The Experts below are selected from a list of 3666 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Andrea Prat - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
-
risk taking and optimal contracts for money managers
Social Science Research Network, 2003Co-Authors: Frederic Palomino, Andrea PratAbstract:Recent empirical work suggests a strong connection between the incentives money managers are offered and their risk-taking behavior. We develop a general model of delegated portfolio management, with the feature that the agent can control the riskiness of the portfolio. This represents a departure from the existing literature on agency theory in that moral hazard is not only effort exertion but also risk taking behavior. The moral hazard problem with risk taking involves an incentive-Compatibility Constraint on risk, which we characterize. We distinguish between one period and several periods. In the former case, under mild conditions, there exists a first-best contract which takes the form of a bonus contract. In the latter, we show that there exists no first-best contract and we use a numerical approximation to study the properties of the second-best contract.
-
risk taking and optimal contracts for money managers
Research Papers in Economics, 1999Co-Authors: Frederic Palomino, Andrea PratAbstract:Recent empirical work suggests a strong connection between the incentives money managers are offered and their risk-taking behavior. We develop a general model of delegated portfolio management, with the feature that the agent can control the riskiness of the portfolio. This represents a departure from the existing literature on agency theory in that moral hazard is not only effort exertion but also risk taking behavior. The moral hazard problem with risk taking involves an incentive-Compatibility Constraint on risk, which we characterize. We distinguish between one period and several periods. In the former case, under mild conditions, there exists a first-best contract which takes the form of a bonus contract. In the latter, we show that there exists no first-best contract and we use a numerical approximation to study the properties of the second-best contract.Recent empirical work suggests a strong connection between the incentives money managers are offered and their risk-taking behavior. We develop a general model of delegated portfolio management, with the feature that the agent can control the riskiness of the portfolio. This represents a departure from the existing literature on agency theory in that moral hazard is not only effort exertion but also risk taking behavior. The moral hazard problem with risk taking involves an incentive-Compatibility Constraint on risk, which we characterize. We distinguish between one period and several periods. In the former case, under mild conditions, there exists a first-best contract which takes the form of a bonus contract. In the latter, we show that there exists no first-best contract and we use a numerical approximation to study the properties of the second-best contract.
D Kim - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
-
evolution of the protein interaction network of budding yeast role of the protein family Compatibility Constraint
Journal of the Korean Physical Society, 2005Co-Authors: K I Goh, B Kahng, D KimAbstract:Understanding of how protein interaction networks (PIN) of living organisms have evolved or are organized can be the first stepping stone in unveiling how life works on a fundamental basis. Here, we introduce a new in-silico evolution model of the PIN of budding yeast, Saccharomyces cerevisiae; the model is composed of the PIN and the protein family network. The basic ingredient of the model includes family Compatibility which constrains the potential binding ability of a protein, as well as the previously proposed gene duplication, divergence, and mutation. We investigate various structural properties of our model network with parameter values relevant to budding yeast and find that the model successfully reproduces the empirical data.
-
evolution of the protein interaction network of budding yeast role of the protein family Compatibility Constraint
arXiv: Molecular Networks, 2003Co-Authors: K I Goh, B Kahng, D KimAbstract:Understanding of how protein interaction networks (PIN) of living organisms have evolved or are organized can be the first stepping stone in unveiling how life works on a fundamental ground. Here we introduce a hybrid network model composed of the yeast PIN and the protein family interaction network. The essential ingredient of the model includes the protein family identity and its robustness under evolution, as well as the three previously proposed ones: gene duplication, divergence, and mutation. We investigate diverse structural properties of our model with parameter values relevant to yeast, finding that the model successfully reproduces the empirical data.
John C Slattery - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
-
the mechanics and thermodynamics of edge fracture the critical energy release rate the Compatibility Constraint and the bond potential
Philosophical Magazine, 2012Co-Authors: John C SlatteryAbstract:Following Gurtin and many others, the critical energy release rate is commonly identified as an ill-defined surface energy. The primary objectives of this paper are to clarify the definition of this surface energy and the role of the entropy inequality in the discussion of critical conditions. In view of an increasing emphasis on ab initio computations, a secondary objective is to show how the critical energy release rate and the Compatibility Constraint 1 can be used to solve a problem for which we have experimental data, using only ab initio estimates of surface tension and bond potential, both of which are increasingly available.
-
Compatibility Constraint at interfaces with elastic crystalline solids i theory
Philosophical Magazine, 2010Co-Authors: John C SlatteryAbstract:Starting with an extended Gibbs–Duhem equation and an expression for stress-deformation behavior derived by Oh and Slattery for elastic crystalline solids, we derive a new Compatibility Constraint on stress at coherent interfaces. Its use is demonstrated in determining the residual stresses developed during oxidation on the surface of a cylinder.
-
Compatibility Constraint at interfaces with elastic crystalline solids ii applications
Philosophical Magazine, 2010Co-Authors: John C SlatteryAbstract:Two applications illustrate how the Compatibility Constraints derived in Part I of this work are to be applied. The analysis of the bending beam experiment of EerNisse and comparison with his experimental data using no adjustable parameters are strong support for their validity.
Baocang Ding - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
-
distributed rhc for tracking and formation of nonholonomic multi vehicle systems
IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control, 2014Co-Authors: Peng Wang, Baocang DingAbstract:This paper considers the synchronous distributed receding horizon control (RHC) for a general problem of the nonholonomic multi-vehicle systems, i.e., the simultaneous forward/backward tracking, regulation and formation with the collision avoidance. First, for each vehicle, a positively invariant terminal-state region and an auxiliary controller are developed. When every vehicle lies in its terminal-state region, all the distributed control targets are achieved by the auxiliary controller. Second, the Compatibility Constraint, restricting the norm of the uncertain deviation between the assumed and actual predictive trajectories of each vehicle, is given, which respects both the collision avoidance and convergence guarantee. Thirdly, a robust collision avoidance Constraint tolerating for the uncertain deviation is designed. By these designs, an overall control algorithm is proposed, by applying which all the control targets are achieved. Two illustrative examples are provided to show the advantage and effectiveness of the proposed approach.
-
a synthesis approach of distributed model predictive control for homogeneous multi agent system with collision avoidance
International Journal of Control, 2014Co-Authors: Peng Wang, Baocang DingAbstract:For the tracking and formation problem of multi-agent systems with collision avoidance, a synchronous distributed model predictive control (DMPC) algorithm is proposed. We consider the deterministic, linear, time-invariant, and homogeneous dynamics for all agents. In the synchronous DMPC, all the agents solve their optimisation problems synchronously, taking advantage of their neighbours’ assumed predictive information, to obtain the current optimal inputs. Considering the uncertain deviation existing between the assumed and actual predictive information of each agent, we contribute to design a deviation-dependent collision avoidance Constraint, which is imposed in the individual optimisation problem to guarantee the safety of each agent. We constrain the uncertain deviation by designing a time-varying Compatibility Constraint in the two-norm form, which is imposed in the individual optimisation problem to play an important role in both the collision avoidance and exponential stability. By applying the pr...
-
distributed model predictive control for multiagent systems with improved consistency
Journal of Control Theory and Applications, 2010Co-Authors: Shanbi Wei, Yi Chai, Baocang DingAbstract:This paper addresses an improved distributed model predictive control (DMPC) scheme for multiagent systems with an attempt to improving its consistency. The deviation between what an agent is actually doing and what its neighbors believe that agent is doing is penalized in the cost function of each agent. At each sampling instant the Compatibility Constraint of each agent is set tighter than the previous sampling instant. Like the traditional approach, the performance cost is utilized as the Lyapunov function to prove closed-looped stability. The closed-loop stability is guaranteed if the weight matrix for deviation in the cost function are sufficiently large. The proposed distributed control scheme is formulated as quadratic programming with quadratic Constraints. A numerical example is given to illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed scheme.
Frederic Palomino - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
-
risk taking and optimal contracts for money managers
Social Science Research Network, 2003Co-Authors: Frederic Palomino, Andrea PratAbstract:Recent empirical work suggests a strong connection between the incentives money managers are offered and their risk-taking behavior. We develop a general model of delegated portfolio management, with the feature that the agent can control the riskiness of the portfolio. This represents a departure from the existing literature on agency theory in that moral hazard is not only effort exertion but also risk taking behavior. The moral hazard problem with risk taking involves an incentive-Compatibility Constraint on risk, which we characterize. We distinguish between one period and several periods. In the former case, under mild conditions, there exists a first-best contract which takes the form of a bonus contract. In the latter, we show that there exists no first-best contract and we use a numerical approximation to study the properties of the second-best contract.
-
risk taking and optimal contracts for money managers
Research Papers in Economics, 1999Co-Authors: Frederic Palomino, Andrea PratAbstract:Recent empirical work suggests a strong connection between the incentives money managers are offered and their risk-taking behavior. We develop a general model of delegated portfolio management, with the feature that the agent can control the riskiness of the portfolio. This represents a departure from the existing literature on agency theory in that moral hazard is not only effort exertion but also risk taking behavior. The moral hazard problem with risk taking involves an incentive-Compatibility Constraint on risk, which we characterize. We distinguish between one period and several periods. In the former case, under mild conditions, there exists a first-best contract which takes the form of a bonus contract. In the latter, we show that there exists no first-best contract and we use a numerical approximation to study the properties of the second-best contract.Recent empirical work suggests a strong connection between the incentives money managers are offered and their risk-taking behavior. We develop a general model of delegated portfolio management, with the feature that the agent can control the riskiness of the portfolio. This represents a departure from the existing literature on agency theory in that moral hazard is not only effort exertion but also risk taking behavior. The moral hazard problem with risk taking involves an incentive-Compatibility Constraint on risk, which we characterize. We distinguish between one period and several periods. In the former case, under mild conditions, there exists a first-best contract which takes the form of a bonus contract. In the latter, we show that there exists no first-best contract and we use a numerical approximation to study the properties of the second-best contract.