The Experts below are selected from a list of 1890 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Xuepeng Liu - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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testing conflicting political economy theories full fledged versus partial scope regional trade agreements
Southern Economic Journal, 2010Co-Authors: Xuepeng LiuAbstract:We apply a duration analysis to test the conflicting predictions of the median voter model and the lobbying model using panel data on regional trade agreement (RTA) formation. Our results show that the pro-labor prediction of the median voter model is supported by the full-fledged free trade areas and Customs Unions (FTAs/CUs), while the pro-capital prediction of the lobbying model is supported by the partial-scope preferential trade arrangements among developing countries. This finding holds better for the country pairs with more different capital-labor ratios as a result of the stronger distributional effects of RTAs. The support for the median voter model (lobbying model) is stronger when the two countries in a pair have left-oriented (right-oriented) governments. I also find stronger support for the median voter model for the subset of FTAs/CUs with service coverage and stronger support for the lobbying model for countries that place higher weight on political contribution.
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testing conflicting political economy theories full fledged versus partial scope regional trade agreements
Social Science Research Network, 2009Co-Authors: Xuepeng LiuAbstract:The median voter approach to trade policies within a Heckscher-Ohlin framework predicts that trade policy is pro-labor; while the lobbying model based on the argument of the free rider problem predicts that trade policy is pro-capital. We test these conflicting political economy theories using data on regional trade agreements (RTAs). Due to the violation of the conditional independence assumption of RTAs, we apply a duration analysis rather than standard binary choice analysis to the RTA panel data. The results show that the prediction of the median-voter model is supported by the full-fledged free trade areas and Customs Unions (FTAs/CUs); while the prediction of the lobbying model is supported by the partial-scope preferential trade arrangements (PTAs) among developing countries. Our findings hold better for the country pairs with more different capital-labor ratios due to stronger distributional effects of RTAs. The support for the median voter model (lobbying model) is stronger when the two countries in a pair have left-oriented (right-oriented) governments. We also find stronger support for the median voter model for the subset of FTAs/CUs with service coverage and stronger support for the lobbying model for countries that place higher weight on political contribution.
Dean A Derosa - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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regional integration arrangements static economic theory quantitative findings and policy guidelines
Social Science Research Network, 1999Co-Authors: Dean A DerosaAbstract:This paper reviews the static theory of regional integration arrangements and considers the economic impact of such arrangements, based on recent quantitative studies of Customs Unions and free trade areas. DeRosa reviews the static theory of regional integration arrangements, identifying and analyzing the impact of such arrangements on the trade and welfare of member countries,nonmember countries, and the world at large. He develops eight policy guidelines that apply mainly to small trading countries unable to influence their international terms of trade or to cease trading entirely with nonmember countries, assuming increasing cost conditions in member countries, homogeneous traded goods, and perfect competition. The guidelines advise establishing regional facilities for compensatory lump-sum transfers or other intrabloc payments to avoid the possibility that, where a trading bloc would be welfare-improving overall, the bloc would not be formed because of the (justified) recalcitrance of one or more would-be member countries whose economic welfare might be reduced by the adoption of the regional trade arrangement. Other guidelines are appropriate on common sense grounds. For example: Regional trade arrangements will be welfare-improving if they are formed by countries that are predominantly least-cost producers of exportables, or if they give rise to increased imports from all trading partners. Yet few if any extant Customs Unions or free trade areas meet such simple guidelines fully. To some extent, Customs Unions and free trade areas are expected to result in cessation of trade (in homogeneous goods) with nonmember countries. Where trade between member countries and nonmember countries is expected to continue under regional arrangements (as real-world data suggest), internationally determined terms of trade rather than regionally determined terms of trade are likely to prevail within the trading bloc, limiting the welfare-improving effects of creating trade but not the welfare-reducing effects of trade diversion. Among the most interesting and arguably operational policy guidelines to emerge from DeRosa's analysis are those concerning countries that might choose to join (1) a large rather than small regional trading bloc, (2) a regional integration arrangement to overcome hindrances facing exports to third countries, or (3) a regional integration arrangement that could have strong pro-competitive effects under imperfect competition and increasing returns to scale. Guidelines 1 and 2 concern mostly developing countries; guideline 3 concerns mostly advanced countries. But the economic bases for the three guidelines are relevant and compelling. This paper - a product of Trade, Development Research Group - is a background paper prepared for a World Bank Policy Research Report, Regionalism and Development.
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regional integration arrangements static economic theory quantitative findings and policy guidelines
Research Papers in Economics, 1998Co-Authors: Dean A DerosaAbstract:The author reviews the static theory of regional integration arrangements, identifying and analyzing the impact of such arrangements on the trade and welfare of member countries, nonmember countries, and the world at large. He develops eight policy guidelines that apply mainly to small trading countries unable to influence their international terms of trade or to cease trading entirely with nonmember countries, assuming increasing cost conditions in member countries, homogeneous traded goods, and perfect competition. The guidelines advise establishing regional facilities for compensatory lump-sum transfers or other intrabloc payments to avoid the possibility that, where a trading bloc would be welfare-improving overall, the bloc would not be formed because of the (justified) recalcitrance of one or more would-be member countries whose economic welfaremight be reduced by the adoption of the regional trade arrangement. Other guidelines are appropriate on commonsense grounds. For example: Regional trade arrangements will be welfare-improving if they are formed by countries that are predominantly least-cost producers of exportable, or if they give rise to increased imports from all trading partners. Yet few if any extant Customs Unions or free trade areas meet such simple guidelines fully. To some extent, Customs Unions and free trade areas are expected to result in cessation of trade (in homogeneous goods) with nonmember countries. Where trade between member countries and nonmember countries is expected to continue under regional arrangements ( as real-world data suggest), internationally determined terms of trade rather than regionally determined terms of trade are likely to prevail within the trading bloc, limiting the welfare-improving effects of creating trade but not the welfare-reducing effects of trade diversion. Among the most interesting and arguably"operational"policy guidelines to emerge from the author's analysis are those concerning countries that might choose to join 1) a large rather than small regional trading bloc, 2) a regional integration arrangement to overcome hindrances facing exports to third countries, or 3) a regional integration arrangement that could have strong pro-competitive effects under imperfect competition and increasing returns to scale. Guidelines 1 and 2 concern mostly developing countries, guideline 3 concerns mostly advanced countries. But the economic bases for the three guidelines are relevant and compelling.
Emanuel Ornelas - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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does regionalism affect trade liberalization toward non members
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2008Co-Authors: Antoni Estevadeordal, Caroline Freund, Emanuel OrnelasAbstract:We examine the effect of regionalism on unilateral trade liberalization using industry-level data on applied most-favored nation (MFN) tariffs and bilateral preferences for ten Latin American countries from 1990 to 2001. We find that preferential tariff reduction in a given sector leads to a reduction in the external (MFN) tariff in that sector. External liberalization is greater if preferences are granted to important suppliers. However, these “complementarity effects” of preferential liberalization on external liberalization do not arise in Customs Unions. Overall, our results suggest that concerns about a negative effect of preferential liberalization on external trade liberalization are unfounded.
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does regionalism affect trade liberalization toward non members
Social Science Research Network, 2008Co-Authors: Antoni Estevadeordal, Caroline Freund, Emanuel OrnelasAbstract:This paper examines the effect of regionalism on unilateral trade liberalization using industry-level data on applied most-favored nation tariffs and bilateral preferences for ten Latin American countries from 1990 to 2001. The findings show that preferential tariff reduction in a given sector leads to a reduction in the external (most-favored nation) tariff in that sector. External liberalization is greater if preferences are granted to important suppliers. However, these "complementarity effects" of preferential liberalization on external liberalization do not arise in Customs Unions. Overall, the results suggest that concerns about a negative effect of preferential liberalization on external trade liberalization are unfounded.
Antoni Estevadeordal - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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does regionalism affect trade liberalization toward non members
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2008Co-Authors: Antoni Estevadeordal, Caroline Freund, Emanuel OrnelasAbstract:We examine the effect of regionalism on unilateral trade liberalization using industry-level data on applied most-favored nation (MFN) tariffs and bilateral preferences for ten Latin American countries from 1990 to 2001. We find that preferential tariff reduction in a given sector leads to a reduction in the external (MFN) tariff in that sector. External liberalization is greater if preferences are granted to important suppliers. However, these “complementarity effects” of preferential liberalization on external liberalization do not arise in Customs Unions. Overall, our results suggest that concerns about a negative effect of preferential liberalization on external trade liberalization are unfounded.
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does regionalism affect trade liberalization toward non members
Social Science Research Network, 2008Co-Authors: Antoni Estevadeordal, Caroline Freund, Emanuel OrnelasAbstract:This paper examines the effect of regionalism on unilateral trade liberalization using industry-level data on applied most-favored nation tariffs and bilateral preferences for ten Latin American countries from 1990 to 2001. The findings show that preferential tariff reduction in a given sector leads to a reduction in the external (most-favored nation) tariff in that sector. External liberalization is greater if preferences are granted to important suppliers. However, these "complementarity effects" of preferential liberalization on external liberalization do not arise in Customs Unions. Overall, the results suggest that concerns about a negative effect of preferential liberalization on external trade liberalization are unfounded.
Anne O Krueger - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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free trade agreements versus Customs Unions
Journal of Development Economics, 1997Co-Authors: Anne O KruegerAbstract:Until NAFTA, analyses of preferential trading arrangements began by assuming a Customs union with a common external tariff, and the differences between Customs Unions and free trade agreements (FTAs) have been littie analyzed. This paper points to some of the differences between FTAs and Customs Unions, and shows that on welfare grounds a Customs union is always Pareto-superior to an FTA. Moreover, the political economy of FTAs will lead to more opposition to further multilateral trade liberalization than will Customs Unions.
