The Experts below are selected from a list of 10071 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Rodrigo Pascual - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
-
optimal maintenance service Contract Negotiation with aging equipment
European Journal of Operational Research, 2008Co-Authors: Canek Jackson, Rodrigo PascualAbstract:In recent years, there has been a growing trend to out-source service operations in which the equipment maintenance is carried out by an external agent rather than in-house. Often, the agent (service provider) offers more than one option and the owners of equipment (customers) are faced to the problem of selecting the optimal option, under the terms of a Contract. In the current work, we develop a model and report results to determine the agent's optimal strategy for a given type of Contract. The model derives in a non-cooperative game formulation in which the decisions are taken by maximizing expected profits. This work extends previous models by considering the realistic case of equipments having an increasing failure intensity due to imperfect maintenance, instead of the standard assumption that considers failure times are exponentially distributed (constant failure intensity). We develop a model using a linear function of time to characterize the failure intensity. The main goal, for the agent, is to determine the pricing structure in the Contract and the number of customers to service. On the other hand, for the clients, the main goal is to define the period between planned actions for preventive maintenance and the time to replace equipments. In order to give a complete characterization of the results, we also carry out a sensitivity analysis over some of the factors that would influence over the failure intensity.
-
optimal maintenance service Contract Negotiation with aging equipment
Quality Engineering, 2008Co-Authors: Canek Jackson, Rodrigo PascualAbstract:In recent years, there has been a growing trend to out-source service operations in which the equipment maintenance is carried out by an external agent rather than in-house. Often, the agent (service provider) offers more than one option and the owners of equipment (customers) are faced to the problem of selecting the optimal option, under the terms of a Contract. In the current work, we develop a model and report results to determine the agent’s optimal strategy for a given type of Contract. The model derives in a non-cooperative game formulation in which the decisions are taken by maximizing expected profits. This work extends previous models by considering the realistic case of equipments having an increasing failure intensity due to imperfect maintenance, instead of the standard assumption that considers failure times are exponentially distributed (constant failure intensity). We develop a model using a linear function of time to characterize the failure intensity. The main goal, for the agent, is to determine the pricing structure in the Contract and the number of customers to service. On the other hand, for the clients, the main goal is to define the period between planned actions for preventive maintenance and the time to replace equipments. In order to give a complete characterization of the results, we also carry out a sensitivity analysis over some of the factors that would influence over the failure intensity. 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Canek Jackson - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
-
optimal maintenance service Contract Negotiation with aging equipment
European Journal of Operational Research, 2008Co-Authors: Canek Jackson, Rodrigo PascualAbstract:In recent years, there has been a growing trend to out-source service operations in which the equipment maintenance is carried out by an external agent rather than in-house. Often, the agent (service provider) offers more than one option and the owners of equipment (customers) are faced to the problem of selecting the optimal option, under the terms of a Contract. In the current work, we develop a model and report results to determine the agent's optimal strategy for a given type of Contract. The model derives in a non-cooperative game formulation in which the decisions are taken by maximizing expected profits. This work extends previous models by considering the realistic case of equipments having an increasing failure intensity due to imperfect maintenance, instead of the standard assumption that considers failure times are exponentially distributed (constant failure intensity). We develop a model using a linear function of time to characterize the failure intensity. The main goal, for the agent, is to determine the pricing structure in the Contract and the number of customers to service. On the other hand, for the clients, the main goal is to define the period between planned actions for preventive maintenance and the time to replace equipments. In order to give a complete characterization of the results, we also carry out a sensitivity analysis over some of the factors that would influence over the failure intensity.
-
optimal maintenance service Contract Negotiation with aging equipment
Quality Engineering, 2008Co-Authors: Canek Jackson, Rodrigo PascualAbstract:In recent years, there has been a growing trend to out-source service operations in which the equipment maintenance is carried out by an external agent rather than in-house. Often, the agent (service provider) offers more than one option and the owners of equipment (customers) are faced to the problem of selecting the optimal option, under the terms of a Contract. In the current work, we develop a model and report results to determine the agent’s optimal strategy for a given type of Contract. The model derives in a non-cooperative game formulation in which the decisions are taken by maximizing expected profits. This work extends previous models by considering the realistic case of equipments having an increasing failure intensity due to imperfect maintenance, instead of the standard assumption that considers failure times are exponentially distributed (constant failure intensity). We develop a model using a linear function of time to characterize the failure intensity. The main goal, for the agent, is to determine the pricing structure in the Contract and the number of customers to service. On the other hand, for the clients, the main goal is to define the period between planned actions for preventive maintenance and the time to replace equipments. In order to give a complete characterization of the results, we also carry out a sensitivity analysis over some of the factors that would influence over the failure intensity. 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Gregory A Aarons - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
-
Contracting as a bridging factor linking outer and inner contexts during ebp implementation and sustainment a prospective study across multiple u s public sector service systems
Implementation Science, 2020Co-Authors: Rebecca Lengnickhall, Cathleen E Willging, Michael S Hurlburt, Karissa Fenwick, Gregory A AaronsAbstract:Bridging factors are relational ties (e.g. partnerships), formal arrangements (e.g. Contracts or polices) and processes (e.g. data sharing agreements) linking outer and inner contexts and are a recent evolution of the Exploration-Preparation-Implementation-Sustainment (EPIS) framework. Bridging factor research can elucidate ways that service systems may influence and/or be influenced by organizations providing health services. This study used the EPIS framework and open systems and resource dependence theoretical approaches to examine Contracting arrangements in U.S. public sector systems. Contracting arrangements function as bridging factors through which systems communicate, interact, and exchange resources with the organizations operating within them. The sample included 17 community-based organizations in eight service systems. Longitudinal data is derived from 113 Contract documents and 88 qualitative interviews and focus groups involving system and organizational stakeholders. Analyses consisted of a document review using content analysis and focused coding of transcripts from the interviews and focus groups. A multiple case study analysis was conducted to identify patterns across service systems and organizations. The dataset represented service systems that had sustained the same EBP for between 2 and 10 years, which allowed for observation of bridging factors and outer-inner context interactions over time. Service systems and organizations influenced each other in a number of ways through Contracting arrangements. Service systems influenced organizations when Contracting arrangements resulted in changes to organizational functioning, required organizational responses to insufficient funding, and altered interorganizational network relationships. Organizations influenced service systems when Contract arrangements prompted organization-driven Contract Negotiation/tailoring, changes to system-level processes, and interorganizational collaboration. Service systems and organizations were dependent on each other as implementation progressed. Resources beyond funding emerged, including adequate numbers of eligible clients, expertise in the evidence-based practice, and training and coaching capacity. This study advances implementation science by expanding the range and definition of bridging factors and illustrating specific bi-directional influences between outer context service systems and inner context organizations. This study also identifies bi-directional dependencies over the course of implementation and sustainment. An analysis of influence, dependencies, and resources exchanged through bridging factors has direct implications for selecting and tailoring implementation strategies, especially those that require system-level coordination and change.
-
Contracting as a bridging factor linking outer and inner contexts during ebp implementation and sustainment a prospective study across multiple u s public sector service systems
Implementation Science, 2020Co-Authors: Rebecca Lengnickhall, Cathleen E Willging, Michael S Hurlburt, Karissa Fenwick, Gregory A AaronsAbstract:Bridging factors are relational ties (e.g. partnerships), formal arrangements (e.g. Contracts or polices) and processes (e.g. data sharing agreements) linking outer and inner contexts and are a recent evolution of the Exploration-Preparation-Implementation-Sustainment (EPIS) framework. Bridging factor research can elucidate ways that service systems may influence and/or be influenced by organizations providing health services. This study used the EPIS framework and open systems and resource dependence theoretical approaches to examine Contracting arrangements in U.S. public sector systems. Contracting arrangements function as bridging factors through which systems communicate, interact, and exchange resources with the organizations operating within them. The sample included 17 community-based organizations in eight service systems. Longitudinal data is derived from 113 Contract documents and 88 qualitative interviews and focus groups involving system and organizational stakeholders. Analyses consisted of a document review using content analysis and focused coding of transcripts from the interviews and focus groups. A multiple case study analysis was conducted to identify patterns across service systems and organizations. The dataset represented service systems that had sustained the same EBP for between 2 and 10 years, which allowed for observation of bridging factors and outer-inner context interactions over time. Service systems and organizations influenced each other in a number of ways through Contracting arrangements. Service systems influenced organizations when Contracting arrangements resulted in changes to organizational functioning, required organizational responses to insufficient funding, and altered interorganizational network relationships. Organizations influenced service systems when Contract arrangements prompted organization-driven Contract Negotiation/tailoring, changes to system-level processes, and interorganizational collaboration. Service systems and organizations were dependent on each other as implementation progressed. Resources beyond funding emerged, including adequate numbers of eligible clients, expertise in the evidence-based practice, and training and coaching capacity. This study advances implementation science by expanding the range and definition of bridging factors and illustrating specific bi-directional influences between outer context service systems and inner context organizations. This study also identifies bi-directional dependencies over the course of implementation and sustainment. An analysis of influence, dependencies, and resources exchanged through bridging factors has direct implications for selecting and tailoring implementation strategies, especially those that require system-level coordination and change.
Hong Jiang - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
-
a pricing model for high speed networks with guaranteed quality of service
International Conference on Computer Communications, 1996Co-Authors: Hong Jiang, S. JordanAbstract:In this paper, we discuss the role of prices in combining user characterization, network resource allocation, and Contract Negotiation to form a complete connection establishment process. We suggest that such a process should encourage network efficiency through distributed resource allocation among virtual circuits, circuit bundles, and virtual paths. We adopt effective bandwidth as our user traffic characterization and our pricing base, and we measure network efficiency by total user benefit. We allow a limited degree of statistical multiplexing by incorporating multiplexing gain into the prices. Finally, we propose a hierarchical and distributed Negotiation structure under which only hierarchically adjacent and geographically local network entities communicate with each other.
-
Connection establishment in high-speed networks
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications, 1995Co-Authors: S. Jordan, Hong JiangAbstract:The evolving view of connection establishment for connection-oriented services in high-speed networks such as ATM involves a Contract Negotiation process between a user agent and a network agent. The first stage consists of separate roles for the user and the network. The user agent must characterize the information streams that will be transmitted and the performance parameters that define the desired quality of service for that user. Similarly, the network agent must determine the network's resources and its capabilities to accommodate various mixes of service types. The second stage involves Negotiations between multiple network and user agents, in which the parties agree to set up connections to transmit the agreed information streams in a manner to guarantee the agreed qualities of service, and at agreed prices. We focus on these two stages that together form the connection establishment process. After this process, during the connection, the network must police the user to determine compliance with the information stream characteristics, and must implement flow control, service priority mechanisms and packet multiplexing disciplines as necessary to guarantee the quality of service.
-
The Role of Price in the Connection Establishment Process
1995Co-Authors: Hong Jiang, S. JordanAbstract:The evolving view of connection establishment for connection-oriented services involves two stages. The first stage consists of separate roles for the user and the network. The user agent must characterize the information streams that will be transmitted and her valuation of the service. Similarly, the network agent must determine the network’s resources and its capabilities to accommodate various mixes of service types. The second stage involves Negotiations between multiple network and user agents, in which the parties agree to set up connections to transmit the agreed information streams in a manner to guarantee the agreed QoS, and at agreed prices. In this paper, we discuss the role of prices in combining user characterization, network resource allocation, and Contract Negotiation to form a complete connection establishment process. We suggest that such a process should encourage network efficiency through distributed resource allocation among virtual circuits, circuit bundles, and virtual paths. We adopt effective bandwidth as our user traffic characterization and our pricing base, and we measure network efficiency by total user benefit. We allow a limited degree of statistical multiplexing by incorporating multiplexing gain into the prices. Finally, we propose a hierarchical and distributed Negotiation structure under which only hierarchically adjacent and geographically local network entities communicate with each other.
Jingsheng Jeannette Song - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
-
Direct Sourcing or Agent Sourcing? Contract Negotiation in Procurement Outsourcing
Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, 2020Co-Authors: Yulan Wang, Baozhuang Niu, Pengfei Guo, Jingsheng Jeannette SongAbstract:Problem definition: In a supply network consisting of a buyer, a purchasing agent, and a supplier, the buyer can procure the component from the supplier directly and rely on the purchasing agent fo...
-
direct sourcing or agent sourcing Contract Negotiation in procurement outsourcing
2017Co-Authors: Yulan Wang, Baozhuang Niu, Pengfei Guo, Jingsheng Jeannette SongAbstract:We consider a supply chain where the buyer may outsource procurement to a purchasing agent. The buyer can either procure the product from the supplier directly and rely on the purchasing agent for complementary services (named direct sourcing), or authorize the purchasing agent to conduct both procurement and complementary services (named agent sourcing). When the parties Contract with each other, they may engage in the following two Contract forms: (1) the parties Contract and negotiate over both wholesale prices and ordering quantities; and (2) the parties Contract and negotiate over wholesale prices only. Under the former Contractual arrangement, we find that the incentives of the players in Contract Negotiation are aligned and thus the supply chain can be fully coordinated. Assuming that the intermediary party (the party that engages in Contract Negotiation with both the other two parties) decides the sequence of Contract Negotiation, we obtain a chain rule that determines the parties’ procurement outsourcing preferences: the buyer prefers direct sourcing if and only if its direct Negotiation power over the supplier is larger than its indirect one, which is the product of its direct Negotiation power over the purchasing agent and that of the purchasing agent over the supplier. Under the latter Contractual arrangement, we show that bilateral Contract Negotiation over price could not coordinate the supply chain, and the parties’ procurement outsourcing preferences depend on their Negotiation powers in a more complex way.
-
direct sourcing or agent sourcing the impact of Contract forms on procurement outsourcing
2015Co-Authors: Yulan Wang, Baozhuang Niu, Pengfei Guo, Jingsheng Jeannette SongAbstract:We consider a supply chain where the buyer may outsource procurement to a purchasing agent. The buyer can either procure the product from the supplier directly and rely on the purchasing agent for complementary services (named direct sourcing), or authorize the purchasing agent to conduct both procurement and complementary services (named agent sourcing). When the parties Contract with each other, they may engage in the following two Contract forms: (1) the parties Contract and negotiate over both wholesale prices and ordering quantities; and (2) the parties Contract and negotiate over wholesale prices only. Under the former Contractual arrangement, we find that the incentives of the players in Contract Negotiation are aligned and thus the supply chain can be fully coordinated. Assuming that the intermediary party (the party that engages in Contract Negotiation with both the other two parties) decides the sequence of Contract Negotiation, we obtain a chain rule that determines the parties’ procurement outsourcing preferences: the buyer prefers direct sourcing if and only if its direct Negotiation power over the supplier is larger than its indirect one, which is the product of its direct Negotiation power over the purchasing agent and that of the purchasing agent over the supplier. Under the latter Contractual arrangement, we show that bilateral Contract Negotiation over price could not coordinate the supply chain, and the parties’ procurement outsourcing preferences depend on their Negotiation powers in a more complex way.