The Experts below are selected from a list of 17376 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform

Zhang Cheng-guang - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Design of Hybrid Small Satellite Formation Flying Control Simulation System
    Computer Simulation, 2006
    Co-Authors: Zhang Cheng-guang
    Abstract:

    One hybrid small satellite formation flying control simulation system is introduced.The system consists of three nodes,including two simulative satellites and one control center,and the nodes exchange data through inter-satellite network.The simulative satellite is made up of On-Board Computer(OBC)and some real sensors and simulative actuators.OBC gets data from sensors and modifies it with satellite-earth conversion Models.With a certain kind of control policy,the control Model gives out control outputs after calculation.The outputs can be shown in the control interface,and also modify the satellite-earth conversion Model to realize closed-loop control.The control center provides strong ability of calculation,and it also can act as a digital simulative satellite.In this simulation system,many control policies can be tested and simulated,including Master-Slave Mode for double satellites,Cooperative Mode for double satellites,Master-Slave Mode for three satellites,Cooperative Mode for three satellites and single satellite failure Mode.

Branka Vucetic - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Spectrum Sharing in RF-Powered Cognitive Radio Networks using Game Theory
    arXiv: Information Theory, 2015
    Co-Authors: He Chen, Zihuai Lin, Branka Vucetic
    Abstract:

    We investigate the spectrum sharing problem of a radio frequency (RF)-powered cognitive radio network, where a multi-antenna secondary user (SU) harvests energy from RF signals radiated by a primary user (PU) to boost its available energy before information transmission. In this paper, we consider that both the PU and SU are rational and self-interested. Based on whether the SU helps forward the PU's information, we develop two different operation Modes for the considered network, termed as non-Cooperative and Cooperative Modes. In the non-Cooperative Mode, the SU harvests energy from the PU and then use its available energy to transmit its own information without generating any interference to the primary link. In the Cooperative Mode, the PU employs the SU to relay its information by providing monetary incentives and the SU splits its energy for forwarding the PU's information as well as transmitting its own information. Optimization problems are respectively formulated for both operation Modes, which constitute a Stackelberg game with the PU as a leader and the SU as a follower. We analyze the Stackelberg game by deriving solutions to the optimization problems and the Stackelberg Equilibrium (SE) is subsequently obtained. Simulation results show that the performance of the Stackelberg game can approach that of the centralized optimization scheme when the distance between the SU and its receiver is large enough.

  • PIMRC - Spectrum sharing in RF-powered cognitive radio networks using game theory
    2015 IEEE 26th Annual International Symposium on Personal Indoor and Mobile Radio Communications (PIMRC), 2015
    Co-Authors: He Chen, Zihuai Lin, Branka Vucetic
    Abstract:

    We investigate the spectrum sharing problem of a radio frequency (RF)-powered cognitive radio network, where a multi-antenna secondary user (SU) harvests energy from RF signals radiated by a primary user (PU) to boost its available energy before information transmission. In this paper, we consider that both the PU and SU are rational and self-interested. Based on whether the SU helps forward the PU's information, we develop two different operation Modes for the considered network, termed as non-Cooperative and Cooperative Modes. In the non-Cooperative Mode, the SU harvests energy from the PU and then use its available energy to transmit its own information without generating any interference to the primary link. In the Cooperative Mode, the PU employs the SU to relay its information by providing monetary incentives and the SU splits its energy for forwarding the PU's information as well as transmitting its own information. Optimization problems are respectively formulated for both operation Modes, which constitute a Stackelberg game with the PU as a leader and the SU as a follower. We analyze the Stackelberg game by deriving solutions to the optimization problems and the Stackelberg Equilibrium (SE) is subsequently obtained. Simulation results show that the performance of the Stackelberg game can approach that of the centralized optimization scheme when the distance between the SU and its receiver is large enough.

Jingjing Zhao - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

Guido Voigt - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Strategic risk in supply chain contract design
    Journal of Business Economics, 2017
    Co-Authors: Abdolkarim Sadrieh, Guido Voigt
    Abstract:

    Supply chains facing asymmetric information can either operate in a Cooperative Mode with information and benefit sharing or can choose a non-Cooperative form of interaction and align their incentives via screening contracts. In the Cooperative Mode, supply chain efficiency can be achieved, but high levels of trust and trustworthiness are required. In the non-Cooperative Mode, the contract mechanism guarantees a second best supply chain performance, but only if all parties choose their equilibrium strategies without trembles. Experimental evidence, however, shows that both operating Modes often fail due to strategic risk. Cooperation is disrupted by deceptive signals and the lack of trust, whereas non-Cooperative strategies suffer from persistent out-of-equilibrium behavior. We present two means to reduce strategic risk. First, a punishment mechanism leads to a better matching of trust and trustworthiness and supports the Cooperative operating Mode. Second, an enforcement of self-selection supports the non-Cooperative equilibrium by increasing the attractiveness of screening contracts. We find that supply chain performance can benefit from reduced strategic risk in either operating Mode.

  • Strategic risk in contract design
    2013
    Co-Authors: Abdolkarim Sadrieh, Guido Voigt
    Abstract:

    Supply chains facing asymmetric information can either operate in a Cooperative Mode with information and benefit sharing or can choose a non-Cooperative form of interaction and align their incentives via screening contracts. In the Cooperative Mode, supply chain efficiency can be achieved, but high levels of trust and trustworthiness are required. In the non-Cooperative Mode, the contract mechanism guarantees a second best supply chain performance, but only if all parties choose their equilibrium strategies without trembles. Experimental evidence, however, shows that both operating Modes often fail due to strategic risk. Cooperation is disrupted by deceptive signals and the lack of trust, whereas non-Cooperative strategies suffer from persistent out-of-equilibrium behavior. We present an experiment on supply chain interaction with reduced strategic risk in both operating Modes. We find that supply chain performance can reach a second-best level in either operating Mode, if strategic risk is sufficiently reduced. We present two means to reduce strategic risk. First, a punishment mechanism leads to a better matching of trust and trustworthiness and supports the Cooperative operating Mode. Second, an enforcement of self-selection supports the non-Cooperative equilibrium by increasing the attractiveness of screening contracts. We conclude that supply chain managers should seek to reduce the variability of the supply chain partners' behavior no matter what operating Mode is considered.

He Chen - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Spectrum Sharing in RF-Powered Cognitive Radio Networks using Game Theory
    arXiv: Information Theory, 2015
    Co-Authors: He Chen, Zihuai Lin, Branka Vucetic
    Abstract:

    We investigate the spectrum sharing problem of a radio frequency (RF)-powered cognitive radio network, where a multi-antenna secondary user (SU) harvests energy from RF signals radiated by a primary user (PU) to boost its available energy before information transmission. In this paper, we consider that both the PU and SU are rational and self-interested. Based on whether the SU helps forward the PU's information, we develop two different operation Modes for the considered network, termed as non-Cooperative and Cooperative Modes. In the non-Cooperative Mode, the SU harvests energy from the PU and then use its available energy to transmit its own information without generating any interference to the primary link. In the Cooperative Mode, the PU employs the SU to relay its information by providing monetary incentives and the SU splits its energy for forwarding the PU's information as well as transmitting its own information. Optimization problems are respectively formulated for both operation Modes, which constitute a Stackelberg game with the PU as a leader and the SU as a follower. We analyze the Stackelberg game by deriving solutions to the optimization problems and the Stackelberg Equilibrium (SE) is subsequently obtained. Simulation results show that the performance of the Stackelberg game can approach that of the centralized optimization scheme when the distance between the SU and its receiver is large enough.

  • PIMRC - Spectrum sharing in RF-powered cognitive radio networks using game theory
    2015 IEEE 26th Annual International Symposium on Personal Indoor and Mobile Radio Communications (PIMRC), 2015
    Co-Authors: He Chen, Zihuai Lin, Branka Vucetic
    Abstract:

    We investigate the spectrum sharing problem of a radio frequency (RF)-powered cognitive radio network, where a multi-antenna secondary user (SU) harvests energy from RF signals radiated by a primary user (PU) to boost its available energy before information transmission. In this paper, we consider that both the PU and SU are rational and self-interested. Based on whether the SU helps forward the PU's information, we develop two different operation Modes for the considered network, termed as non-Cooperative and Cooperative Modes. In the non-Cooperative Mode, the SU harvests energy from the PU and then use its available energy to transmit its own information without generating any interference to the primary link. In the Cooperative Mode, the PU employs the SU to relay its information by providing monetary incentives and the SU splits its energy for forwarding the PU's information as well as transmitting its own information. Optimization problems are respectively formulated for both operation Modes, which constitute a Stackelberg game with the PU as a leader and the SU as a follower. We analyze the Stackelberg game by deriving solutions to the optimization problems and the Stackelberg Equilibrium (SE) is subsequently obtained. Simulation results show that the performance of the Stackelberg game can approach that of the centralized optimization scheme when the distance between the SU and its receiver is large enough.