The Experts below are selected from a list of 12837 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Luc Laeven - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Deposit Insurance Database - Deposit Insurance Database
Policy Research Working Papers, 2014Co-Authors: Asli Demirguc-kunt, Edward J. Kane, Luc LaevenAbstract:This paper provides a comprehensive, global database of Deposit Insurance arrangements as of 2013. The authors extend their earlier dataset by including recent adopters of Deposit Insurance and information on the use of government guarantees on banks' assets and liabilities, including during the recent global financial crisis. They also create a Safety Net Index capturing the generosity of the Deposit Insurance scheme and government guarantees on banks' balance sheets. The data show that Deposit Insurance has become more widespread and more extensive in coverage since the global financial crisis, which also triggered a temporary increase in the government protection of non-Deposit liabilities and bank assets. In most cases, these guarantees have since been formally removed but coverage of Deposit Insurance remains above pre-crisis levels, raising concerns about implicit coverage and moral hazard going forward.
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Deposit Insurance database
National Bureau of Economic Research, 2014Co-Authors: Asli Demirguckunt, Edward J. Kane, Luc LaevenAbstract:This paper provides a comprehensive, global database of Deposit Insurance arrangements as of 2013. The authors extend their earlier dataset by including recent adopters of Deposit Insurance and information on the use of government guarantees on banks' assets and liabilities, including during the recent global financial crisis. They also create a Safety Net Index capturing the generosity of the Deposit Insurance scheme and government guarantees on banks' balance sheets. The data show that Deposit Insurance has become more widespread and more extensive in coverage since the global financial crisis, which also triggered a temporary increase in the government protection of non-Deposit liabilities and bank assets. In most cases, these guarantees have since been formally removed but coverage of Deposit Insurance remains above pre-crisis levels, raising concerns about implicit coverage and moral hazard going forward.
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Deposit Insurance Database
IMF Working Papers, 2014Co-Authors: Asli Demirguc-kunt, Edward J. Kane, Luc LaevenAbstract:This paper provides a comprehensive, global database of Deposit Insurance arrangements as of 2013. We extend our earlier dataset by including recent adopters of Deposit Insurance and information on the use of government guarantees on banks’ assets and liabilities, including during the recent global financial crisis. We also create a Safety Net Index capturing the generosity of the Deposit Insurance scheme and government guarantees on banks’ balance sheets. The data show that Deposit Insurance has become more widespread and more extensive in coverage since the global financial crisis, which also triggered a temporary increase in the government protection of non-Deposit liabilities and bank assets. In most cases, these guarantees have since been formally removed but coverage of Deposit Insurance remains above pre-crisis levels, raising concerns about implicit coverage and moral hazard going forward.
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The Political Economy of Deposit Insurance
Journal of Financial Services Research, 2004Co-Authors: Luc LaevenAbstract:This paper uses a political economy framework to analyze cross-country differences in Deposit Insurance coverage. It finds supporting evidence of the significance of private interest theories in explaining coverage of Deposit Insurance. Deposit Insurance coverage is significantly higher in countries where poorly capitalized banks dominate the market and in countries where Depositors are poorly educated. The analysis does not find that coverage is significantly related to political-institutional variables, such as the degree of democracy or restraints on the executive, or to proxies for the general level of institutional development, such as per capita income or property rights. These results provide evidence in support of the private interest view, according to which risky banks lobby for extensive coverage.
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The Political Economy of Deposit Insurance - The Political Economy of Deposit Insurance
Policy Research Working Papers, 2004Co-Authors: Luc LaevenAbstract:The author uses a political economy framework to analyze cross-country differences in Deposit Insurance coverage. He finds supporting evidence of the significance of private interest theories in explaining coverage of Deposit Insurance. Deposit Insurance coverage is significantly higher in countries where poorly capitalized banks dominate the market and in countries where Depositors are poorly educated. The author does not find that coverage is significantly related to political-institutional variables, such as the degree of democracy or restraints on the executive, or to proxies for the general level of institutional development, such as per capita income or property rights. These results provide evidence in support of the private interest view, according to which risky banks lobby for extensive coverage.
Jukka Vesala - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Deposit Insurance moral hazard and market monitoring
Review of Finance, 2004Co-Authors: Reint Gropp, Jukka VesalaAbstract:The paper analyses the relationship between Deposit Insurance, debt-holder monitoring, and risk taking. In a stylised banking model we show that Deposit Insurance may reduce moral hazard, if Deposit Insurance credibly leaves out non-Deposit creditors. Testing the model using EU bank level data yields evidence consistent with the model, suggesting that explicit Deposit Insurance may serve as a commitment device to limit the safety net and permit monitoring by uninsured subordinated debt holders. We further find that credible limits to the safety net reduce risk taking of smaller banks with low charter values and sizeable subordinated debt shares only. However, we also find that the introduction of explicit Deposit Insurance tends to increase the share of insured Deposits in banks' liabilities.
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Deposit Insurance and moral hazard does the counterfactual matter
2001Co-Authors: Reint Gropp, Jukka VesalaAbstract:The paper analyses the relationship between Deposit Insurance, debt-holder monitoring, charter values and risk taking. Utilising cross-sectional and time series variation in the existence of Deposit Insurance schemes in the EU, we find that the establishment of explicit Deposit Insurance significantly reduces the risk taking of banks. This finding stands in contrast to most of the previous empirical literature. It supports the hypothesis that in the absence of Deposit Insurance, European banking systems have been characterised by strong implicit Insurance operating through the expectation of public intervention at times of distress. We also test further hypotheses regarding the interaction between Deposit Insurance and monitoring, charter values and 'too-big-to-fail.' We find that smaller banks and banks with lower charter values and more subordinated debt reduce risk taking more after the introduction of explicit Deposit Insurance, which supports 'too-big-to-fail', monitoring by debt holders and the moral hazard reducing effect of charter values. JEL Classification: G21, G28
Edward J. Kane - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Deposit Insurance Database - Deposit Insurance Database
Policy Research Working Papers, 2014Co-Authors: Asli Demirguc-kunt, Edward J. Kane, Luc LaevenAbstract:This paper provides a comprehensive, global database of Deposit Insurance arrangements as of 2013. The authors extend their earlier dataset by including recent adopters of Deposit Insurance and information on the use of government guarantees on banks' assets and liabilities, including during the recent global financial crisis. They also create a Safety Net Index capturing the generosity of the Deposit Insurance scheme and government guarantees on banks' balance sheets. The data show that Deposit Insurance has become more widespread and more extensive in coverage since the global financial crisis, which also triggered a temporary increase in the government protection of non-Deposit liabilities and bank assets. In most cases, these guarantees have since been formally removed but coverage of Deposit Insurance remains above pre-crisis levels, raising concerns about implicit coverage and moral hazard going forward.
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Deposit Insurance database
National Bureau of Economic Research, 2014Co-Authors: Asli Demirguckunt, Edward J. Kane, Luc LaevenAbstract:This paper provides a comprehensive, global database of Deposit Insurance arrangements as of 2013. The authors extend their earlier dataset by including recent adopters of Deposit Insurance and information on the use of government guarantees on banks' assets and liabilities, including during the recent global financial crisis. They also create a Safety Net Index capturing the generosity of the Deposit Insurance scheme and government guarantees on banks' balance sheets. The data show that Deposit Insurance has become more widespread and more extensive in coverage since the global financial crisis, which also triggered a temporary increase in the government protection of non-Deposit liabilities and bank assets. In most cases, these guarantees have since been formally removed but coverage of Deposit Insurance remains above pre-crisis levels, raising concerns about implicit coverage and moral hazard going forward.
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Deposit Insurance Database
IMF Working Papers, 2014Co-Authors: Asli Demirguc-kunt, Edward J. Kane, Luc LaevenAbstract:This paper provides a comprehensive, global database of Deposit Insurance arrangements as of 2013. We extend our earlier dataset by including recent adopters of Deposit Insurance and information on the use of government guarantees on banks’ assets and liabilities, including during the recent global financial crisis. We also create a Safety Net Index capturing the generosity of the Deposit Insurance scheme and government guarantees on banks’ balance sheets. The data show that Deposit Insurance has become more widespread and more extensive in coverage since the global financial crisis, which also triggered a temporary increase in the government protection of non-Deposit liabilities and bank assets. In most cases, these guarantees have since been formally removed but coverage of Deposit Insurance remains above pre-crisis levels, raising concerns about implicit coverage and moral hazard going forward.
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Deposit Insurance: Handle with Care
2003Co-Authors: Asli Demirgüç-kun, Edward J. KaneAbstract:Explicit Deposit Insurance has been spreading rapidly in the past decades, most recently to countries with low levels of financial and institutional development. This paper documents the extent of crosscountry differences in Deposit-Insurance design and reviews empirical evidence on how particular design features affect private market discipline, banking stability, financial development, and the effectiveness of crisis resolution. This evidence challenges the wisdom of encouraging countries to adopt explicit Deposit Insurance without first stopping to assess and remedy weaknesses in their informational and supervisory environments. The paper also includes recommendations for reforming the Chilean Deposit Insurance system based on the results of the research reviewed here.
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Deposit Insurance Around the Globe: Where Does It Work? - Deposit Insurance Around the Globe: Where Does it Work?
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2002Co-Authors: Edward J. Kane, Asli Demirguc-kuntAbstract:Explicit Deposit Insurance has been spreading rapidly in recent years, even to countries not advanced in financial and institutional development. Economic theory indicates that Deposit Insurance design features interact--for good or ill--with country-specific elements of the financial and governmental contracting environment. The authors document the extent of cross-country differences in Deposit Insurance design and review empirical evidence on how design features affect private market discipline, banking stability, financial development, and the effectiveness of crisis resolution. This evidence challenges the wisdom of encouraging countries to adopt explicit Deposit Insurance without first addresing weaknesses in their informational and supervisory environments.
Asli Demirguckunt - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Deposit Insurance database
National Bureau of Economic Research, 2014Co-Authors: Asli Demirguckunt, Edward J. Kane, Luc LaevenAbstract:This paper provides a comprehensive, global database of Deposit Insurance arrangements as of 2013. The authors extend their earlier dataset by including recent adopters of Deposit Insurance and information on the use of government guarantees on banks' assets and liabilities, including during the recent global financial crisis. They also create a Safety Net Index capturing the generosity of the Deposit Insurance scheme and government guarantees on banks' balance sheets. The data show that Deposit Insurance has become more widespread and more extensive in coverage since the global financial crisis, which also triggered a temporary increase in the government protection of non-Deposit liabilities and bank assets. In most cases, these guarantees have since been formally removed but coverage of Deposit Insurance remains above pre-crisis levels, raising concerns about implicit coverage and moral hazard going forward.
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Deposit Insurance around the globe where does it work
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2001Co-Authors: Edward J. Kane, Asli DemirguckuntAbstract:Explicit Deposit Insurance has been spreading rapidly in recent years, even to countries not advanced in financial and institutional development. Economic theory indicates that Deposit Insurance design features interact--for good or ill--with country-specific elements of the financial and governmental contracting environment. The authors document the extent of cross-country differences in Deposit Insurance design and review empirical evidence on how design features affect private market discipline, banking stability, financial development, and the effectiveness of crisis resolution. This evidence challenges the wisdom of encouraging countries to adopt explicit Deposit Insurance without first addresing weaknesses in their informational and supervisory environments.
Reint Gropp - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Deposit Insurance moral hazard and market monitoring
Review of Finance, 2004Co-Authors: Reint Gropp, Jukka VesalaAbstract:The paper analyses the relationship between Deposit Insurance, debt-holder monitoring, and risk taking. In a stylised banking model we show that Deposit Insurance may reduce moral hazard, if Deposit Insurance credibly leaves out non-Deposit creditors. Testing the model using EU bank level data yields evidence consistent with the model, suggesting that explicit Deposit Insurance may serve as a commitment device to limit the safety net and permit monitoring by uninsured subordinated debt holders. We further find that credible limits to the safety net reduce risk taking of smaller banks with low charter values and sizeable subordinated debt shares only. However, we also find that the introduction of explicit Deposit Insurance tends to increase the share of insured Deposits in banks' liabilities.
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Deposit Insurance and moral hazard does the counterfactual matter
2001Co-Authors: Reint Gropp, Jukka VesalaAbstract:The paper analyses the relationship between Deposit Insurance, debt-holder monitoring, charter values and risk taking. Utilising cross-sectional and time series variation in the existence of Deposit Insurance schemes in the EU, we find that the establishment of explicit Deposit Insurance significantly reduces the risk taking of banks. This finding stands in contrast to most of the previous empirical literature. It supports the hypothesis that in the absence of Deposit Insurance, European banking systems have been characterised by strong implicit Insurance operating through the expectation of public intervention at times of distress. We also test further hypotheses regarding the interaction between Deposit Insurance and monitoring, charter values and 'too-big-to-fail.' We find that smaller banks and banks with lower charter values and more subordinated debt reduce risk taking more after the introduction of explicit Deposit Insurance, which supports 'too-big-to-fail', monitoring by debt holders and the moral hazard reducing effect of charter values. JEL Classification: G21, G28
