The Experts below are selected from a list of 3663 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Vera Bergelson - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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the Duty to Protect the victim or the Duty to suffer punishment
Law and Philosophy, 2013Co-Authors: Vera BergelsonAbstract:This paper addresses The Ends of Harm by Victor Tadros. In it, I attempted to explore some of the implications of Tadros’s theory of punishment, particularly those following from the uneasy relationship between punishment of the offender (D) and D’s Duty to Protect the victim (V) from future harm. Among my concerns were: the apparent underinclusiveness of Tadros’s theory of punishment; the vague and unpredictable scope of D’s liabilities; the taking away by the state of V’s right to be Protected; and the lack of inherent limitations on the appropriate forms and amounts of punishment. I also questioned the true meaning of the Duty incurred by D as a result of D’s wrongdoing and suggested that Protection of Vs from future harm may not be as essential to Tadros’s justification of punishment as he has argued.
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The Duty to Protect the Victim – Or the Duty to Suffer Punishment?
Law and Philosophy, 2013Co-Authors: Vera BergelsonAbstract:This paper addresses The Ends of Harm by Victor Tadros. In it, I attempted to explore some of the implications of Tadros’s theory of punishment, particularly those following from the uneasy relationship between punishment of the offender (D) and D’s Duty to Protect the victim (V) from future harm. Among my concerns were: the apparent underinclusiveness of Tadros’s theory of punishment; the vague and unpredictable scope of D’s liabilities; the taking away by the state of V’s right to be Protected; and the lack of inherent limitations on the appropriate forms and amounts of punishment. I also questioned the true meaning of the Duty incurred by D as a result of D’s wrongdoing and suggested that Protection of Vs from future harm may not be as essential to Tadros’s justification of punishment as he has argued.
Christopher Serkin - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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passive takings the state s affirmative Duty to Protect property
Michigan Law Review, 2014Co-Authors: Christopher SerkinAbstract:As conventionally understood, regulatory takings doctrine Protects property owners from the most significant costs of legal transitions. Legal change has therefore always been central to regulatory takings claims. This Article argues that it does not need to be, and that governments can violate the Takings Clause by failing to act in the face of a changing world. This is much more than a minor refinement of takings law because government liability for failing to act means that, in at least some circumstances, the Takings Clause imposes an affirmative obligation on the government to Protect property. This liability runs counter to conventional understandings of constitutional law in which the Constitution enshrines primarily negative liberties. The Takings Clause, then, can serve as a previously unrecognized basis for affirmative government obligations. The Article ultimately illustrates this new category of passive takings with the example of sea level rise, arguing that ecological threats may compel the government to respond or else face takings liability.
James C Beck - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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The Psychotherapist's Duty to Protect Third Parties from Harm
2020Co-Authors: James C BeckAbstract:In 1974, the California Supreme Court issued its land mark decision in Tarasoff v. Board of Regents of the University of California1 which held that psychotherapists may have a Duty to Protect a person whom their patient threatens to harm. Before Tarasoff psychiatrists were liable for the violent acts of their pa tients only when the court found a breach of the Duty to control hospitalized patients. They also were required to use due care in deciding on their release.2 Since 1974, more than 20 jurisdictions have considered the Tarasoff doctrine.3 Repeatedly courts have been asked to consider whether the Tarasoff Duty applies when a psychotherapist is treating an outpatient, and whether Tarasoff, as well as the Duty to use due care, applies when a hospitalized patient is released. The courts have held consistently that psychotherapists have a Duty to Protect a named third party when their patients make specific threats against that party. A few courts have even ex tended the Duty to unnamed third parties and to proper ty.4 Other courts have refused on public policy grounds to apply the Tarasoff doctrine.5 This paper's primary purpose is to delineate how the courts define the responsibilities of mental health pro fessionals based on the Duty to Protect. A secondary pur pose is to evaluate whether the Duty to Protect is, as many psychotherapists charge, overly burdensome, or whether it is accomplishing a useful social purpose. The Tarasoff Decision When a psychotherapist became convinced that his pa tient, Prosenjit Poddar, posed a threat to Tatiana Tarasoff, he tried,,without success, to have him commit ted. Instead, the patient terminated therapy and two months later killed Tarasoff. Tarasoff's survivors sued, charging the therapist with negligence in failing to confine the patient and in failing to warn Tarasoff of her peril. A lower court held that the defendant was statutorily immune on the question of the failure to confine, and had no legal obligation to warn the potential victim.6 Following a number of interim court actions, the California Supreme Court reheard the case in 1976, and in a 4-3 opinion,7 ruled When a therapist determines or pursuant to the standard of his profession should determine, that his patient presents a serious danger of violence to another, he incurs an obligation to use reasonable care to Protect the intended victim against such danger. The discharge of this Duty. . . may call for him to warn the intended victim or others likely to apprise the intended victim of danger, to notify the police, or take whatever steps are reasonably necessary under the circumstances.8
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status of the psychiatric Duty to Protect circa 2006
Journal of the American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law, 2010Co-Authors: Matthew F Soulier, Andrea Maislen, James C BeckAbstract:States have responded to the Tarasoff Duty to Protect by passing statutes in all but 13 states. Such statutes either mandate or permit warning a potential victim. In this study, we analyzed 70 Tarasoff -related cases from a Westlaw-based search between 1985 and 2006. We determined the extent to which clinicians are being held liable for breach of the Tarasoff Duty in statutory and nonstatutory states, whether there is language in the statutes that permits warning compared with statutes that mandate warning, and whether recent Tarasoff decisions better reflect the inherent ambiguities in clinical mental health practice. We found 70 appellate cases, and only 6 were plaintiff verdicts. Statutes that mandate warning a victim appear to be the most Protective of clinicians. Seven of the 17 remanded cases came from the jurisdictions with permission-to-warn statutes, suggesting that permission rather than a strict mandate to warn may increase the liability for clinicians. Notwithstanding the language of statutes, the Protections from Tarasoff are not extended to poor clinical judgment, particularly in the controlled inpatient setting.
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current analysis of the tarasoff Duty an evolution towards the limitation of the Duty to Protect
Behavioral Sciences & The Law, 2001Co-Authors: M Damon Muir D Walcott, J Pat D Cerundolo, James C BeckAbstract:In 1976, the Tarasoff case established a new legal Duty to Protect third parties from a psychiatric patient's foreseeable violence. After the Tarasoff case, courts expanded the scope and role of a clinician's Duty to Protect, sometimes in novel ways. Later interpretations of Tarasoff began to limit significantly the situations in which a Duty to Protect would attach. Recent Tarasoff-type cases in which courts have rejected the clinician's Duty to warn suggest that Tarasoff is declining in significance. The advent of state statutes that codify the establishment and discharge of Tarasoff Duty have contributed to a further limitation of the Duty to Protect. Lastly, when faced with the management of dangerous patients, we advocate for a thorough, well documented assessment of risk of violence as the best means for addressing concern about potential legal liability. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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confidentiality versus the Duty to Protect foreseeable harm in the practice of psychiatry
1990Co-Authors: James C BeckAbstract:The basic issues. Current Status of the Duty to Protect. The Duty to Protect in private practice. The Duty to Protect in emergency psychiatry. The Duty to Protect in inpatient psychiatry. Managing risk and confidentiality in clinical encounters with children and families. Therapist sexual misconduct and the Duty to Protect. The HIV antibody-positive patient. Tarasoff and the dual-diagnosis patient. Posttraumatic stress disorder and the Duty to Protect. The antisocial patient. Driving, mental illness, and the Duty to Protect. The case of Ms. Troubled.
Markus Krajewski - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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the state Duty to Protect against human rights violations through transnational business activities
Deakin Law Review, 2018Co-Authors: Markus KrajewskiAbstract:Transnational corporations are currently not formally bound by international human rights obligations. Instead, states have a Duty to Protect individuals against human rights abuses by third parties, including corporations. While it is undisputed that this obligation extends to all individuals living on the territory of the respective state, the extraterritorial scope of the Duty to Protect remains contested. This is especially the case for human rights violations through transnational business activities. The state on whose territory the violation occurs has a Duty to Protect human rights by adopting and implementing labour and environmental laws applicable in that state. However, it is less clear if and to what extent the state of the main seat of the mother company or the global ordering company — the ‘home state’ — also has a human rights Duty to regulate transnational business activity. This article argues that such a Duty can be based on existing human rights doctrine and standards of general international law such as the ‘no harm’ rule and the due diligence principle. It argues that states have a Duty to regulate transnational business activities of corporations over which they exercise jurisdiction if human rights violations caused by such activities are predictable and preventable. In its final part, the article assesses various approaches in state practice which could be seen as instruments in the fulfilment of the Duty to regulate transnational business activities.
Graham D Glancy - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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the Duty to Protect
The Canadian Journal of Psychiatry, 2002Co-Authors: Gary Chaimowitz, Graham D GlancyAbstract:Privilege and confidentiality are central to the physician–patient relationship. These concepts are Protected by law in almost all jurisdictions (1,2). Breaches of confidentiality have long been considered unethical and, in many situations, actionable. In this regard, physicians have been governed by their standards of practice, by the regulations of their professional colleges, and in many jurisdictions, by legislation.
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the Duty to warn and Protect impact on practice
The Canadian Journal of Psychiatry, 2000Co-Authors: Gary Chaimowitz, Graham D Glancy, Janice BlackburnAbstract:Objective:to discuss the concepts of the Duty to Protect and the associated threat to confidentiality and their impact on practice for Canadian psychiatrists.Method:We review these concepts and pro...
