The Experts below are selected from a list of 85917 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Mark J Roe - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
-
regulatory competition in making Corporate law in the united states and its limits
Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 2005Co-Authors: Mark J RoeAbstract:American Corporate-law scholars have focused on jurisdictional competition as an engine--usually as the engine--making American Corporate law. Recent decisions in the European Court of Justice open up the possibility of similar competition in the EU. That has led analysts to wonder whether a European race would mimic the American, which depending on one's view is a race to the top--promoting capital markets efficiency--or one to the bottom--demeaning it by giving managers too much authority in the American corporation. But the academic race literature underestimates Washington's role in making American Corporate law. Federal authorities are regularly involved, regularly make law governing the American corporation--from shareholder voting rules, to boardroom composition, to dual class stock--and they could do even more. In structure, the United States has two Corporate lawmaking powers--the states (primarily Delaware) and Washington. We are only beginning to understand how they interact, as complements and substitutes, but the foundational fact of American Corporate lawmaking during the twentieth century is that whenever there is a big issue--the kind of Corporate Policy decision that could strongly affect capital costs--Washington acted or considered acting. We cannot understand the structure of American Corporate lawmaking by examining state-to-state jurisdictional competition alone. Copyright 2005, Oxford University Press.
-
regulatory competition in making Corporate law in the united states and its limits
Social Science Research Network, 2005Co-Authors: Mark J RoeAbstract:American Corporate-law scholars have focused on jurisdictional competition as an engine-usually as the engine-making American Corporate law. Recent decisions in the European Court of Justice open up the possibility of similar competition in the EU. That has led analysts to wonder whether a European race would mimic the American, which depending on one`s view is a race to the top-promoting capital markets efficiency-or one to the bottom-demeaning it by giving managers too much authority in the American corporation. But the academic race literature underestimates Washington`s role in making American Corporate law. Federal authorities are regularly involved, regularly make law governing the American corporation-from shareholder voting rules, to boardroom composition, to dual class stock-and they could do even more. In structure, the United States has two Corporate lawmaking powers-the states (primarily Delaware) and Washington. We are only beginning to understand how they interact, as complements and substitutes, but the foundational fact of American Corporate lawmaking during the twentieth century is that whenever there is a big issue-the kind of Corporate Policy decision that could strongly affect capital costs-Washington acted or considered acting. We cannot understand the structure of American Corporate lawmaking by examining state-to-state jurisdictional competition alone.
George P Baker - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
-
growth Corporate policies and the investment opportunity set
Journal of Accounting and Economics, 1993Co-Authors: George P BakerAbstract:Abstract Gaver and Gaver take on a difficult project with their paper, and succeed in bringing insight to this important and growing area. The paper is somewhat weakend by the failure to distinguish between equity value growth and asset growth, and by a sample segmentation technique that separates firms into growth and nongrowth subsamples, and finds that the growth firms are larger and substantially more profitable. The paper also fails, as do all the papers in this area, to deal with the fundamental simultaneity between the investment opportunity set and Corporate Policy decisions.
Kenneth M Gaver - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
-
compensation Policy and the investment opportunity set
Social Science Research Network, 1999Co-Authors: Jennifer J Gaver, Kenneth M GaverAbstract:Smith and Watts (1992) and Gaver and Gaver (1993) present initial evidence that cross-sectional differences in Corporate Policy decisions are related to the firm's investment opportunity set. This study provides further insight into the relation between the investment opportunity set and compensation Policy by analyzing the structure of executive compensation agreements. The sample consists of 321 Fortune 1000 firms that participated in a compensation survey conducted by the consulting firm of William M. Mercer, Inc. in early 1993. Following Gaver and Gaver (1993), common factor analysis is used to construct an index of investment opportunities for each firm. The results indicate that firms with abundant investment opportunities pay higher levels of total compensation to their executives. Executives of growth firms derive a larger portion of their compensation from long-term incentive compensation (such as performance awards, restricted stock grants and stock option grants), while those of non-growth firms receive a larger portion of their pay from fixed salary.
Cesare Fracassi - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
-
Corporate finance policies and social networks
Management Science, 2017Co-Authors: Cesare FracassiAbstract:This paper shows that managers are influenced by their social peers when making Corporate Policy decisions. Using biographical information about executives and directors of U.S. public companies, we define social ties from current and past employment, education, and other activities. We find that more connections two companies share with each other, more similar their capital investments are. To address endogeneity concerns, we find that companies invest less similarly when an individual connecting them dies. The results extend to other Corporate finance policies. Furthermore, central companies in the social network invest in a less idiosyncratic way, and exhibit better economic performance.
Jennifer J Gaver - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
-
compensation Policy and the investment opportunity set
Social Science Research Network, 1999Co-Authors: Jennifer J Gaver, Kenneth M GaverAbstract:Smith and Watts (1992) and Gaver and Gaver (1993) present initial evidence that cross-sectional differences in Corporate Policy decisions are related to the firm's investment opportunity set. This study provides further insight into the relation between the investment opportunity set and compensation Policy by analyzing the structure of executive compensation agreements. The sample consists of 321 Fortune 1000 firms that participated in a compensation survey conducted by the consulting firm of William M. Mercer, Inc. in early 1993. Following Gaver and Gaver (1993), common factor analysis is used to construct an index of investment opportunities for each firm. The results indicate that firms with abundant investment opportunities pay higher levels of total compensation to their executives. Executives of growth firms derive a larger portion of their compensation from long-term incentive compensation (such as performance awards, restricted stock grants and stock option grants), while those of non-growth firms receive a larger portion of their pay from fixed salary.
