an early career psychologist who just completed her doctoral program in cognitive sciences with a focus on Comparative cognition (AEP), a first-year graduate student also in cognitive sciences (BTJ), and an undergraduate student who has worked with multiple species of nonhuman primates in various internship positions (SEF). MJB circulated this article to get reactions from his co-authors given that they presently are heavily invested in Comparative Psychology at various stages in their careers, to see how they perceive its future. None of us felt that as undergraduates we needed a course in Comparative Psychology (formally) to have found our way to being interested in Comparative Psychology, which was good because none of us had such a course. MJB, for example, took courses in Learning and Behavior and Cognitive Psychology that led him to potential graduate programs in Comparative Psychology (primarily in areas focused on cognition or psychopharmacology). AEP completed her biology undergraduate degree with very little formal training in Psychology, but was introduced to and intrigued by Comparative Psychology through zoology, animal behavior, primatology, and evolution courses. BTJ noted that she also took the Comparative Psychology classes that were “hidden” under other names (primate behavior, biological anthropology, etc.), but that for her this still led her to Comparative Psychology as a graduate student. Thus, we believe that students who go into other specializations are not disengaged with the field of Comparative Psychology, nor are the psychologists in other specializations incapable of being considered Comparative psychologists, if those other specializations recognize the importance of Comparative approaches. We agree with Abramson (2015) that Comparative Psychology needs to be clearer in its projection to students of what it offers by way of broad skills learned while studying this area. We further note that this same point can be made with translating our work and its implications for the general public. We know that our work has benefits to human society through educational reform, communication theory, behavior modification, and so forth, but we imagine that this clarity of relevance was better made in decades past when, for example, Skinnerian theories and approaches were well known and well integrated into everyday life. We appreciate Dr. Abramson's concern that Comparative Psychology not be confused (or worse, equated) with Comparative cognition. Comparative cognition draws upon evolutionary biology, anthropology, animal behavior, physiology, neuroscience, linguistics, and other fields, many of which also overlap to varying degrees with Comparative Psychology while not being the same as Comparative Psychology. It probably is true that the typical undergraduate best equates the idea of Comparative Psychology with approaches in Comparative cognition (or, perhaps, depending on the department, with Pavlovian and Skinnerian learning theories). A curriculum that emphasizes Learning and Behavior and Cognitive Psychology courses, along with an interdisciplinary approach with Biology and Neuroscience could work toward a resolution of this concern even if a course in Comparative Psychology did not exist. We agree that three of the most critical issues facing undergraduates who might consider graduate training in Comparative Psychology are (1) access to animal research as undergraduates, (2) the sense that animal research is under increasing threat from animal rights advocates and (3) limited career opportunities, especially in academia, for those trained in Comparative Psychology. The first problem can be overcome by looking for opportunities outside university and college settings. Zoos, sanctuaries, and other such organizations that have animals can and will accept motivated interns. In fact, we encourage this approach, because one thing it offers that many Comparative Psychology students of last century largely did not get is the idea that animal behavior means more than the behavior of rats and pigeons! Comparative Psychology needs to be more Comparative (Beran et al., 2014), a problem that was a greater concern when Comparative Psychology was more prominent as an area of focused training (e.g., Beach, 1950). Going to where the animals are could help with this problem, and it already has in the sub-area of Comparative cognition (e.g., Shettleworth, 2009). Of course, this also requires faculty that support such efforts by interested students. Concerns about animal rights activists can be addressed by teaching undergraduate students about the ways in which psychological scientists ethically and responsibly work with animals, with discussions about IACUC protocols, and with information about organizations such as APA's CARE committee. Finally, jobs in academia tend to go “where the money is,” and so this may require a bottom-up approach where re-establishing a stronger pipeline of students trained in the tradition of Comparative Psychology and successful in generating grant support then generates a larger workforce that can train future generations in the same tradition. Certainly, one can look at areas such as neuroimaging research to see how this trend emerges. At the same time, jobs for Comparative psychologists may take other names, and even come from non-Psychology departments (e.g., evolutionary biology), but they still exist and still require students trained in the methods of Comparative Psychology. Comparative Psychology remains a crucial and necessary aspect of a full psychological theory of behavior, including human behavior, and it needs to be presented to undergraduate students as such. More can be done, and it should, but in the end we think that there is less of a crisis than Abramson (2015) suggests. We do see a current lethargic promotion of the breadth of topics in a formally-defined Comparative Psychology (excluding the area of Comparative cognition), but at the same time there is a strong and growing promotion of interdisciplinary approaches to animal behavior and cognition. Thus, “Comparative Psychology” as a distinct training tradition may fade, but if students still are exposed to rigorous methods for studying animal (and human) behavior in traditions such as Comparative cognitive science, developmental science, biological science, or neuroscience, “Comparative Psychology” as a field is alive and well and still highly attractive to future students.

  • number without language Comparative Psychology and the evolution of numerical cognition
    Frontiers in Psychology, 2013
    Co-Authors: Christian Agrillo, Michael J. Beran
    Abstract:

    Curiosity about the numerical abilities of non-human animals has been a topic in experimental Psychology for about as long as such a science has existed. Some of the earliest Comparative work looked at how well animals could use number as a cue in making different kinds of judgments. Early results were mixed, and in some cases were incredibly controversial (e.g., the case of the horse Clever Hans). After the “fall” of behaviorism and the “rise” of cognitive Psychology, the question of numerical competence became one of the dominant research areas in the new field of Comparative cognition. The present series of papers in this special topic represents the newest additions to that research area. This special topic also serves as an anniversary of sorts, as it comes 25 years after one of the most influential papers on the subject of numerical competence in animals (Davis and Perusse, 1988). Comparing the major themes of that paper to the topics in this special issue serves to highlight where we came from, and where we might be going with future research. Davis and Perusse (1988) and the commentaries that were involved in that paper presented a number of critical issues in the area of numerical cognition research at that time. One of the largest was whether the use of the term “counting” was appropriate for much of what was being studied with non-human animals, and they cautioned against applying that term to methodologies that did not require the principles that underlie counting in humans (e.g., Gelman and Gallistel, 1978). This problem seems to be largely resolved, as most researchers in the area today recognize that animals are not counting, even in their most sophisticated demonstrations. Davis and Perusse (1988) attempted to standardize terminology. Some of the terms they offered have come to be re-defined (e.g., “sense of number”) whereas others have come to be re-named (e.g., changing relative numerousness judgments to relative quantity judgments where it is clear that number is not the only stimulus dimension that an animal could use to perform a task). Subitizing remains an interesting phenomenon, sometimes evident in animal research but other times not evident (see Murofushi, 1997). Davis and Perusse (1988) also called for the use of transfer tests, and better controls in experimental work, and although those concerns still remain (e.g., Beran, 2012), in general the field has risen to that challenge. Perhaps the biggest change has been the shift from questioning whether number is used by animals only as a “last resort” (e.g., Davis and Memmott, 1982) to the now general consensus that number is a relevant stimulus cue to which animals are sensitive in a number of contexts (e.g., Cantlon and Brannon, 2007; Agrillo et al., 2011). As the papers in this special topic demonstrate, animals can and do use quantitative and numerical information in a variety of contexts, and in some cases may even be fairly described as numerate, although with certain caveats such as being far more “fuzzy” in how they represent numerosities than are humans above 5 or 6 years of age. This special topic encompasses 16 novel studies, including mammals (e.g., Beran et al., 2012; Panteleeva et al., 2013), birds (Armstrong et al., 2012), fish (Gomez-Laplaza and Gerlai, 2012), and invertebrates (Pahl et al., 2013). We learned that numerical information is a potential relevant cue also in species that have been poorly investigated compared to primates (e.g., dolphins: Yaman et al., 2012, beetles: Carazo et al., 2012). Some non-numerical visual cues, however, may play a key role too: for instance, overall quantity of movement within the shoals is a necessary condition for large (but not for small) shoals discrimination in angelfish, with interesting implications for the theoretical debate about how non-human animals process small and large quantities (Gomez-Laplaza and Gerlai, 2012). Also the lack of a ratio effect reported in wolves in the range 1–4 is potentially in line with the idea of different ways to process small and large quantities (Utrata et al., 2012). In contrast, data against the existence of a subitizing-like process have been described in primates (Jones and Brannon, 2012; Barnard et al., 2013) and canids (Baker et al., 2012), highlighting that we are still far from solving the question raised by Davis and Perusse regarding whether animals subitize (see also Cutini and Bonato, 2012). Interspecific studies comparing different species (fish: Agrillo et al., 2012; canids: Baker et al., 2012) are also reported in the special topic: in both of these studies similarities among the species are greater than differences, suggesting the existence of similar numerical systems among vertebrates. The special topic also includes theoretical and research studies on human infants. In particular, attention has been focused on number-space interaction (de Hevia et al., 2012), the relation between numerical and non-numerical cues (Uller et al., 2013) and the development of ordinal abilities (Anderson and Cordes, 2013). It has been suggested that human and non-human animals share the same non-symbolic numerical systems (Feigenson et al., 2004). If so, we believe that an inter-disciplinary approach including cognitive (non-verbal numerical judgments in adults), developmental (newborns and infants) and Comparative Psychology will represent the very frontier of numerical cognition studies, enabling us to understand both the evolutionary foundations of our numerical abilities and the exact mechanisms underlying quantity discrimination in the absence of language.

Christophe Boesch - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • away from ethnocentrism and anthropocentrism towards a scientific understanding of what makes us human
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 2010
    Co-Authors: Christophe Boesch
    Abstract:

    The quest to understand "what makes us human" has been heading towards an impasse, when Comparative Psychology compares primarily individuals that are not representative of their species. Captives experience such divergent socioecological niches that they cannot stand for their wild counterparts. Only after removing ethnocentrism and anthropocentrism will we he able to progress in our understanding of "what makes us human.".

  • what makes us human homo sapiens the challenge of cognitive cross species comparison
    Journal of Comparative Psychology, 2007
    Co-Authors: Christophe Boesch
    Abstract:

    Two major theoretical approaches have dominated the quest for uniquely human cognitive abilities: a developmentalist approach stressing the importance of environmental and social conditions, and a predominant approach in experimental and Comparative Psychology, the deterministic approach suggesting the effect of environmental and social conditions to be minimal. As a consequence, most claims of human cognitive uniqueness are based on comparisons of White middle class Westerner humans (Homo sapiens) with captive chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes). However, humans are much more than only White middle class Westerners, and chimpanzees are much more than only captives. A review of some data available on different populations of humans and chimpanzees reveals that only the predictions of the developmentalist approach are supported. In addition, systematic biases are too often introduced in experiment protocols when comparing humans with apes that further cast doubts on cross-species comparisons. The author argues that only with consideration of within-species population differences in the cognitive domains and the use of well-matched cross-species experimental procedures will an objective understanding of the different cognitive abilities between species emerge. This will require a shift in the theoretical approach adopted by many in experimental and Comparative Psychology.

Eric Hochstein - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • when does folk Psychology count as folk psychological
    The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 2017
    Co-Authors: Eric Hochstein
    Abstract:

    It has commonly been argued that certain types of mental descriptions, specifically those characterized in terms of propositional attitudes, are part of a folk psychological understanding of the mind. Recently, however, it has also been argued that this is the case even when such descriptions are employed as part of scientific theories in domains like social Psychology and Comparative Psychology. In this paper, I argue that there is no plausible way to understand the distinction between folk and scientific Psychology that can support such claims. Moreover, these sorts of claims can have adverse consequences for the neuroscientific study of the brain by downplaying the value of many psychological theories that provide information neuroscientists need in order to build and test neurological models.

Mathias Osvath - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • What's in a name? Commentary: A crisis in Comparative Psychology: where have all the undergraduates gone
    Frontiers in psychology, 2015
    Co-Authors: Mathias Osvath, Tomas Persson
    Abstract:

    Abramson recently expressed concern over the fact that the Comparative Psychology discipline might be in danger, as the number of academic courses bearing its name is low (Abramson, 2015). In contrast to Abramson we do not think that a fading name equals a dying science. On the contrary, it is likely a sign of a developing science and a more multifaceted education. That a discipline's name does not contain “Comparative” does not mean that comparisons are not made, or are crucial. If subscribing to the definition given by Abramson: “similarities and differences in the behavior of organisms,” it is in fact difficult to imagine an animal science without any comparisons. For example, ethology is a branch of science with inherently Comparative studies of animal behavior (Burkhardt, 2005). There is no obvious monopoly on Comparative methods in Comparative Psychology. The approach of comparing organisms is a biological one, stemming from pre-Darwinian times in such fields as Comparative anatomy. Comparisons with humans, especially, are ubiquitous in many disciplines. That such disciplines would not offer training in making valid comparisons—whatever that is—appears to be an unfounded assumption. We hope that animal sciences, along with most other sciences, also develop the students' “critical thinking skills, personal exploration, cultivating a comprehensive view of the world around them, and their ability to apply their skills in both academic and applied fields” just as well as Comparative Psychology does. Students can certainly learn about “analogies, homologies, subject variables, environmental variables, observation skills, etc.” in a course on e.g., animal cognition, or behavioral ecology. The crux of the matter seems to be that Abramson lacks a place for the Comparative study of behavior without reference to cognition. Still, he wants to call this Psychology, and demand a place for this in introductory texts and courses on Psychology. It is true that “cognition” or “cognitive” are moot and debatable terms, but so is “behavior” (Levitis et al., 2009). Cognition is a contemporary term that for us encompasses a host of phenomena concerning behaviors in organisms with a nervous system. Contrary to the author we believe that cognition is a broad concept, and involves fundamental processes. Abramson posits that Comparative cognition is based on a very specific theoretical position, including the belief that internal cognitive processes can be studied scientifically. First of all, cognitive science(s) is far from a specific theoretical position, there are numerous contradicting hypotheses. Secondly, the belief that cognition can be measured through behavior is as much a belief as the notion that evolution can by measured through observations, or that learning might be studied without assuming memory, and retrieval mechanisms. Thirdly, viewing cognition as purely “internal” is an antiquated position; contemporary cognitive theories often view cognition as a causal process where the body's interaction with the environment is essential, or is part of the cognitive process (Gardenfors, 2008). Abramson seems to think that such things as physiology and evolution are beyond the scope of Comparative cognition—we cannot see this. He also appears to mean that behaviorist questions cannot be studied within a cognitive framework. If this refers to learning theories, then such an assumption is false. Learning theories are in our experience given plenty of room in courses on e.g., animal cognition. We would share Abramsons' concerns of a disappearing body of knowledge if we thought it was true. Instead, we think that the successful methods and theories of such various fields as e.g., Comparative Psychology, ethology, neurocognition, developmental Psychology, philosophy, and theoretical biology, are today incorporated in the education in animal cognition, as well as in other courses with different names. The study of animals' behaviors and minds has always been an eclectic enterprise. Fractionalisation is a natural result of both the dynamics of science and the branding necessary to explain a field's content. We regret to learn that Abramson sees a need for faculties to point out the value of Comparative Psychology. But is this best done by distancing the subject from sister subjects? This is arguably not a fruitful way to establish the image of an important discipline. Integration is the proof that something is of use for something else. Comparative Psychology has been a discipline mainly of North American concern, and Abramson's paper is heavy with references to American conditions. In Europe there has traditionally been a focus on the biological disciplines, such as ethology (Burkhardt, 2005). One should not be surprised in not finding many programs and courses named “Comparative Psychology” when browsing European universities. In Sweden we call the subject “cognitive zoology,” and for pedagogical reasons we call our courses “animal cognition.” In Austria it is called “cognitive biology.” In UK one would find various names and so on. However, the curriculums of the different programs and courses overlap. Perhaps this is the case in USA too? It could of course be that the implicit definition of “Comparative cognition” differs between USA and Europe, which might give Abramson right with respect to “Comparative cognition” being a heavily reduced form of “Comparative Psychology.” In that case the cognitively inclined researchers in Europe should be worried too, as Abramson's observations would then indeed indicate a narrowing of the theoretical scope in USA. In order to judge whether this is the case, a more qualitative analysis is required.

  • The string-pulling paradigm in Comparative Psychology.
    Journal of comparative psychology (Washington D.C. : 1983), 2015
    Co-Authors: Ivo Jacobs, Mathias Osvath
    Abstract:

    String pulling is one of the most widely used paradigms in Comparative Psychology. First documented 2 millennia ago, it has been a well-established scientific paradigm for a century. More than 160 bird and mammal species have been tested in over 200 studies with countless methodological variations. The paradigm can be used to address a wide variety of issues on animal cognition; for example, what animals understand about contact and connection as well as whether they rely on perceptual feedback, grasp the functionality of strings, generalize across conditions, apply their knowledge flexibly, and possess insight. Mammals are typically tested on a horizontal configuration, birds on a vertical one, making the studies difficult to compare; in particular, pulling a string vertically requires better coordination and attention. A species' performance on the paradigm is often influenced by its ecology, especially concerning whether limbs are used for foraging. Many other factors can be of importance and should be considered. The string-pulling paradigm is easy to administer, vary, and apply to investigate a wide array of cognitive abilities. Although it can be and has been used to compare species, divergent methods and unclear reporting have limited its Comparative utility. With increasing research standards, the paradigm is expected to become an even more fundamental tool in Comparative Psychology. (PsycINFO Database Record (Less)

Adam B Cohen - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Psychology of culture and religion introduction to the jccp special issue
    Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 2011
    Co-Authors: Vassilis Saroglou, Adam B Cohen
    Abstract:

    In introducing this Special Issue we first consider six ways of thinking about how culture and religion relate to each other: Religion may be part of culture, constitute culture, include and transcend culture, be influenced by culture, shape culture, or interact with culture in influencing cognitions, emotions, and actions. Second, we present the major current trends of relevant research from cross-cultural Psychology, social and cultural Psychology, and Comparative Psychology of religion. Although diverging in methodologies, theoretical traditions, and research focus, these approaches complement each other in increasing our psychological understanding of the inter-relations between culture and religion. Finally, we present the papers of this special issue that offer theoretical advances, test new research hypotheses, and provide empirical evidence showing how cultural-level dimensions (from ecology and biology to ethnicity, family practices, and socio-economic factors) shape religion’s functioning at the individual and/or collective level with regard to key life domains.