The Experts below are selected from a list of 30 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform

Patrick Traynor - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • OnionDNS: a seizure-resistant top-level Domain
    International Journal of Information Security, 2017
    Co-Authors: Nolen Scaife, Lyrissa Lidsky, Rachael L. Jones, Henry Carter, Patrick Traynor
    Abstract:

    The Domain Name System (DNS) provides the critical service of mapping canonical names to IP addresses. Recognizing this, a number of parties have increasingly attempted to perform “Domain seizures” on targets by having them delisted from DNS. Such operations often occur without providing due process to the owners of these Domains, a practice made potentially worse by recent legislative proposals. We address this problem by creating OnionDNS, an anonymous top-level Domain and resolution service for the Internet. Our solution relies on the establishment of a hidden service running DNS within Tor and uses a variety of mechanisms to ensure a high-performance architecture with strong integrity guarantees for resolved records. We then present our anonymous Domain Registrar and detail the protocol for securely transferring the service to another party. Finally, we also conduct both performance and legal analyses to further demonstrate the robustness of this approach. In so doing, we show that the delisting of Domains from DNS can be mitigated in an efficient and secure manner.

  • CNS - OnionDNS: A seizure-resistant top-level Domain
    International Journal of Information Security, 2017
    Co-Authors: Nolen Scaife, Henry Carter, Patrick Traynor
    Abstract:

    The Domain Name System (DNS) provides the critical service of mapping canonical names to IP addresses. Recognizing this, a number of parties have increasingly attempted to perform “Domain seizures” on targets by having them delisted from DNS. Such operations often occur without providing due process to the owners of these Domains, a practice made potentially worse by recent legislative proposals. We address this problem by creating OnionDNS, an anonymous top-level Domain (TLD) and resolution service for the Internet. Our solution relies on the establishment of a hidden service running DNS within Tor, and uses a variety of mechanisms to enable a high-performance architecture with strong integrity guarantees for resolved records. After discussing the details of our DNS architecture, we present our anonymous Domain Registrar and detail the protocol for securely transferring the service to another party. We also conduct a performance analysis demonstrating the service is fast with an average request latency between 1 and 2 seconds over Tor. In doing so, we demonstrate that the delisting of Domains from DNS can be mitigated in an efficient and secure manner.

  • OnionDNS: A seizure-resistant top-level Domain
    2015 IEEE Conference on Communications and Network Security (CNS), 2015
    Co-Authors: Nolen Scaife, Henry Carter, Patrick Traynor
    Abstract:

    The Domain Name System (DNS) provides the critical service of mapping canonical names to IP addresses. Recognizing this, a number of parties have increasingly attempted to perform “Domain seizures” on targets by having them delisted from DNS. Such operations often occur without providing due process to the owners of these Domains, a practice made potentially worse by recent legislative proposals. We address this problem by creating OnionDNS, an anonymous top-level Domain (TLD) and resolution service for the Internet. Our solution relies on the establishment of a hidden service running DNS within Tor, and uses a variety of mechanisms to enable a high-performance architecture with strong integrity guarantees for resolved records. After discussing the details of our DNS architecture, we present our anonymous Domain Registrar and detail the protocol for securely transferring the service to another party. We also conduct a performance analysis demonstrating the service is fast with an average request latency between 1 and 2 seconds over Tor. In doing so, we demonstrate that the delisting of Domains from DNS can be mitigated in an efficient and secure manner.

Engin Kirda - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • from deletion to re registration in zero seconds Domain Registrar behaviour during the drop
    Internet Measurement Conference, 2018
    Co-Authors: Tobias Lauinger, Ahmet Salih Buyukkayhan, Abdelberi Chaabane, William Robertson, Engin Kirda
    Abstract:

    When desirable Internet Domain names expire, they are often re-registered in the very moment the old registration is deleted, in a highly competitive and resource-intensive practice called Domain drop-catching. To date, there has been little insight into the daily time period when expired Domain names are deleted, and the race to re-registration that takes place. In this paper, we show that .com Domains are deleted in a predictable order, and propose a model to infer the earliest possible time a Domain could have been re-registered. We leverage this model to characterise at a precision of seconds how fast certain types of Domain names are re-registered. We show that 9.5 % of deleted Domains are re-registered with a delay of zero seconds. Domains not taken immediately by the drop-catch services are often re-registered later, with different behaviours over the following seconds, minutes and hours. Since these behaviours imply different effort and price points, our methodology can be useful for future work to explain the uses of re-registered Domains.

  • Internet Measurement Conference - From Deletion to Re-Registration in Zero Seconds: Domain Registrar Behaviour During the Drop
    Proceedings of the Internet Measurement Conference 2018, 2018
    Co-Authors: Tobias Lauinger, Ahmet Salih Buyukkayhan, Abdelberi Chaabane, William Robertson, Engin Kirda
    Abstract:

    When desirable Internet Domain names expire, they are often re-registered in the very moment the old registration is deleted, in a highly competitive and resource-intensive practice called Domain drop-catching. To date, there has been little insight into the daily time period when expired Domain names are deleted, and the race to re-registration that takes place. In this paper, we show that .com Domains are deleted in a predictable order, and propose a model to infer the earliest possible time a Domain could have been re-registered. We leverage this model to characterise at a precision of seconds how fast certain types of Domain names are re-registered. We show that 9.5 % of deleted Domains are re-registered with a delay of zero seconds. Domains not taken immediately by the drop-catch services are often re-registered later, with different behaviours over the following seconds, minutes and hours. Since these behaviours imply different effort and price points, our methodology can be useful for future work to explain the uses of re-registered Domains.

Nolen Scaife - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • OnionDNS: a seizure-resistant top-level Domain
    International Journal of Information Security, 2017
    Co-Authors: Nolen Scaife, Lyrissa Lidsky, Rachael L. Jones, Henry Carter, Patrick Traynor
    Abstract:

    The Domain Name System (DNS) provides the critical service of mapping canonical names to IP addresses. Recognizing this, a number of parties have increasingly attempted to perform “Domain seizures” on targets by having them delisted from DNS. Such operations often occur without providing due process to the owners of these Domains, a practice made potentially worse by recent legislative proposals. We address this problem by creating OnionDNS, an anonymous top-level Domain and resolution service for the Internet. Our solution relies on the establishment of a hidden service running DNS within Tor and uses a variety of mechanisms to ensure a high-performance architecture with strong integrity guarantees for resolved records. We then present our anonymous Domain Registrar and detail the protocol for securely transferring the service to another party. Finally, we also conduct both performance and legal analyses to further demonstrate the robustness of this approach. In so doing, we show that the delisting of Domains from DNS can be mitigated in an efficient and secure manner.

  • CNS - OnionDNS: A seizure-resistant top-level Domain
    International Journal of Information Security, 2017
    Co-Authors: Nolen Scaife, Henry Carter, Patrick Traynor
    Abstract:

    The Domain Name System (DNS) provides the critical service of mapping canonical names to IP addresses. Recognizing this, a number of parties have increasingly attempted to perform “Domain seizures” on targets by having them delisted from DNS. Such operations often occur without providing due process to the owners of these Domains, a practice made potentially worse by recent legislative proposals. We address this problem by creating OnionDNS, an anonymous top-level Domain (TLD) and resolution service for the Internet. Our solution relies on the establishment of a hidden service running DNS within Tor, and uses a variety of mechanisms to enable a high-performance architecture with strong integrity guarantees for resolved records. After discussing the details of our DNS architecture, we present our anonymous Domain Registrar and detail the protocol for securely transferring the service to another party. We also conduct a performance analysis demonstrating the service is fast with an average request latency between 1 and 2 seconds over Tor. In doing so, we demonstrate that the delisting of Domains from DNS can be mitigated in an efficient and secure manner.

  • OnionDNS: A seizure-resistant top-level Domain
    2015 IEEE Conference on Communications and Network Security (CNS), 2015
    Co-Authors: Nolen Scaife, Henry Carter, Patrick Traynor
    Abstract:

    The Domain Name System (DNS) provides the critical service of mapping canonical names to IP addresses. Recognizing this, a number of parties have increasingly attempted to perform “Domain seizures” on targets by having them delisted from DNS. Such operations often occur without providing due process to the owners of these Domains, a practice made potentially worse by recent legislative proposals. We address this problem by creating OnionDNS, an anonymous top-level Domain (TLD) and resolution service for the Internet. Our solution relies on the establishment of a hidden service running DNS within Tor, and uses a variety of mechanisms to enable a high-performance architecture with strong integrity guarantees for resolved records. After discussing the details of our DNS architecture, we present our anonymous Domain Registrar and detail the protocol for securely transferring the service to another party. We also conduct a performance analysis demonstrating the service is fast with an average request latency between 1 and 2 seconds over Tor. In doing so, we demonstrate that the delisting of Domains from DNS can be mitigated in an efficient and secure manner.

Tobias Lauinger - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • from deletion to re registration in zero seconds Domain Registrar behaviour during the drop
    Internet Measurement Conference, 2018
    Co-Authors: Tobias Lauinger, Ahmet Salih Buyukkayhan, Abdelberi Chaabane, William Robertson, Engin Kirda
    Abstract:

    When desirable Internet Domain names expire, they are often re-registered in the very moment the old registration is deleted, in a highly competitive and resource-intensive practice called Domain drop-catching. To date, there has been little insight into the daily time period when expired Domain names are deleted, and the race to re-registration that takes place. In this paper, we show that .com Domains are deleted in a predictable order, and propose a model to infer the earliest possible time a Domain could have been re-registered. We leverage this model to characterise at a precision of seconds how fast certain types of Domain names are re-registered. We show that 9.5 % of deleted Domains are re-registered with a delay of zero seconds. Domains not taken immediately by the drop-catch services are often re-registered later, with different behaviours over the following seconds, minutes and hours. Since these behaviours imply different effort and price points, our methodology can be useful for future work to explain the uses of re-registered Domains.

  • Internet Measurement Conference - From Deletion to Re-Registration in Zero Seconds: Domain Registrar Behaviour During the Drop
    Proceedings of the Internet Measurement Conference 2018, 2018
    Co-Authors: Tobias Lauinger, Ahmet Salih Buyukkayhan, Abdelberi Chaabane, William Robertson, Engin Kirda
    Abstract:

    When desirable Internet Domain names expire, they are often re-registered in the very moment the old registration is deleted, in a highly competitive and resource-intensive practice called Domain drop-catching. To date, there has been little insight into the daily time period when expired Domain names are deleted, and the race to re-registration that takes place. In this paper, we show that .com Domains are deleted in a predictable order, and propose a model to infer the earliest possible time a Domain could have been re-registered. We leverage this model to characterise at a precision of seconds how fast certain types of Domain names are re-registered. We show that 9.5 % of deleted Domains are re-registered with a delay of zero seconds. Domains not taken immediately by the drop-catch services are often re-registered later, with different behaviours over the following seconds, minutes and hours. Since these behaviours imply different effort and price points, our methodology can be useful for future work to explain the uses of re-registered Domains.

St.africa African Websites - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.