The Experts below are selected from a list of 2448 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform

Mangard Stefan - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Flush+Flush: A Fast and Stealthy Cache Attack
    2016
    Co-Authors: Gruss Daniel, Maurice Clémentine, Wagner Klaus, Mangard Stefan
    Abstract:

    Research on Cache attacks has shown that CPU Caches leak signi_cant information. Proposed detection mechanisms assume that all Cache attacks cause more Cache hits and Cache misses than benign applications and use hardware performance counters for detection. In this article, we show that this assumption does not hold by developing a novel attack technique: the Flush+Flush attack. The Flush+Flush attack only relies on the execution time of the ush instruction, which depends on whether data is Cached or not. Flush+Flush does not make any memory accesses, contrary to any other Cache attack. Thus, it causes no Cache misses at all and the number of Cache hits is reduced to a minimum due to the Constant Cache ushes. Therefore, Flush+Flush attacks are stealthy, i.e., the spy process cannot be detected based on Cache hits and misses, or state-of-the-art detection mechanisms. The Flush+Flush attack runs in a higher frequency and thus is faster than any existing Cache attack. With 496 KB/s in a cross-core covert channel it is 6:7 times faster than any previously published Cache covert channel

  • Flush+Flush: A Fast and Stealthy Cache Attack
    2016
    Co-Authors: Gruss Daniel, Maurice Clémentine, Wagner Klaus, Mangard Stefan
    Abstract:

    Research on Cache attacks has shown that CPU Caches leak significant information. Proposed detection mechanisms assume that all Cache attacks cause more Cache hits and Cache misses than benign applications and use hardware performance counters for detection. In this article, we show that this assumption does not hold by developing a novel attack technique: the Flush+Flush attack. The Flush+Flush attack only relies on the execution time of the flush instruction, which depends on whether data is Cached or not. Flush+Flush does not make any memory accesses, contrary to any other Cache attack. Thus, it causes no Cache misses at all and the number of Cache hits is reduced to a minimum due to the Constant Cache flushes. Therefore, Flush+Flush attacks are stealthy, i.e., the spy process cannot be detected based on Cache hits and misses, or state-of-the-art detection mechanisms. The Flush+Flush attack runs in a higher frequency and thus is faster than any existing Cache attack. With 496 KB/s in a cross-core covert channel it is 6.7 times faster than any previously published Cache covert channel.Comment: This paper has been accepted at the 13th Conference on Detection of Intrusions and Malware & Vulnerability Assessment (DIMVA) 2016. The final publication is available at link.springer.co

Gruss Daniel - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Flush+Flush: A Fast and Stealthy Cache Attack
    2016
    Co-Authors: Gruss Daniel, Maurice Clémentine, Wagner Klaus, Mangard Stefan
    Abstract:

    Research on Cache attacks has shown that CPU Caches leak signi_cant information. Proposed detection mechanisms assume that all Cache attacks cause more Cache hits and Cache misses than benign applications and use hardware performance counters for detection. In this article, we show that this assumption does not hold by developing a novel attack technique: the Flush+Flush attack. The Flush+Flush attack only relies on the execution time of the ush instruction, which depends on whether data is Cached or not. Flush+Flush does not make any memory accesses, contrary to any other Cache attack. Thus, it causes no Cache misses at all and the number of Cache hits is reduced to a minimum due to the Constant Cache ushes. Therefore, Flush+Flush attacks are stealthy, i.e., the spy process cannot be detected based on Cache hits and misses, or state-of-the-art detection mechanisms. The Flush+Flush attack runs in a higher frequency and thus is faster than any existing Cache attack. With 496 KB/s in a cross-core covert channel it is 6:7 times faster than any previously published Cache covert channel

  • Flush+Flush: A Fast and Stealthy Cache Attack
    2016
    Co-Authors: Gruss Daniel, Maurice Clémentine, Wagner Klaus, Mangard Stefan
    Abstract:

    Research on Cache attacks has shown that CPU Caches leak significant information. Proposed detection mechanisms assume that all Cache attacks cause more Cache hits and Cache misses than benign applications and use hardware performance counters for detection. In this article, we show that this assumption does not hold by developing a novel attack technique: the Flush+Flush attack. The Flush+Flush attack only relies on the execution time of the flush instruction, which depends on whether data is Cached or not. Flush+Flush does not make any memory accesses, contrary to any other Cache attack. Thus, it causes no Cache misses at all and the number of Cache hits is reduced to a minimum due to the Constant Cache flushes. Therefore, Flush+Flush attacks are stealthy, i.e., the spy process cannot be detected based on Cache hits and misses, or state-of-the-art detection mechanisms. The Flush+Flush attack runs in a higher frequency and thus is faster than any existing Cache attack. With 496 KB/s in a cross-core covert channel it is 6.7 times faster than any previously published Cache covert channel.Comment: This paper has been accepted at the 13th Conference on Detection of Intrusions and Malware & Vulnerability Assessment (DIMVA) 2016. The final publication is available at link.springer.co

Stefan Mangard - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • flush flush a fast and stealthy Cache attack
    arXiv: Cryptography and Security, 2015
    Co-Authors: Daniel Gruss, Clementine Maurice, Klaus Wagner, Stefan Mangard
    Abstract:

    Research on Cache attacks has shown that CPU Caches leak significant information. Proposed detection mechanisms assume that all Cache attacks cause more Cache hits and Cache misses than benign applications and use hardware performance counters for detection. In this article, we show that this assumption does not hold by developing a novel attack technique: the Flush+Flush attack. The Flush+Flush attack only relies on the execution time of the flush instruction, which depends on whether data is Cached or not. Flush+Flush does not make any memory accesses, contrary to any other Cache attack. Thus, it causes no Cache misses at all and the number of Cache hits is reduced to a minimum due to the Constant Cache flushes. Therefore, Flush+Flush attacks are stealthy, i.e., the spy process cannot be detected based on Cache hits and misses, or state-of-the-art detection mechanisms. The Flush+Flush attack runs in a higher frequency and thus is faster than any existing Cache attack. With 496 KB/s in a cross-core covert channel it is 6.7 times faster than any previously published Cache covert channel.

Wagner Klaus - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Flush+Flush: A Fast and Stealthy Cache Attack
    2016
    Co-Authors: Gruss Daniel, Maurice Clémentine, Wagner Klaus, Mangard Stefan
    Abstract:

    Research on Cache attacks has shown that CPU Caches leak signi_cant information. Proposed detection mechanisms assume that all Cache attacks cause more Cache hits and Cache misses than benign applications and use hardware performance counters for detection. In this article, we show that this assumption does not hold by developing a novel attack technique: the Flush+Flush attack. The Flush+Flush attack only relies on the execution time of the ush instruction, which depends on whether data is Cached or not. Flush+Flush does not make any memory accesses, contrary to any other Cache attack. Thus, it causes no Cache misses at all and the number of Cache hits is reduced to a minimum due to the Constant Cache ushes. Therefore, Flush+Flush attacks are stealthy, i.e., the spy process cannot be detected based on Cache hits and misses, or state-of-the-art detection mechanisms. The Flush+Flush attack runs in a higher frequency and thus is faster than any existing Cache attack. With 496 KB/s in a cross-core covert channel it is 6:7 times faster than any previously published Cache covert channel

  • Flush+Flush: A Fast and Stealthy Cache Attack
    2016
    Co-Authors: Gruss Daniel, Maurice Clémentine, Wagner Klaus, Mangard Stefan
    Abstract:

    Research on Cache attacks has shown that CPU Caches leak significant information. Proposed detection mechanisms assume that all Cache attacks cause more Cache hits and Cache misses than benign applications and use hardware performance counters for detection. In this article, we show that this assumption does not hold by developing a novel attack technique: the Flush+Flush attack. The Flush+Flush attack only relies on the execution time of the flush instruction, which depends on whether data is Cached or not. Flush+Flush does not make any memory accesses, contrary to any other Cache attack. Thus, it causes no Cache misses at all and the number of Cache hits is reduced to a minimum due to the Constant Cache flushes. Therefore, Flush+Flush attacks are stealthy, i.e., the spy process cannot be detected based on Cache hits and misses, or state-of-the-art detection mechanisms. The Flush+Flush attack runs in a higher frequency and thus is faster than any existing Cache attack. With 496 KB/s in a cross-core covert channel it is 6.7 times faster than any previously published Cache covert channel.Comment: This paper has been accepted at the 13th Conference on Detection of Intrusions and Malware & Vulnerability Assessment (DIMVA) 2016. The final publication is available at link.springer.co

Maurice Clémentine - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Flush+Flush: A Fast and Stealthy Cache Attack
    2016
    Co-Authors: Gruss Daniel, Maurice Clémentine, Wagner Klaus, Mangard Stefan
    Abstract:

    Research on Cache attacks has shown that CPU Caches leak signi_cant information. Proposed detection mechanisms assume that all Cache attacks cause more Cache hits and Cache misses than benign applications and use hardware performance counters for detection. In this article, we show that this assumption does not hold by developing a novel attack technique: the Flush+Flush attack. The Flush+Flush attack only relies on the execution time of the ush instruction, which depends on whether data is Cached or not. Flush+Flush does not make any memory accesses, contrary to any other Cache attack. Thus, it causes no Cache misses at all and the number of Cache hits is reduced to a minimum due to the Constant Cache ushes. Therefore, Flush+Flush attacks are stealthy, i.e., the spy process cannot be detected based on Cache hits and misses, or state-of-the-art detection mechanisms. The Flush+Flush attack runs in a higher frequency and thus is faster than any existing Cache attack. With 496 KB/s in a cross-core covert channel it is 6:7 times faster than any previously published Cache covert channel

  • Flush+Flush: A Fast and Stealthy Cache Attack
    2016
    Co-Authors: Gruss Daniel, Maurice Clémentine, Wagner Klaus, Mangard Stefan
    Abstract:

    Research on Cache attacks has shown that CPU Caches leak significant information. Proposed detection mechanisms assume that all Cache attacks cause more Cache hits and Cache misses than benign applications and use hardware performance counters for detection. In this article, we show that this assumption does not hold by developing a novel attack technique: the Flush+Flush attack. The Flush+Flush attack only relies on the execution time of the flush instruction, which depends on whether data is Cached or not. Flush+Flush does not make any memory accesses, contrary to any other Cache attack. Thus, it causes no Cache misses at all and the number of Cache hits is reduced to a minimum due to the Constant Cache flushes. Therefore, Flush+Flush attacks are stealthy, i.e., the spy process cannot be detected based on Cache hits and misses, or state-of-the-art detection mechanisms. The Flush+Flush attack runs in a higher frequency and thus is faster than any existing Cache attack. With 496 KB/s in a cross-core covert channel it is 6.7 times faster than any previously published Cache covert channel.Comment: This paper has been accepted at the 13th Conference on Detection of Intrusions and Malware & Vulnerability Assessment (DIMVA) 2016. The final publication is available at link.springer.co