The Experts below are selected from a list of 5988 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
James G Stewart - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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a pragmatic critique of Corporate criminal theory lessons from the extremity
New Criminal Law Review, 2013Co-Authors: James G StewartAbstract:Corporate criminal liability is a controversial beast. To a large extent, the controversies surround three core questions: first, whether there is a basic conceptual justification for using a system of criminal justice constructed for individuals against inanimate entities like corporations; second, what value Corporate criminal liability could have given co-existent possibilities of civil redress against them; and third, whether Corporate criminal liability has any added value over and above individual criminal responsibility of Corporate officers. This article criticizes all sides of these debates, using examples from the frontiers of international criminal justice. In particular, it highlights the shortcomings of Corporate criminal theory to date by examining the latent possibility of prosecuting Corporate actors for the pillage of natural resources and for complicity through the supply of weapons. Throughout, the article draws on principles derived from philosophical and legal pragmatism to reveal a set of recurring analytical flaws in this literature. These include: a tendency to presuppose a perfect single jurisdiction that overlooks globalization, the blind projection of local theories of Corporate criminal responsibility onto global Corporate practices, and a perspective that sometimes seems insensitive to the plight of the many who have fallen victim to Corporate Crime in the developing world. To begin anew, we need to embrace a pragmatic theory of Corporate criminal liability that is forced upon us in a world as complex, unequal, and dysfunctional as that we presently inhabit.
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a pragmatic critique of Corporate criminal theory lessons from the extremity
Social Science Research Network, 2012Co-Authors: James G StewartAbstract:Corporate criminal liability is a controversial beast. To a large extent, the controversies surround three core questions: first, whether there is a basic conceptual justification for using a system of criminal justice constructed for individuals against inanimate entities like corporations; second, what value Corporate criminal liability could have given co-existent possibilities of civil redress against them; and third, whether Corporate criminal liability has any added value over and above individual criminal responsibility of Corporate officers. In this paper, I use examples from the frontiers of international criminal justice to criticize all sides of these debates. In particular, I harness the latent possibility of prosecuting Corporate actors for the pillage of natural resources and for complicity through the supply of weapons, to highlight the shortcomings of Corporate criminal theory to date. Throughout, I draw on principles derived from philosophical and legal pragmatism to reveal a set of recurring analytical flaws in this literature. These include: a tendency to presuppose a perfect single jurisdiction that overlooks globalization, the blind projection of local theories of Corporate criminal responsibility onto global Corporate practices; and a perspective that sometimes seems insensitive to the plight of the many who have fallen victim to Corporate Crime in the developing world. To begin anew, we need to embrace a pragmatic theory of Corporate criminal liability that is forced upon us in a world as complex, unequal, and dysfunctional as that we presently inhabit.
Mark W H Hsiao - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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the shift in china from Corporate Crime to Corporate manslaughter Crime comparisons with the uk and australia
Social Science Research Network, 2015Co-Authors: Mark W H HsiaoAbstract:The Chinese Criminal Law 19971 (CL 1997) recognises that corporations can be guilty of committing Crimes: in other words, that they can exhibit a legal personality. However, there have been few comparative studies which have the aim of conceptualising the value and benefits that this criminal liability has actually brought to China. The author seeks to find out how this Corporate criminal liability was inCorporated into the Chinese drafting, and suggests that provisions of Corporate criminal liability extend to regulate the Crime of "Corporate manslaughter". Through comparisons with Australia and the United Kingdom, this article shows the similarities in the adoption of "negligence" for regulating the Crime of Corporate manslaughter. This negligence standard is inherently an objective standard that represents the Corporate intent. In addition, the author argues that much like the United Kingdom’s Health and Safety at Work Act 1974, the Chinese Work Safety Law is an alternative means of regulating the Crime of Corporate manslaughter, apart from the fact that it is derived from the socialist principle of workers’ rights.
Robert Tillman - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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the savings and loan debacle financial Crime and the state
Review of Sociology, 1997Co-Authors: Kitty Calavita, Robert Tillman, Henry N PontellAbstract:The savings and loan crisis of the 1980s was one of the worst financial disasters of the twentieth century. We argue here that much financial fraud of the sort that contributed to this debacle constitutes “collective embezzlement,” and that this collective embezzlement may be the prototypical Corporate Crime of the late twentieth century. We further argue that the state may have a different relationship to this kind of financial fraud than to manufacturing Crime perpetrated on behalf of Corporate profits. In the conclusion, we suggest that an understanding of the relationship between financial fraud and state interests may open up new regulatory space for the control of these costly Crimes. Our data come from a wide variety of sources, including government documents, primary statistical data on prosecutions, and interviews with regulators.
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Corporate Crime and criminal justice system capacity government response to financial institution fraud
Justice Quarterly, 1994Co-Authors: Henry N Pontell, Kitty Calavita, Robert TillmanAbstract:(1994). Corporate Crime and criminal justice system capacity: Government response to financial institution fraud. Justice Quarterly: Vol. 11, No. 3, pp. 383-410.
Vikramaditya S Khanna - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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an analysis of internal governance and the role of the general counsel in reducing Corporate Crime
2018Co-Authors: Vikramaditya S KhannaAbstract:This chapter reviews the empirical literature on the factors related to the likelihood and detection of Corporate wrongdoing, which increasingly focuses on internal governance, and examines calls to split the traditional tasks of the General Counsel (GC) between the GC and a Chief Compliance Officer (CCO) who reports directly to the Board. The reason for this is to have more independence and expertise in compliance matters than the GC’s office traditionally provides. This chapter argues that although independence is often valuable in reducing wrongdoing, in this context, it is likely to come with additional costs that may make gathering information on wrongdoing more difficult. In particular, some employees may be more reluctant to provide information as easily to a CCO than to the GC and this might sometimes result in increased wrongdoing and weaker operating performance. These deleterious effects, however, might be somewhat ameliorated by institutional and governance design adjustments. This chapter examines what factors may drive likely outcomes and finds that further empirical inquiry would be valuable and suggests some ways in which future research might engage in this inquiry.
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Corporate Crime legislation a political economy analysis
Washington University Law Review, 2004Co-Authors: Vikramaditya S KhannaAbstract:Corporate Crime has once again become an important issue on the U.S. legislative agenda, leading Congress and the various regulatory bodies to tighten the law and enhance honesty and completeness in disclosure. However, the continued and rather explosive growth of Corporate Crime legislation leaves one with a rather strange puzzle: how can such a state of the world arise? After all, corporations and business interests are considered some of the most, if not the most, powerful and effective lobbyists in the country. Yet, we witness the continued expansion of legislation that criminalizes their behavior (one estimate suggests over 300,000 federal regulatory offenses that can be prosecuted criminally). How could this have happened? This paper sets out to explain this puzzle. Overall, my analysis suggests that most Corporate Crime legislation arises when there is a large public outcry over a series of Corporate scandals during or around a downturn in the economy. In such situations, Congress must respond. Corporate Crime legislation may be the preferred response for some Corporate interests because it satisfies public outcry while imposing relatively low costs on those interests, thereby avoiding legislative and judicial responses that are more harmful to their interests and sometimes deflecting criminal liability away from managers and executives and onto corporations. This explains not only the impressive growth of Corporate Crime legislation but also leads to some surprising normative conclusions. In particular, it suggests that if one starts with the view that there is under-deterrence of Corporate wrongdoing, then one would probably prefer to reduce Corporate criminal liability and focus more on Corporate civil and managerial liability. * Visiting Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School, Fall 2003; Associate Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law; John M. Olin Faculty Fellow 2002–2003; S.J.D. Harvard Law School, 1997. Email: vskhanna2004@yahoo.com, vskhanna@umich.edu, or vkhanna@bu.edu. I thank the John M. Olin Foundation for funding support and Jonathan Barnett, Brian Cheffins, John Coffee, Robert Cooter, Richard Craswell, John Donohue, Bill Eskridge, Jill Fisch, Victor Fleischer, Victor Goldberg, Jeff Gordon, Mitu Gulati, Michael Heller, Samuel Issacaroff, Avery Katz, Santosh Khanna, Reinier Kraakman, Kim Krawiec, Tom Merrill, Curtis Milhaupt, Ed Morrison, Mitch Polinsky, Adam Pritchard, Daniel Richman, Ken Scott, Cathy Sharkey, Steve Washington University Open Scholarship p 95 Khanna book pages.doc4/12/2004 96 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 82:95
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Corporate Crime legislation a political economy analysis
2003Co-Authors: Vikramaditya S KhannaAbstract:Corporate Crime has once again become an important issue on the U.S. legislative agenda leading Congress and the various regulatory bodies to tighten the law and enhance honesty and completeness in disclosure. However, the continued and rather explosive growth of Corporate Crime legislation leaves one with a rather strange puzzle: how can such a state of the world arise? After all, corporations and business interests are considered some of the most, if not the most, powerful and effective lobbyists in the country. Yet, we witness the continued expansion of legislation that criminalizes their behavior (one estimate suggests over 300,000 federal regulatory offenses that can be prosecuted criminally). How could this have happened? This paper sets out to answer this puzzle. An answer is important not only for understanding the political dynamics of current regulation, but also because it provides insights into the effectiveness of our current approach for regulating Corporate wrongdoing. Overall, my analysis suggests that most Corporate Crime legislation arises at times when there is a large public outcry over a series of Corporate scandals during or around a downturn in the economy. In such a situation Congress must respond and Corporate Crime legislation may be the preferred response for some Corporate interests. This is because it satisfies the public outcry while imposing relatively low costs on Corporate interests, avoiding legislative and judicial responses that are more harmful to their interests, and sometimes helping to deflect criminal liability away from managers and executives and on to corporations. This explains not only the impressive growth of Corporate Crime legislation, but also leads to some surprising normative conclusions. In particular, it leads to the counter-intuitive result that if one starts with the view that there is under-deterrence of Corporate wrongdoing then one would probably prefer to reduce Corporate criminal liability and focus more on Corporate civil liability and managerial liability.
Mark D Walker - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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the effect of tougher enforcement on foreign firms evidence from the adelphia perp walk
Journal of Corporate Finance, 2013Co-Authors: Charles R Knoeber, Mark D WalkerAbstract:The public arrest of Adelphia executives on July 24, 2002 signaled tougher enforcement of laws against Corporate Crime. On that day and the two following days, foreign firms experienced a cumulative 1.7% decline in value. Relative to domestic firms, the loss was a much larger 4.5%. The expected cost to firms from tougher enforcement suggests three possible reasons. Foreign firms may be targeted more heavily, may face greater penalties, or may find it more costly to react to (deflect) enforcement. We find evidence consistent with foreign firms facing higher costs from tougher enforcement for each of these reasons.
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the adelphia perp walk tougher enforcement and foreign firms
2011Co-Authors: Charles R Knoeber, Mark D WalkerAbstract:The public arrest of Adelphia executives John Rigas and his two sons on July 24, 2002 and the spectacle of these executives being paraded in front of news reporters and photographers signaled tougher enforcement of laws against Corporate Crime. Relative to domestic firms, foreign firms traded in the U.S. fared badly on the day of the Adelphia perp walk, underperforming by 1.8% (by 2.5% when controlling for industry and the financial characteristics of firms). A framework based on the expected cost to firms from tougher enforcement suggests three possible reasons. Foreign firms may be targeted more heavily, may face greater reputational penalties, or may find it more costly to react to (deflect) enforcement. We construct variables linked to each reason and test to see if these explain the July 24 returns of foreign firms. We find some evidence consistent with each of the suggested reasons, but stronger evidence for differential targeting and higher reaction costs for foreign firms.
