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Natalia Reisel - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • do country level investor Protections impact security level contract design evidence from foreign bond covenants
    Review of Financial Studies, 2012
    Co-Authors: Darius P Miller, Natalia Reisel
    Abstract:

    This article studies the ability of security-level contracts to substitute for poor country-level investor Protections. Using a cross-country sample of restrictive covenants, we find that bond contacts are more likely to include covenants when Creditor Protection laws are weak. Further, the use of restrictive covenants in weak Creditor Protection countries is associated with a lower cost of debt. We also find that strong country-level shareholder rights are not necessarily harmful to bondholders. Overall, the findings suggest that issuers and investors can create international contracts that overcome some of the deficiencies of country-level investor Protections and facilitate access to external finance. The Author 2011. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oup.com., Oxford University Press.

  • do country level investor Protections affect security level contract design evidence from foreign bond covenants
    Review of Financial Studies, 2012
    Co-Authors: Darius P Miller, Natalia Reisel
    Abstract:

    This article studies the ability of security-level contracts to substitute for poor country-level investor Protections. Using a cross-country sample of restrictive covenants, we find that bond contacts are more likely to include covenants when Creditor Protection laws are weak. Further, the use of restrictive covenants in weak Creditor Protection countries is associated with a lower cost of debt. We also find that strong country-level shareholder rights are not necessarily harmful to bondholders. Overall, the findings suggest that issuers and investors can create international contracts that overcome some of the deficiencies of country-level investor Protections and facilitate access to external finance. The Author 2011. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oup.com., Oxford University Press.

  • do country level investor Protections impact security level contract design evidence from foreign bond covenants
    2011
    Co-Authors: Darius P Miller, Natalia Reisel
    Abstract:

    This paper studies the ability of security-level contracts to substitute for poor country-level investor Protections. Using a cross-country sample of restrictive covenants, we find that bond contacts are more likely to include covenants when Creditor Protection laws are weak. Further, the use of restrictive covenants in weak Creditor Protection countries is associated with a lower cost of debt. We also find that strong country-level shareholder rights are not necessarily harmful to bondholders. Overall, our findings suggest issuers and investors can create international contracts that overcome some of the deficiencies of country-level investor Protections and facilitate access to external finance.

Darius P Miller - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • do country level investor Protections impact security level contract design evidence from foreign bond covenants
    Review of Financial Studies, 2012
    Co-Authors: Darius P Miller, Natalia Reisel
    Abstract:

    This article studies the ability of security-level contracts to substitute for poor country-level investor Protections. Using a cross-country sample of restrictive covenants, we find that bond contacts are more likely to include covenants when Creditor Protection laws are weak. Further, the use of restrictive covenants in weak Creditor Protection countries is associated with a lower cost of debt. We also find that strong country-level shareholder rights are not necessarily harmful to bondholders. Overall, the findings suggest that issuers and investors can create international contracts that overcome some of the deficiencies of country-level investor Protections and facilitate access to external finance. The Author 2011. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oup.com., Oxford University Press.

  • do country level investor Protections affect security level contract design evidence from foreign bond covenants
    Review of Financial Studies, 2012
    Co-Authors: Darius P Miller, Natalia Reisel
    Abstract:

    This article studies the ability of security-level contracts to substitute for poor country-level investor Protections. Using a cross-country sample of restrictive covenants, we find that bond contacts are more likely to include covenants when Creditor Protection laws are weak. Further, the use of restrictive covenants in weak Creditor Protection countries is associated with a lower cost of debt. We also find that strong country-level shareholder rights are not necessarily harmful to bondholders. Overall, the findings suggest that issuers and investors can create international contracts that overcome some of the deficiencies of country-level investor Protections and facilitate access to external finance. The Author 2011. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oup.com., Oxford University Press.

  • do country level investor Protections impact security level contract design evidence from foreign bond covenants
    2011
    Co-Authors: Darius P Miller, Natalia Reisel
    Abstract:

    This paper studies the ability of security-level contracts to substitute for poor country-level investor Protections. Using a cross-country sample of restrictive covenants, we find that bond contacts are more likely to include covenants when Creditor Protection laws are weak. Further, the use of restrictive covenants in weak Creditor Protection countries is associated with a lower cost of debt. We also find that strong country-level shareholder rights are not necessarily harmful to bondholders. Overall, our findings suggest issuers and investors can create international contracts that overcome some of the deficiencies of country-level investor Protections and facilitate access to external finance.

Prabirjit Sarkar - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • varieties of Creditor Protection insolvency law reform and credit expansion in developed market economies
    Socio-economic Review, 2016
    Co-Authors: Simon Deakin, Viviana Mollica, Prabirjit Sarkar
    Abstract:

    We examine the relationship between Creditor Protection, law reform and credit expansion using longitudinal data for four OECD countries between 1970 and 2005. By decomposing the different elements of Creditor Protection, we show that civil law countries (France and Germany) have developed a high level of Protection for Creditors in the form of controls over the management of debtor firms, while common law countries (UK and USA) have arrived at a high degree of Protection in relation to secured Creditors' contractual rights over firms' assets. Using panel causality tests and dynamic panel data modelling, we show that laws strengthening Creditors' control over debtor firms in these four countries had a long-term positive effect on the expansion of private credit, while reforms increasing secured Creditors' rights had a negative effect. We explore the implications of our findings for legal origin theory and the varieties of capitalism approach.

  • common law vs civil law which system provides more Protection to shareholders and Creditors and promotes financial development
    MPRA Paper, 2011
    Co-Authors: Prabirjit Sarkar
    Abstract:

    This study re-examines the theory of legal-origin on the basis of a new longitudinal dataset for four OECD countries (UK, USA, France and Germany) over a long time span 1970-2005. It observes that the civil law countries (France and Germany) provided better minority shareholder Protection and Creditor Protection relating to debtors’ control while the common law countries (UK and USA) provided better Creditor Protection relating to credit contract and insolvency. Through dynamic panel data modelling our study shows that minority shareholder Protection has a long-term favourable effect only on stock market listing of firms and debtors’ control has a similar effect on credit market expansion while the credit contract component of Creditor Protection has the opposite effect. Thus, our study questions the proposition that common-law countries provide more Protection to their shareholders and Creditors; it also casts doubt on the related proposition that shareholder and Creditor Protection promotes financial development.

  • do the english legal origin countries have more dispersed share ownership and more developed financial systems
    International Journal of The Economics of Business, 2009
    Co-Authors: Prabirjit Sarkar
    Abstract:

    Abstract The essence of the legal origin hypothesis is that a country with an English legal origin provides better investor and Creditor Protection and experiences greater financial development; financial institutions and stock markets flourish, the general public participate more in financing investment projects of companies and so shareholding is less concentrated. The present paper examines this hypothesis on the basis of a cross‐country study of 85 countries. We find no evidence of more dispersed share ownership in the English law countries than in other countries with different legal origins irrespective of whether we adjust for the existence of transitional economies and less developed countries in the sample. Using three indicators of development of banking and other credit institutions and four indicators of stock market developments, we also find no evidence of more developed financial systems in the English law countries. As expected, there is some evidence of lower financial development in the ...

  • do the english legal origin countries have more dispersed share ownership and more developed financial systems
    2008
    Co-Authors: Prabirjit Sarkar
    Abstract:

    The essence of the legal origin hypothesis is that a country with an English legal origin provides better investor and Creditor Protection and experiences greater financial development; financial institutions and stock markets flourish, the general public participate more in financing investment projects of companies and so shareholding is less concentrated. The present paper examines this hypothesis on the basis of a cross-country study of 85 countries. We find no evidence of more dispersed share ownership in the English law countries than in other countries with different legal origins irrespective of whether we adjust for the existence of transitional economies and less developed countries present in the sample. Using three indicators of development of banking and other credit institutions and four indicators of stock market developments, we also find no evidence of more developed financial systems in the English law countries. As expected, there is some evidence of lower financial development in the less developed countries and transitional countries. It is not the English law heritage but the security of persons and goods that appears to explain the cross-country variations in financial development.

Wulandari Endah - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • PERLINDUNGAN HUKUM BAGI BANK DALAM MENCEGAH KERUGIAN AKIBAT KREDIT BERMASALAH DENGAN JAMINAN PERSONAL GUARANTEE
    Kumpulan Jurnal Mahasiswa Fakultas Hukum, 2017
    Co-Authors: Wulandari Endah
    Abstract:

    Abstract                This journal aims to identify and analyze on what form of legal Protection for the bank as a Creditor in preventing losses from non-performing loans with collateral personal guarantees and how the formulation of clauses in the agreement underwriting that could provide legal Protection for banks to prevent losses in the event of non-performing loans with collateral personal guarantee. This research is normative juridical research with the approach of legislation which assisted with the conceptual nature of legal materials of primary, secondary and tertiary, which will be described, described, and analyzed using three theories, namely the law guarantees legal Protection and agreements.                The results of this research is a form of legal Protection for the bank as a Creditor to prevent losses in the event of non-performing loans with a personal guarantee has not been found either through legislation or through regulatory authority of the financial services, legislation governing responsibility in article 1820- 1850, Protection is only given to the surety with several privileges, so the banks are inadequately protected because the bank can not take steps to resolve credit debtor in question while the surety was not cooperative to implement the achievements of the debtors default, the Personal Guarantee Creditor Protection obtained through a clause in treaty underwriting, is supposed to provide legal Protection for Creditors financial services authority ruled that the agreement underwriting must be authentic deed as well as the submission of counter guarantee by the insurer and the formulation of clauses in the agreement underwriting proposed by researchers aim to equalize the clause in the treaty underwriting this as a form of Protection law for Creditors and to avoid clauses are important precisely not included in the underwriting agreement.  Key words: legal Protection , losses , personal guarantee Abstrak Jurnal ini bertujuan untuk mengetahui dan menganalisis tentang Apa bentuk perlindungan hukum bagi bank selaku kreditor dalam mencegah kerugian akibat kredit bermasalah dengan jaminan personal guarantee dan bagaimana formulasi klausul dalam perjanjian penanggungan yang bisa memberikan perlindungan hukum bagi bank untuk mencegah kerugian dalam hal terjadi kredit bermasalah dengan jaminan personal guarantee. Jenis penelitian ini merupakan penelitian Yuridis Normatif  dengan menggunakan pendekatan perundang-undangan yang bersifat konseptual dibantu dengan bahan-bahan hukum primer, sekunder dan tersier, yang akan diuraikan, dideskripsikan, dan dianalisis dengan menggunakan 3 teori yaitu hukum jaminan,  perlindungan hukum dan  perjanjian. Hasil dari penelitian ini adalah bentuk perlindungan hukum bagi bank selaku kreditor untuk mencegah kerugian jika terjadi kredit bermasalah dengan personal guarantee selama ini belum diketemukan baik melalui peraturan perundang-undangan maupun melalui peraturan otoritas jasa keuangan, peraturan perundang-undangan yang mengatur penanggungan dalam pasal 1820-1850, perlindungan hanya diberikan kepada penjamin dengan beberapa hak istimewanya, sehingga pihak bank kurang terlindungi sebab pihak bank tidak bisa mengambil langkah penyelesaian kredit debitor yang bermasalah sementara penjamin tidak kooperatif untuk melaksanakan prestasi dari debitor yang wanprestasi, dalam Personal Guarantee perlindungan kreditor didapat  melalui klausul dalam perjanjian penanggungan, seharusnya untuk memberikan perlindungan hukum bagi kreditor otoritas jasa keuangan mengeluarkan aturan bahwa perjanjian penanggungan harus dengan akta otentik serta penyerahan counter guarantee oleh penanggung dan formulasi klausul dalam perjanjian penanggungan yang diusulkan oleh peneliti bertujuan untuk menyamakan klausul dalam perjanjian penanggungan hal ini sebagai bentuk perlindungan hukum bagi kreditor dan untuk menghindari klausul yang penting justru tidak dicantumkan dalam perjanjian penanggungan. Kata Kunci: perlindungan hukum, kerugian, personal guarante

Cara Vansteenkiste - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Creditor rights claims enforcement and bond performance in mergers and acquisitions
    Journal of International Business Studies, 2017
    Co-Authors: Luc Renneboog, Peter G Szilagyi, Cara Vansteenkiste
    Abstract:

    This article shows that country-level differences in Creditor Protection affect bond performance around cross-border M&A announcements. Using Eurobonds and a global sample of 1,100 cross-border M&As, we find that the bondholders of bidding firms respond more positively to deals that expose their firm to a jurisdiction with stronger Creditor rights and more efficient claims enforcement through courts. Positive Creditor Protection spillovers are enhanced by now-global jurisdictional cooperation in multinational insolvencies and Creditors’ ability to do insolvency arbitrage. The spillover effects we observe are stronger for firms with higher asset risk, longer maturity bonds, and a higher likelihood of financial distress.

  • Creditor rights claims enforcement and bond performance in mergers and acquisitions
    Other publications TiSEM, 2017
    Co-Authors: Luc Renneboog, Peter G Szilagyi, Cara Vansteenkiste
    Abstract:

    This article shows that country-level differences in Creditor Protection affect bond performance around cross-border M&A announcements. Using Eurobonds and a global sample of 1,100 cross-border M&As, we find that the bondholders of bidding firms respond more positively to deals that expose their firm to a jurisdiction with stronger Creditor rights and more efficient claims enforcement through courts. Positive Creditor Protection spillovers are enhanced by now-global jurisdictional cooperation in multinational insolvencies and Creditors’ ability to do insolvency arbitrage. The spillover effects we observe are stronger for firms with higher asset risk, longer maturity bonds, and a higher likelihood of financial distress. (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)