The Experts below are selected from a list of 4716 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
David M. Reeb - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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board characteristics accounting report integrity and the Cost of Debt
Journal of Accounting and Economics, 2004Co-Authors: Ronald C. Anderson, Sattar A Mansi, David M. ReebAbstract:Creditor reliance on accounting-based Debt covenants suggests that Debtors are potentially concerned with board of director characteristics that influence the integrity of financial accounting reports. In a sample of S&P 500 firms, we find that the Cost of Debt is inversely related to board independence and board size. We also find that fully independent audit committees are associated with a significantly lower Cost of Debt financing. Similarly, yield spreads are also negatively related to audit committee size and meeting frequency. Overall, these results provide market-based evidence that boards and audit committees are important elements affecting the reliability of financial reports.
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founding family ownership and the agency Cost of Debt
Journal of Financial Economics, 2003Co-Authors: Ronald C. Anderson, Sattar A Mansi, David M. ReebAbstract:We investigate the impact of founding family ownership structure on the agency Cost of Debt. We find that founding family ownership is common in large, publicly traded firms and is related, both statistically and economically, to a lower Cost of Debt financing. Our results are consistent with the idea that founding family firms have incentive structures that result in fewer agency conflicts between equity and Debt claimants. This suggests that bond holders view founding family ownership as an organizational structure that better protects their interests.
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Founding family ownership and the agency Cost of Debt
Journal of Financial Economics, 2003Co-Authors: Ronald C. Anderson, Sattar A Mansi, David M. ReebAbstract:We investigate the impact of founding family ownership structure on the agency Cost of Debt. We find that founding family ownership is common in large, publicly traded firms and is related, both statistically and economically, to a lower Cost of Debt financing. Our results are consistent with the idea that founding family firms have incentive structures that result in fewer agency conflicts between equity and Debt claimants. This suggests that bond holders view founding family ownership as an organizational structure that better protects their interests. © 2003 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
Ronald C. Anderson - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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board characteristics accounting report integrity and the Cost of Debt
Journal of Accounting and Economics, 2004Co-Authors: Ronald C. Anderson, Sattar A Mansi, David M. ReebAbstract:Creditor reliance on accounting-based Debt covenants suggests that Debtors are potentially concerned with board of director characteristics that influence the integrity of financial accounting reports. In a sample of S&P 500 firms, we find that the Cost of Debt is inversely related to board independence and board size. We also find that fully independent audit committees are associated with a significantly lower Cost of Debt financing. Similarly, yield spreads are also negatively related to audit committee size and meeting frequency. Overall, these results provide market-based evidence that boards and audit committees are important elements affecting the reliability of financial reports.
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founding family ownership and the agency Cost of Debt
Journal of Financial Economics, 2003Co-Authors: Ronald C. Anderson, Sattar A Mansi, David M. ReebAbstract:We investigate the impact of founding family ownership structure on the agency Cost of Debt. We find that founding family ownership is common in large, publicly traded firms and is related, both statistically and economically, to a lower Cost of Debt financing. Our results are consistent with the idea that founding family firms have incentive structures that result in fewer agency conflicts between equity and Debt claimants. This suggests that bond holders view founding family ownership as an organizational structure that better protects their interests.
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Founding family ownership and the agency Cost of Debt
Journal of Financial Economics, 2003Co-Authors: Ronald C. Anderson, Sattar A Mansi, David M. ReebAbstract:We investigate the impact of founding family ownership structure on the agency Cost of Debt. We find that founding family ownership is common in large, publicly traded firms and is related, both statistically and economically, to a lower Cost of Debt financing. Our results are consistent with the idea that founding family firms have incentive structures that result in fewer agency conflicts between equity and Debt claimants. This suggests that bond holders view founding family ownership as an organizational structure that better protects their interests. © 2003 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
Elyas Elyasiani - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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institutional ownership stability and the Cost of Debt
Journal of Financial Markets, 2010Co-Authors: Elyas ElyasianiAbstract:This study documents that the stability of institutional ownership plays an important role in determining the Cost of Debt. After controlling for other determinants of the Cost of Debt, and correcting for the endogeneity of institutional ownership stability, three major results are uncovered. First, there is a robust negative relationship between the Cost of Debt and institutional ownership stability. Second, institutional ownership stability plays a bigger role in determining the Cost of Debt, than the institutional ownership level commonly used in the literature. Third, institutional ownership stability affects the Cost of Debt to a greater extent for firms that are subject to more severe information asymmetry and greater agency Costs of Debt.
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Institutional ownership stability and the Cost of Debt
Journal of Financial Markets, 2010Co-Authors: Elyas Elyasiani, Jingyi Jane Jia, Connie X. MaoAbstract:This study documents that the stability of institutional ownership plays an important role in determining the Cost of Debt. After controlling for other determinants of the Cost of Debt, and correcting for the endogeneity of institutional ownership stability, three major results are uncovered. First, there is a robust negative relationship between the Cost of Debt and institutional ownership stability. Second, institutional ownership stability plays a bigger role in determining the Cost of Debt, than the institutional ownership level commonly used in the literature. Third, institutional ownership stability affects the Cost of Debt to a greater extent for firms that are subject to more severe information asymmetry and greater agency Costs of Debt. © 2010 Elsevier B.V.
Praveen Kumar - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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the Cost of Debt
2020Co-Authors: Hadiye Aslan, Praveen KumarAbstract:We theoretically and empirically address the endogeneity of corporate ownership structure and the Cost of Debt, with a novel emphasis on the role of control concentration in post-default firm restructuring. Control concentration raises agency Costs of Debt, and dominant shareholders trade off private benefits of control against higher borrowing Costs in choosing their ownership stakes. Based on our theoretical predictions, and using an international sample of syndicated loans and unique dynamic ownership structure data, we present new evidence on the firm- and macro-level determinants of corporate control concentration and the Cost of Debt.
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strategic ownership structure and the Cost of Debt
Review of Financial Studies, 2012Co-Authors: Hadiye Aslan, Praveen KumarAbstract:We theoretically and empirically address the endogeneity of corporate ownership structure and the Cost of Debt, with a novel emphasis on the role of control concentration in post-default firm restructuring. Control concentration raises agency Costs of Debt, and dominant shareholders trade off private benefits of control against higher borrowing Costs in choosing their ownership stakes. Based on our theoretical predictions, and using an international sample of syndicated loans and unique dynamic ownership structure data, we present new evidence on the firm- and macro-level determinants of corporate control concentration and the Cost of Debt. The Author 2012. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oup.com., Oxford University Press.
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Strategic ownership structure and the Cost of Debt
Review of Financial Studies, 2012Co-Authors: Hadiye Aslan, Praveen KumarAbstract:We theoretically and empirically address the endogeneity of corporate ownership structure and the Cost of Debt, with a novel emphasis on the role of control concentration in postdefault firm restructuring. Control concentration raises agency Costs of Debt, and dominant shareholders trade off private benefits of control against higher borrowing Costs in choosing their ownership stakes. Based on our theoretical predictions, and using an international sample of syndicated loans and unique dynamic ownership structure data, we present new evidence on the firm- and macro-level determinants of corporate control concentration and the Cost of Debt.
Sattar A Mansi - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Golden Parachutes, Incentives, and the Cost of Debt
2020Co-Authors: John K Wald, Sattar A Mansi, Anh Phuong NguyenAbstract:We examine the relation between the presence of golden parachutes and the Cost of Debt financing. We hypothesize that since golden parachutes compensate CEOs in the event of termination, CEOs with golden parachutes will have an incentive to increase firm risk and decrease effort, and this will lead to a higher Cost of Debt. Consistent with these hypotheses, we document a significant positive relation between the use of golden parachutes and the Cost of Debt. We confirm these results with a natural experiment using a difference-in-difference specification based on a 2004 change in IRS tax regulations. Moreover, we find that the adoption of a golden parachute is associated with an increase in firm risk, a higher likelihood of CEO turnover, and a lower operating performance. Overall, the evidence suggests that golden parachutes are primarily negative for the firm and for Debt holders in particular.
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board characteristics accounting report integrity and the Cost of Debt
Journal of Accounting and Economics, 2004Co-Authors: Ronald C. Anderson, Sattar A Mansi, David M. ReebAbstract:Creditor reliance on accounting-based Debt covenants suggests that Debtors are potentially concerned with board of director characteristics that influence the integrity of financial accounting reports. In a sample of S&P 500 firms, we find that the Cost of Debt is inversely related to board independence and board size. We also find that fully independent audit committees are associated with a significantly lower Cost of Debt financing. Similarly, yield spreads are also negatively related to audit committee size and meeting frequency. Overall, these results provide market-based evidence that boards and audit committees are important elements affecting the reliability of financial reports.
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founding family ownership and the agency Cost of Debt
Journal of Financial Economics, 2003Co-Authors: Ronald C. Anderson, Sattar A Mansi, David M. ReebAbstract:We investigate the impact of founding family ownership structure on the agency Cost of Debt. We find that founding family ownership is common in large, publicly traded firms and is related, both statistically and economically, to a lower Cost of Debt financing. Our results are consistent with the idea that founding family firms have incentive structures that result in fewer agency conflicts between equity and Debt claimants. This suggests that bond holders view founding family ownership as an organizational structure that better protects their interests.
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Founding family ownership and the agency Cost of Debt
Journal of Financial Economics, 2003Co-Authors: Ronald C. Anderson, Sattar A Mansi, David M. ReebAbstract:We investigate the impact of founding family ownership structure on the agency Cost of Debt. We find that founding family ownership is common in large, publicly traded firms and is related, both statistically and economically, to a lower Cost of Debt financing. Our results are consistent with the idea that founding family firms have incentive structures that result in fewer agency conflicts between equity and Debt claimants. This suggests that bond holders view founding family ownership as an organizational structure that better protects their interests. © 2003 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
