The Experts below are selected from a list of 285 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Giovanni Ursino - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Deceptive Advertising with Rational Buyers
Management Science, 2018Co-Authors: Salvatore Piccolo, Piero Tedeschi, Giovanni UrsinoAbstract:We study a simple game in which two sellers supply goods whose quality cannot be assessed by consumers even after consumption but can be verified with some probability by a public authority. Sellers may induce a prospective buyer into a bad purchase through comparative Deceptive Advertising. The central contribution of this paper is the characterization of a class of pooling equilibria in which low-quality sellers deceive a buyer who is Bayes-rational and makes a purchase decision on the basis of the available information. The analysis of these equilibria suggests that high-quality firms should pursue more intensive Advertising campaigns than their low-quality competitors. Surprisingly, we find conditions under which sellers’ expected profit is higher in pooling equilibria than in the separating equilibrium in which quality is reflected by prices and there is no need to waste resources in Advertising. Hence, we show that there are plausible cases in which firms should be ex ante willing to tolerate some d...
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How Limiting Deceptive Practices Harms Consumers
The RAND Journal of Economics, 2015Co-Authors: Salvatore Piccolo, Piero Tedeschi, Giovanni UrsinoAbstract:There are two competing sellers of an experience good, one offers high quality, one low. The low-quality seller can engage in Deceptive Advertising, potentially fooling a buyer into thinking the product is better than it is. Although Deceptive Advertising might seem to harm the buyer, we show that he could be better off when the low-quality seller can engage in Deceptive Advertising than not. We characterize the optimal deterrence rule that a regulatory agency seeking to punish Deceptive practices should adopt. We show that greater protection against Deceptive practices does not necessarily improve the buyer welfare.
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Deceptive Advertising with rational buyers
2013Co-Authors: Giovanni Ursino, Salvatore Piccolo, Piero TedeschiAbstract:We study a Bertrand game where two sellers supplying products of different and unverifiable qualities can outwit potential clients through (costly) Deceptive Advertising. We characterize a class of pooling equilibria where sellers post the same price regardless of their quality and low quality ones deceive buyers. Although in these equilibria low quality goods are purchased with positive probability, the buyer’s (expected) utility can surprisingly be higher than in a fully separating equilibrium, which suggests that (absent price regulation) a per se rule banning Deceptive practices may harm consumers. We also argue that sellers invest more in Deceptive Advertising the better their reputation vis-a-vis potential clients – i.e., firms that are better trusted by customers, have greater incentives to invest in Deceptive Advertising. Finally, we characterize the optimal monitoring effort exerted by a regulatory agency who seeks to identify and punish Deceptive practices. We show that consumer surplus maximization requires a higher monitoring e¤ort than social welfare maximization.
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Deceptive Advertising with Rational Buyers
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2012Co-Authors: Giovanni Ursino, Salvatore Piccolo, Piero TedeschiAbstract:We study a Bertrand game where two sellers supplying products of different and unverifiable qualities can outwit potential clients through their (costly) Deceptive Advertising. We characterize a class of pooling equilibria where sellers post the same price regardless of their quality and low quality ones deceive buyers. Although in these equilibria low quality goods are purchased with positive probability, the buyer (expected) utility can be higher than in a fully separating equilibrium. It is also argued that low quality sellers invest more in Deceptive Advertising the better is their reputation vis-a-vis potential clients - i.e., firms that are better trusted by customers, have greater incentives to invest in Deceptive Advertising when they produce a low quality product. Finally, we characterize the optimal monitoring effort exerted by a regulatory agency who seeks to identify and punish Deceptive practices. When the objective of this agency is to maximize consumer surplus, its monitoring effort is larger than under social welfare maximization.
Salvatore Piccolo - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Deceptive Advertising with Rational Buyers
Management Science, 2018Co-Authors: Salvatore Piccolo, Piero Tedeschi, Giovanni UrsinoAbstract:We study a simple game in which two sellers supply goods whose quality cannot be assessed by consumers even after consumption but can be verified with some probability by a public authority. Sellers may induce a prospective buyer into a bad purchase through comparative Deceptive Advertising. The central contribution of this paper is the characterization of a class of pooling equilibria in which low-quality sellers deceive a buyer who is Bayes-rational and makes a purchase decision on the basis of the available information. The analysis of these equilibria suggests that high-quality firms should pursue more intensive Advertising campaigns than their low-quality competitors. Surprisingly, we find conditions under which sellers’ expected profit is higher in pooling equilibria than in the separating equilibrium in which quality is reflected by prices and there is no need to waste resources in Advertising. Hence, we show that there are plausible cases in which firms should be ex ante willing to tolerate some d...
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How Limiting Deceptive Practices Harms Consumers
The RAND Journal of Economics, 2015Co-Authors: Salvatore Piccolo, Piero Tedeschi, Giovanni UrsinoAbstract:There are two competing sellers of an experience good, one offers high quality, one low. The low-quality seller can engage in Deceptive Advertising, potentially fooling a buyer into thinking the product is better than it is. Although Deceptive Advertising might seem to harm the buyer, we show that he could be better off when the low-quality seller can engage in Deceptive Advertising than not. We characterize the optimal deterrence rule that a regulatory agency seeking to punish Deceptive practices should adopt. We show that greater protection against Deceptive practices does not necessarily improve the buyer welfare.
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Deceptive Advertising with rational buyers
2013Co-Authors: Giovanni Ursino, Salvatore Piccolo, Piero TedeschiAbstract:We study a Bertrand game where two sellers supplying products of different and unverifiable qualities can outwit potential clients through (costly) Deceptive Advertising. We characterize a class of pooling equilibria where sellers post the same price regardless of their quality and low quality ones deceive buyers. Although in these equilibria low quality goods are purchased with positive probability, the buyer’s (expected) utility can surprisingly be higher than in a fully separating equilibrium, which suggests that (absent price regulation) a per se rule banning Deceptive practices may harm consumers. We also argue that sellers invest more in Deceptive Advertising the better their reputation vis-a-vis potential clients – i.e., firms that are better trusted by customers, have greater incentives to invest in Deceptive Advertising. Finally, we characterize the optimal monitoring effort exerted by a regulatory agency who seeks to identify and punish Deceptive practices. We show that consumer surplus maximization requires a higher monitoring e¤ort than social welfare maximization.
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Deceptive Advertising with Rational Buyers
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2012Co-Authors: Giovanni Ursino, Salvatore Piccolo, Piero TedeschiAbstract:We study a Bertrand game where two sellers supplying products of different and unverifiable qualities can outwit potential clients through their (costly) Deceptive Advertising. We characterize a class of pooling equilibria where sellers post the same price regardless of their quality and low quality ones deceive buyers. Although in these equilibria low quality goods are purchased with positive probability, the buyer (expected) utility can be higher than in a fully separating equilibrium. It is also argued that low quality sellers invest more in Deceptive Advertising the better is their reputation vis-a-vis potential clients - i.e., firms that are better trusted by customers, have greater incentives to invest in Deceptive Advertising when they produce a low quality product. Finally, we characterize the optimal monitoring effort exerted by a regulatory agency who seeks to identify and punish Deceptive practices. When the objective of this agency is to maximize consumer surplus, its monitoring effort is larger than under social welfare maximization.
Piero Tedeschi - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Deceptive Advertising with Rational Buyers
Management Science, 2018Co-Authors: Salvatore Piccolo, Piero Tedeschi, Giovanni UrsinoAbstract:We study a simple game in which two sellers supply goods whose quality cannot be assessed by consumers even after consumption but can be verified with some probability by a public authority. Sellers may induce a prospective buyer into a bad purchase through comparative Deceptive Advertising. The central contribution of this paper is the characterization of a class of pooling equilibria in which low-quality sellers deceive a buyer who is Bayes-rational and makes a purchase decision on the basis of the available information. The analysis of these equilibria suggests that high-quality firms should pursue more intensive Advertising campaigns than their low-quality competitors. Surprisingly, we find conditions under which sellers’ expected profit is higher in pooling equilibria than in the separating equilibrium in which quality is reflected by prices and there is no need to waste resources in Advertising. Hence, we show that there are plausible cases in which firms should be ex ante willing to tolerate some d...
-
How Limiting Deceptive Practices Harms Consumers
The RAND Journal of Economics, 2015Co-Authors: Salvatore Piccolo, Piero Tedeschi, Giovanni UrsinoAbstract:There are two competing sellers of an experience good, one offers high quality, one low. The low-quality seller can engage in Deceptive Advertising, potentially fooling a buyer into thinking the product is better than it is. Although Deceptive Advertising might seem to harm the buyer, we show that he could be better off when the low-quality seller can engage in Deceptive Advertising than not. We characterize the optimal deterrence rule that a regulatory agency seeking to punish Deceptive practices should adopt. We show that greater protection against Deceptive practices does not necessarily improve the buyer welfare.
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Deceptive Advertising with rational buyers
2013Co-Authors: Giovanni Ursino, Salvatore Piccolo, Piero TedeschiAbstract:We study a Bertrand game where two sellers supplying products of different and unverifiable qualities can outwit potential clients through (costly) Deceptive Advertising. We characterize a class of pooling equilibria where sellers post the same price regardless of their quality and low quality ones deceive buyers. Although in these equilibria low quality goods are purchased with positive probability, the buyer’s (expected) utility can surprisingly be higher than in a fully separating equilibrium, which suggests that (absent price regulation) a per se rule banning Deceptive practices may harm consumers. We also argue that sellers invest more in Deceptive Advertising the better their reputation vis-a-vis potential clients – i.e., firms that are better trusted by customers, have greater incentives to invest in Deceptive Advertising. Finally, we characterize the optimal monitoring effort exerted by a regulatory agency who seeks to identify and punish Deceptive practices. We show that consumer surplus maximization requires a higher monitoring e¤ort than social welfare maximization.
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Deceptive Advertising with Rational Buyers
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2012Co-Authors: Giovanni Ursino, Salvatore Piccolo, Piero TedeschiAbstract:We study a Bertrand game where two sellers supplying products of different and unverifiable qualities can outwit potential clients through their (costly) Deceptive Advertising. We characterize a class of pooling equilibria where sellers post the same price regardless of their quality and low quality ones deceive buyers. Although in these equilibria low quality goods are purchased with positive probability, the buyer (expected) utility can be higher than in a fully separating equilibrium. It is also argued that low quality sellers invest more in Deceptive Advertising the better is their reputation vis-a-vis potential clients - i.e., firms that are better trusted by customers, have greater incentives to invest in Deceptive Advertising when they produce a low quality product. Finally, we characterize the optimal monitoring effort exerted by a regulatory agency who seeks to identify and punish Deceptive practices. When the objective of this agency is to maximize consumer surplus, its monitoring effort is larger than under social welfare maximization.
Hung-yu Kao - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Data-Driven and Deep Learning Methodology for Deceptive Advertising and Phone Scams Detection
arXiv: Cryptography and Security, 2017Co-Authors: Tonton Hsien-de Huang, Hung-yu KaoAbstract:The advance of smartphones and cellular networks boosts the need of mobile Advertising and targeted marketing. However, it also triggers the unseen security threats. We found that the phone scams with fake calling numbers of very short lifetime are increasingly popular and have been used to trick the users. The harm is worldwide. On the other hand, Deceptive Advertising (Deceptive ads), the fake ads that tricks users to install unnecessary apps via either alluring or daunting texts and pictures, is an emerging threat that seriously harms the reputation of the advertiser. To counter against these two new threats, the conventional blacklist (or whitelist) approach and the machine learning approach with predefined features have been proven useless. Nevertheless, due to the success of deep learning in developing the highly intelligent program, our system can efficiently and effectively detect phone scams and Deceptive ads by taking advantage of our unified framework on deep neural network (DNN) and convolutional neural network (CNN). The proposed system has been deployed for operational use and the experimental results proved the effectiveness of our proposed system. Furthermore, we keep our research results and release experiment material on this http URL and this http URL if there is any update.
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Data-Driven and Deep Learning Methodology for Deceptive Advertising and Phone Scams Detection
2017 Conference on Technologies and Applications of Artificial Intelligence (TAAI), 2017Co-Authors: Tonton Hsien-de Huang, Chia-mu Yu, Hung-yu KaoAbstract:The advance of smartphones and cellular networks boosts the need of mobile Advertising and targeted marketing. However, it also triggers the unseen security threats. We found that the phone scams with fake calling numbers of very short lifetime are increasingly popular and have been used to trick the users. The harm is worldwide. On the other hand, Deceptive Advertising (Deceptive ads), the fake ads that tricks users to install unnecessary apps via either alluring or daunting texts and pictures, is an emerging threat that seriously harms the reputation of the advertiser. To counter against these two new threats, the conventional blacklist (or whitelist) approach and the machine learning approach with predefined features have been proven useless. Nevertheless, due to the success of deep learning in developing the highly intelligent program, our system can efficiently and effectively detect phone scams and Deceptive ads by taking advantage of our unified framework on deep neural network (DNN) and convolutional neural network (CNN). The proposed system has been deployed for operational use and the experimental results proved the effectiveness of our proposed system. Furthermore, we keep our research results and release experiment material on http://Deceptiveads.twman.org and http://phonescams.twman.org if there is any update.
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TAAI - Data-Driven and Deep Learning Methodology for Deceptive Advertising and Phone Scams Detection
2017 Conference on Technologies and Applications of Artificial Intelligence (TAAI), 2017Co-Authors: Tonton Hsien-de Huang, Hung-yu KaoAbstract:The advance of smartphones and cellular networks boosts the need of mobile Advertising and targeted marketing. However, it also triggers the unseen security threats. We found that the phone scams with fake calling numbers of very short lifetime are increasingly popular and have been used to trick the users. The harm is worldwide. On the other hand, Deceptive Advertising (Deceptive ads), the fake ads that tricks users to install unnecessary apps via either alluring or daunting texts and pictures, is an emerging threat that seriously harms the reputation of the advertiser. To counter against these two new threats, the conventional blacklist (or whitelist) approach and the machine learning approach with predefined features have been proven useless. Nevertheless, due to the success of deep learning in developing the highly intelligent program, our system can efficiently and effectively detect phone scams and Deceptive ads by taking advantage of our unified framework on deep neural network (DNN) and convolutional neural network (CNN). The proposed system has been deployed for operational use and the experimental results proved the effectiveness of our proposed system. Furthermore, we keep our research results and release experiment material on http://Deceptiveads.twman.org and http://phonescams.twman.org if there is any update.
Eric Zitzewitz - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Wintertime for Deceptive Advertising
American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 2016Co-Authors: Jonathan Zinman, Eric ZitzewitzAbstract:Casual empiricism suggests that Deceptive Advertising about product quality is prevalent, and several classes of theories explore its causes and consequences. We provide unusually sharp empirical evidence on its extent, mechanics, and dynamics. Ski resorts self-report substantially more natural snowfall than comparable government sources. The difference is more pronounced on weekends, despite third-party evidence that snowfall is uniform throughout the week—as one would expect given plausibly greater returns to exaggeration on weekends. Exaggeration is greater for resorts that plausibly reap greater benefits from it: those with expert terrain and those not offering money back guarantees. (JEL D83, L15, L83, M37, Z31)
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Wintertime for Deceptive Advertising
National Bureau of Economic Research, 2012Co-Authors: Jonathan Zinman, Eric ZitzewitzAbstract:Casual empiricism suggests that Deceptive Advertising about product quality is prevalent, and several classes of theories explore its causes and consequences. We provide some unusually sharp empirical evidence on the extent, mechanics, and dynamics of Deceptive Advertising. Ski resorts self-report substantially more natural snowfall on weekends. Resorts that plausibly reap greater benefits from exaggerating do it more. Data on website visits suggests that consumers are appropriately skeptical of weekend reports. We find little evidence that competition restrains or encourages exaggeration. Near the end of our sample period, a new iPhone application feature makes it easier for skiers share information on ski conditions in real time. Exaggeration falls sharply, especially at resorts with better iPhone reception.
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Snowed: Deceptive Advertising by Ski Resorts
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2009Co-Authors: Jonathan Zinman, Eric ZitzewitzAbstract:Casual empiricism suggests that Deceptive Advertising is prevalent, and several classes of theories explore its causes and consequences. We provide some unusually sharp empirical evidence on the extent, mechanics, and dynamics of Deceptive Advertising. Ski resorts self-report 23 percent more snowfall on weekends; there is no such weekend effect in government precipitation data. Resorts that plausibly reap greater benefits from exaggerating do it more. We find little evidence that competition restrains or encourages exaggeration. Near the end of our sample period, we observe a shock to the information environment: a new iPhone application feature makes it easier for skiers to comment on resort ski conditions in real time. Exaggeration falls sharply, especially at resorts where iPhones can get reception.
