The Experts below are selected from a list of 69 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
David Windisch - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Does European Union policy making explain accounting choices? An empirical analysis of the effects of investigations by the Directorate General for Competition on accounting choices
Journal of Management & Governance, 2014Co-Authors: Roland Königsgruber, David WindischAbstract:The hypothesis that political costs caused by the regulatory process impact upon accounting has been tested extensively and has found considerable empirical support. However, most studies use data from the United States. Whether the conclusions carry over to different institutional settings is an open question. This study exploits the fact that, in the European Union, there exists a policy area—Competition policy—in which the European Commission can act in a manner significantly less constrained than in most other policy areas, imposing substantial fines on companies found to be in infringement of European Competition Regulations. Companies investigated by the Commission’s Directorate General for Competition have strong incentives to deflect attention and keep a low profile. It is conjectured that such companies will use income-decreasing accruals in order not to appear to be making unjustified profits. The results confirm this conjecture.
Roland Königsgruber - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Does European Union policy making explain accounting choices? An empirical analysis of the effects of investigations by the Directorate General for Competition on accounting choices
Journal of Management & Governance, 2014Co-Authors: Roland Königsgruber, David WindischAbstract:The hypothesis that political costs caused by the regulatory process impact upon accounting has been tested extensively and has found considerable empirical support. However, most studies use data from the United States. Whether the conclusions carry over to different institutional settings is an open question. This study exploits the fact that, in the European Union, there exists a policy area—Competition policy—in which the European Commission can act in a manner significantly less constrained than in most other policy areas, imposing substantial fines on companies found to be in infringement of European Competition Regulations. Companies investigated by the Commission’s Directorate General for Competition have strong incentives to deflect attention and keep a low profile. It is conjectured that such companies will use income-decreasing accruals in order not to appear to be making unjustified profits. The results confirm this conjecture.
Vahagn Jerbashian - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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intellectual property and product market Competition Regulations in a model with two r d performing sectors
Macroeconomic Dynamics, 2021Co-Authors: Vahagn JerbashianAbstract:I analyze the impact of intellectual property and product market Competition Regulations on innovation and long-run growth in an endogenous growth model with two R&D performing sectors. I show that strengthening intellectual property rights and Competition in a sector increases its R&D investments. However, these policies adversely affect R&D investments in the other sector because of increased factor Competition between the sectors. As a result, the overall impact of such policies on economic growth is ambiguous. I perform a numerical exercise in an attempt to resolve this ambiguity. This exercise suggests that strengthening intellectual property rights increases economic growth, but higher Competition has a very limited effect on growth.
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intellectual property and product market Competition Regulations in a model with two r d performing sectors
Research Papers in Economics, 2017Co-Authors: Vahagn JerbashianAbstract:I analyze the impact of intellectual property and product market Competition Regulations on innovation and long-run growth in an endogenous growth model with two R&D performing sectors. I show that strengthening intellectual property rights and Competition in a sector increases its R&D investments. However, these policies adversely affect R&D investments of the other sector. The overall impact of such policies on economic growth is ambiguous because of this. I perform a numerical exercise in an attempt of resolving the ambiguity. This exercise suggests that strengthening intellectual property rights can increase economic growth, but higher Competition has a very limited effect on growth.
Fabien Bertho - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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the impact of liner shipping trade and Competition Regulations on the market structure maritime transport costs and seaborne trade flows Regulations on the market structure maritime transport costs and seaborne trade flows
Sciences Po publications, 2012Co-Authors: Fabien BerthoAbstract:J’evalue l’impact des reglementations commerciales et concurrentielles dans transport maritime de ligne sur la structure du marche, les couts de transport et le commerce maritime. D’abord, je quantifie le niveau global des Barrieres Commerciales (BC) dans le secteur du transport maritime de ligne en construisant un Indice de Restriction du Commerce des Services (IRCS). Cet indicateur est inclus dans une analyse econometrique en deux etapes. Les BC sont susceptibles d’influencer le commerce maritime a travers les Couts de Transport Maritime (CTM). Ainsi, j’evalue l'impact des BC sur les CTM, puis l'impact des CTM sur le commerce maritime. Je montre que les BC ont un impact positif sur les CTM et que les CTM ont un impact negatif sur le commerce maritime. Ainsi, les BC ont un impact indirect negatif sur le commerce maritime. Je montre aussi qu’en plus d’affecter negativement le commerce maritime a travers les CTM, la distance a un impact positif direct sur le commerce maritime. Ensuite, j’evalue l'impact des barrieres reglementaires a l'entree sur la structure du marche et les CTM. D’abord, j’evalue l'impact de la reglementation sur la structure du marche. Puis, j’evalue l'impact de la structure du marche sur les CTM. Je montre que la presence de conferences maritimes n’a pas d’impact sur le nombre de compagnies sur les routes alors que la presence d'accords de discussion a un impact positif. De plus, lorsqu’elles atteignent un seuil, les BC ont un impact negatif sur le nombre de compagnies. En outre, je montre les BC affectent les CTM a travers la structure du marche et les couts marginaux. Enfin, je montre que les compagnies maritimes de ligne exercent un pouvoir de march
Ernestas Spruogis - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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THE COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE EU AND LITHUANIAN LEGAL TRANSPORT Regulations
TRANSPORT, 2005Co-Authors: Ernestas SpruogisAbstract:The significance of the transport economy determines such a fact that the State and its institutions have a duty to look over this economic branch very narrowly. This duty is especially important while guaranteeing conditions for the fair Competition in the transport sector. The author presents the analysis of the EU and Lithuanian legal transport Competition Regulations. The conclusion is drawn that the national legal Competition regulation complies with the EU legal Competition regulation; the EU legal transport Competition regulation is much more detailed than national legal transport Competition regulation in Lithuania.