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Awi Federgruen - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • price competition under mixed multinomial logit Demand Functions
    Social Science Research Network, 2013
    Co-Authors: Margaret Pierson, Gad Allon, Awi Federgruen
    Abstract:

    In this paper, we postulate a general class of price competition models with mixed multinomial logit Demand Functions under affine cost Functions. In these models, the market is partitioned into a finite set of market segments. We characterize the equilibrium behavior of this class of models in the case where each product in the market is sold by a separate, independent firm. We identify a simple and very broadly satisfied condition under which a pure Nash equilibrium exists and the set of Nash equilibria coincides with the solutions of the system of first-order-condition equations, a property of essential importance to empirical studies. This condition specifies that in every market segment, each firm captures less than 50% of the potential customer population when pricing at a specific level that, under the condition, is an upper bound for a rational price choice for the firm irrespective of the competitors' prices. We show that under a somewhat stronger, but still broadly satisfied, version of the above condition, a unique equilibrium exists. We complete the picture by establishing the existence of a Nash equilibrium, indeed a unique Nash equilibrium, for markets with an arbitrary degree of concentration, under sufficiently tight price bounds. We discuss how our results extend to a continuum of customer types. A discussion of the multiproduct case is included. The paper concludes with a discussion of implications for structural estimation methods.

  • price competition under mixed multinomial logit Demand Functions
    Management Science, 2013
    Co-Authors: Margaret Aksoypierson, Gad Allon, Awi Federgruen
    Abstract:

    In this paper, we postulate a general class of price competition models with mixed multinomial logit Demand Functions under affine cost Functions. In these models, the market is partitioned into a finite set of market segments. We characterize the equilibrium behavior of this class of models in the case where each product in the market is sold by a separate, independent firm. We identify a simple and very broadly satisfied condition under which a pure Nash equilibrium exists and the set of Nash equilibria coincides with the solutions of the system of first-order-condition equations, a property of essential importance to empirical studies. This condition specifies that in every market segment, each firm captures less than 50% of the potential customer population when pricing at a specific level that, under the condition, is an upper bound for a rational price choice for the firm irrespective of the competitors' prices. We show that under a somewhat stronger, but still broadly satisfied, version of the abov...

Gad Allon - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • price competition under mixed multinomial logit Demand Functions
    Social Science Research Network, 2013
    Co-Authors: Margaret Pierson, Gad Allon, Awi Federgruen
    Abstract:

    In this paper, we postulate a general class of price competition models with mixed multinomial logit Demand Functions under affine cost Functions. In these models, the market is partitioned into a finite set of market segments. We characterize the equilibrium behavior of this class of models in the case where each product in the market is sold by a separate, independent firm. We identify a simple and very broadly satisfied condition under which a pure Nash equilibrium exists and the set of Nash equilibria coincides with the solutions of the system of first-order-condition equations, a property of essential importance to empirical studies. This condition specifies that in every market segment, each firm captures less than 50% of the potential customer population when pricing at a specific level that, under the condition, is an upper bound for a rational price choice for the firm irrespective of the competitors' prices. We show that under a somewhat stronger, but still broadly satisfied, version of the above condition, a unique equilibrium exists. We complete the picture by establishing the existence of a Nash equilibrium, indeed a unique Nash equilibrium, for markets with an arbitrary degree of concentration, under sufficiently tight price bounds. We discuss how our results extend to a continuum of customer types. A discussion of the multiproduct case is included. The paper concludes with a discussion of implications for structural estimation methods.

  • price competition under mixed multinomial logit Demand Functions
    Management Science, 2013
    Co-Authors: Margaret Aksoypierson, Gad Allon, Awi Federgruen
    Abstract:

    In this paper, we postulate a general class of price competition models with mixed multinomial logit Demand Functions under affine cost Functions. In these models, the market is partitioned into a finite set of market segments. We characterize the equilibrium behavior of this class of models in the case where each product in the market is sold by a separate, independent firm. We identify a simple and very broadly satisfied condition under which a pure Nash equilibrium exists and the set of Nash equilibria coincides with the solutions of the system of first-order-condition equations, a property of essential importance to empirical studies. This condition specifies that in every market segment, each firm captures less than 50% of the potential customer population when pricing at a specific level that, under the condition, is an upper bound for a rational price choice for the firm irrespective of the competitors' prices. We show that under a somewhat stronger, but still broadly satisfied, version of the abov...

Vinod Mishra - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • estimating money Demand Functions for south asian countries
    Empirical Economics, 2009
    Co-Authors: Paresh Kumar Narayan, Seema Narayan, Vinod Mishra
    Abstract:

    In this paper, we estimate a money Demand function for a panel of five South Asian countries. We find that the money Demand and its determinants, namely real income, real exchange rate and short-term domestic and foreign interest rates are cointegrated both for individual countries as well as for the panel, and panel long-run elasticities provide robust evidence of statistically significant relationships between money Demand and its determinants. Our test for panel Granger causality suggests short-run causality running from all variables, except foreign interest rate, to money Demand, and we find evidence that except for Nepal money Demand Functions are stable.

  • estimating money Demand Functions for south asian countries
    Social Science Research Network, 2009
    Co-Authors: Paresh Kumar Narayan, Seema Narayan, Vinod Mishra
    Abstract:

    In this paper, we estimate a money Demand function for a panel of five South Asian countries. We find that the money Demand and its determinants, namely real income, real exchange rate and short-term domestic and foreign interest rates are cointegrated both for individual countries as well as for the panel, and panel long-run elasticities provide robust evidence of statistically significant relationships between money Demand and its determinants. Our test for panel Granger causality suggests short-run causality running from all variables, except foreign interest rate, to money Demand, and we find evidence that except for Nepal money Demand Functions are stable Asian countries

Margaret Pierson - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • price competition under mixed multinomial logit Demand Functions
    Social Science Research Network, 2013
    Co-Authors: Margaret Pierson, Gad Allon, Awi Federgruen
    Abstract:

    In this paper, we postulate a general class of price competition models with mixed multinomial logit Demand Functions under affine cost Functions. In these models, the market is partitioned into a finite set of market segments. We characterize the equilibrium behavior of this class of models in the case where each product in the market is sold by a separate, independent firm. We identify a simple and very broadly satisfied condition under which a pure Nash equilibrium exists and the set of Nash equilibria coincides with the solutions of the system of first-order-condition equations, a property of essential importance to empirical studies. This condition specifies that in every market segment, each firm captures less than 50% of the potential customer population when pricing at a specific level that, under the condition, is an upper bound for a rational price choice for the firm irrespective of the competitors' prices. We show that under a somewhat stronger, but still broadly satisfied, version of the above condition, a unique equilibrium exists. We complete the picture by establishing the existence of a Nash equilibrium, indeed a unique Nash equilibrium, for markets with an arbitrary degree of concentration, under sufficiently tight price bounds. We discuss how our results extend to a continuum of customer types. A discussion of the multiproduct case is included. The paper concludes with a discussion of implications for structural estimation methods.

Margaret Aksoypierson - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • price competition under mixed multinomial logit Demand Functions
    Management Science, 2013
    Co-Authors: Margaret Aksoypierson, Gad Allon, Awi Federgruen
    Abstract:

    In this paper, we postulate a general class of price competition models with mixed multinomial logit Demand Functions under affine cost Functions. In these models, the market is partitioned into a finite set of market segments. We characterize the equilibrium behavior of this class of models in the case where each product in the market is sold by a separate, independent firm. We identify a simple and very broadly satisfied condition under which a pure Nash equilibrium exists and the set of Nash equilibria coincides with the solutions of the system of first-order-condition equations, a property of essential importance to empirical studies. This condition specifies that in every market segment, each firm captures less than 50% of the potential customer population when pricing at a specific level that, under the condition, is an upper bound for a rational price choice for the firm irrespective of the competitors' prices. We show that under a somewhat stronger, but still broadly satisfied, version of the abov...