The Experts below are selected from a list of 54 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
N V Vdovichenko - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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a way to new rationality on the centenary of the birth of i r prigogine a foreign member of the ussr russian academy of sciences
Herald of the Russian Academy of Sciences, 2017Co-Authors: N V VdovichenkoAbstract:We are in the habit of living in a Deterministic World, in which knowledge of the state of the system at a point in time allows us to describe the future unambiguously. Ilya Prigogine and his students were able to shake this idea, which had been formulated long ago by Isaac Newton. They were able to show that everything is much more complicated, that instability generates ambiguity, and that the future state of a system can at best be described only probabilistically.
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A way to new rationality (On the Centenary of the Birth of I.R. Prigogine, A Foreign Member of the USSR/Russian Academy of Sciences)
Herald of the Russian Academy of Sciences, 2017Co-Authors: N V VdovichenkoAbstract:We are in the habit of living in a Deterministic World, in which knowledge of the state of the system at a point in time allows us to describe the future unambiguously. Ilya Prigogine and his students were able to shake this idea, which had been formulated long ago by Isaac Newton. They were able to show that everything is much more complicated, that instability generates ambiguity, and that the future state of a system can at best be described only probabilistically.
Andras Lorincz - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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decision making agent searching for markov models in near Deterministic World
arXiv: Artificial Intelligence, 2011Co-Authors: Gabor Matuz, Andras LorinczAbstract:Reinforcement learning has solid foundations, but becomes inefficient in partially observed (non-Markovian) environments. Thus, a learning agent -born with a representation and a policy- might wish to investigate to what extent the Markov property holds. We propose a learning architecture that utilizes combinatorial policy optimization to overcome non-Markovity and to develop efficient behaviors, which are easy to inherit, tests the Markov property of the behavioral states, and corrects against non-Markovity by running a Deterministic factored Finite State Model, which can be learned. We illustrate the properties of architecture in the near Deterministic Ms. Pac-Man game. We analyze the architecture from the point of view of evolutionary, individual, and social learning.
Stephen Kearns - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Aborting the zygote argument
Philosophical Studies, 2012Co-Authors: Stephen KearnsAbstract:Alfred Mele’s zygote argument for incompatibilism is based on a case involving an agent in a Deterministic World whose entire life is planned by someone else. Mele’s contention is that Ernie (the agent) is unfree and that normal determined agents are relevantly similar to him with regards to free will. In this paper, I examine four different ways of understanding this argument and then criticize each interpretation. I then extend my criticism to manipulation arguments in general. I conclude that the zygote argument is no threat to compatibilism.
Bernard Berofsky - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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The myth of source
Acta Analytica, 2006Co-Authors: Bernard BerofskyAbstract:If determinism is a threat to freedom, that threat derives solely from its alleged eradication of power. The source incompatibilist mistakenly supposes that special views about the self are required to insure that we are the ultimate source of and in control of our decisions and actions. Source incompatibilism fails whether it takes the form of Robert Kane’s event-causal libertarianism or the various agent-causal varieties defended by Derk Pereboom and Randolph Clarke. It is argued that the sort of control free agents need to possess and exercise can be secured without metaphysical excess. If there is a free will problem, it is the one G. E. Moore addressed in 1912. He concluded that persons can act otherwise in a Deterministic World. We should continue to try to figure out whether he was right or wrong.
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ultimate responsibility in a Deterministic World the significance of free will
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2000Co-Authors: Bernard Berofsky, Robert J KaneAbstract:Life is getting difficult for us compatibilists. You won't find respectable ones relying on conditional analyses anymore. And the hierarchical version's dismissive attitude towards worries about the character of origins invites the rebuttal of incompatibilists like Robert Kane who concede the desirability of the compatibilist freedoms stressed by hierarchical theorists, yet wish as well to accommodate our deep-seated yearning to be the ultimate source of our own natures. And the two flanking strategies of compatibilists have also come under fire. The first, P. F. Strawson's celebrated proposal to construe freedom and responsibility as constitutive of human society failed to convince enough of us that metaphysical issues cannot have a bearing on the attitudes and perhaps even the practices associated with these notions. The second is a familiar fallback strategy adopted by most compatibilists. "Perhaps I cannot convince you that freedom is compatible with determinism," says the compatibilist. "No matter. For an even stronger position can be defended, to wit, that freedom presupposes determinism." Ever since reading Philippa Foot's critique of this position' I have believed (and have written2) that this compatibilist strategy fails. There have been rebuttals since Foot, but none as brilliant or utterly convincing as that of Kane. Moreover, given Kane's refusal to appeal to a conception of self-determinism that rests on an obscure metaphysics of the self, along with his effort to replace a dualistic metaphysics traditionally associated with libertarianism with an account of the self congenial to contemporary scientific findings, we are confronted with the most powerful statement of an incompatibilist theory of free will that I have seen. Kane's central complaint against compatibilists, to wit, that they fail to take seriously our yearning for ultimate responsibility, targets compatibilists other than hierarchical theorists. In general, compatibilists can hold their own
Robert J Kane - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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ultimate responsibility in a Deterministic World the significance of free will
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2000Co-Authors: Bernard Berofsky, Robert J KaneAbstract:Life is getting difficult for us compatibilists. You won't find respectable ones relying on conditional analyses anymore. And the hierarchical version's dismissive attitude towards worries about the character of origins invites the rebuttal of incompatibilists like Robert Kane who concede the desirability of the compatibilist freedoms stressed by hierarchical theorists, yet wish as well to accommodate our deep-seated yearning to be the ultimate source of our own natures. And the two flanking strategies of compatibilists have also come under fire. The first, P. F. Strawson's celebrated proposal to construe freedom and responsibility as constitutive of human society failed to convince enough of us that metaphysical issues cannot have a bearing on the attitudes and perhaps even the practices associated with these notions. The second is a familiar fallback strategy adopted by most compatibilists. "Perhaps I cannot convince you that freedom is compatible with determinism," says the compatibilist. "No matter. For an even stronger position can be defended, to wit, that freedom presupposes determinism." Ever since reading Philippa Foot's critique of this position' I have believed (and have written2) that this compatibilist strategy fails. There have been rebuttals since Foot, but none as brilliant or utterly convincing as that of Kane. Moreover, given Kane's refusal to appeal to a conception of self-determinism that rests on an obscure metaphysics of the self, along with his effort to replace a dualistic metaphysics traditionally associated with libertarianism with an account of the self congenial to contemporary scientific findings, we are confronted with the most powerful statement of an incompatibilist theory of free will that I have seen. Kane's central complaint against compatibilists, to wit, that they fail to take seriously our yearning for ultimate responsibility, targets compatibilists other than hierarchical theorists. In general, compatibilists can hold their own