Ecological Psychology

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Matthew Crippen - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Enactive Pragmatism and Ecological Psychology
    Frontiers in psychology, 2020
    Co-Authors: Matthew Crippen
    Abstract:

    A widely cited roadblock to bridging Ecological Psychology and enactivism is that the former identifies with realism and the latter with constructivism, which critics charge is subjectivist. A pragmatic reading, however, suggests non-mental forms of constructivism that simultaneously fit core tenets of enactivism and Ecological realism. After advancing a pragmatic version of enactive constructivism that does not obviate realism, I reinforce the position with an empirical illustration: P. polycephalum, a communal unicellular organism that leaves slime trails that form chemical barriers that it avoids in foraging explorations. Here, environmental building and sensorimotor engagement are part of the same process, with P. polycephalum coordinating around self-created, affordance-bearing geographies, which nonetheless exist independently in ways described by Ecological realists. For Ecological psychologists, affordances are values, meaning values are external to the perceiver. I argue that agent-enacted values have the same status and thus do not obviate Ecological realism, nor generate subjectivism. The constructivist-realist debate organizes around the emphasis that enactivists and Ecological theorists respectively place on the inner constitution of organisms versus the structure of environments. Building on alimentary themes introduced in the P. polycephalum example and also in Gibson’s work, I go on to consider how environment, brain, visceral systems and even bacteria within them enter perceptual loops. This highlights almost unfathomable degrees of mutually modulating internal and external synchronization. It also shows instances in which internal conditions alter worldly configurations and invert values, in Gibson’s sense of the term, albeit without implying subjectivism. My aim is to cut across the somatic focus of enactive constructivism and the external environment-oriented emphasis of Ecological realism, and show that enactivism can enrich Ecological accounts of value.

  • enactive pragmatism and Ecological Psychology
    Frontiers in Psychology, 2020
    Co-Authors: Matthew Crippen
    Abstract:

    A widely cited roadblock to bridging Ecological Psychology and enactivism is that the former identifies with realism and the latter identifies with constructivism, which critics charge is subjectivist. A pragmatic reading, however, suggests non-mental forms of constructivism that simultaneously fit core tenets of enactivism and Ecological realism. After advancing a pragmatic version of enactive constructivism that does not obviate realism, I reinforce the position with an empirical illustration: Physarum polycephalum, a communal unicellular organism that leaves slime trails that form chemical barriers that it avoids in foraging explorations. Here, environmental building and sensorimotor engagement are part of the same process with P. polycephalum coordinating around self-created, affordance-bearing geographies, which nonetheless exist independently in ways described by Ecological realists. For Ecological psychologists, affordances are values, meaning values are external to the perceiver. I argue that agent-enacted values have the same status and thus do not obviate Ecological realism or generate subjectivism. The constructivist-realist debate organizes around the emphasis that enactivists and Ecological theorists respectively place on the inner constitution of organisms vs. the structure of environments. Building on alimentary themes introduced in the P. polycephalum example and also in Gibson's work, I go on to consider how environment, brain, visceral systems, and even bacteria within them enter perceptual loops. This highlights almost unfathomable degrees of mutually modulating internal and external synchronization. It also shows instances in which internal conditions alter worldly configurations and invert values, in Gibson's sense of the term, albeit without implying subjectivism. My aim is to cut across the somatic focus of enactive constructivism and the external environment-oriented emphasis of Ecological realism and show that enactivism can enrich Ecological accounts of value.

Manuel Heras-escribano - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Ecological Psychology is radical enough: A reply to radical enactivists
    Philosophical Psychology, 2019
    Co-Authors: Miguel Segundo-ortin, Manuel Heras-escribano, Vicente Raja
    Abstract:

    Ecological Psychology is one of the most influential theories of perception in the embodied, anti-representational, and situated cognitive sciences. However, radical enactivists claim that Gibsonia...

  • Pragmatism, enactivism, and Ecological Psychology: towards a unified approach to post-cognitivism
    Synthese, 2019
    Co-Authors: Manuel Heras-escribano
    Abstract:

    This paper argues that it is possible to combine enactivism and Ecological Psychology in a single post-cognitivist research framework if we highlight the common pragmatist assumptions of both approaches. These pragmatist assumptions or starting points are shared by Ecological Psychology and the enactive approach independently of being historically related to pragmatism, and they are based on the idea of organic coordination, which states that the evolution and development of the cognitive abilities of an organism are explained by appealing to the history of interactions of that organism with its environment. It is argued that the idea of behavioral or organic coordination within the enactive approach gives rise to the sensorimotor abilities of the organism, while the Ecological approach emphasizes the coordination at a higher-level between organism and environment through the agent’s exploratory behavior for perceiving affordances. As such, these two different processes of organic coordination can be integrated in a post-cognitivist research framework, which will be based on two levels of analysis: the subpersonal one (the neural dynamics of the sensorimotor contingencies and the emergence of enactive agency) and the personal one (the dynamics that emerges from the organism-environment interaction in Ecological terms). If this proposal is on the right track, this may be a promising first step for offering a systematized and consistent post-cognitivist approach to cognition that retain the full potential of both enactivism and Ecological Psychology.

  • New Challenges for Ecological Psychology
    The Philosophy of Affordances, 2019
    Co-Authors: Manuel Heras-escribano
    Abstract:

    This chapter aims to analyze a few current challenges for Ecological Psychology. These challenges are varied and range from minimal to social cognition, including applications of Ecological principles to sensory substitution devices, the relation of sociality to perceptual processes from an Ecological perspective, and the political dimension of affordances.

  • Quantifying affordances through information theory
    The 2019 Conference on Artificial Life, 2019
    Co-Authors: Miguel Aguilera, Iñigo Arandia-romero, Manuel Heras-escribano
    Abstract:

    Affordances are directly perceived environmental possibilities for action. Born within Ecological Psychology, they have been proposed to be one of the main building blocks to explain cognition from...

  • The History and Philosophy of Ecological Psychology.
    Frontiers in psychology, 2018
    Co-Authors: Lorena Lobo, Manuel Heras-escribano, David Travieso
    Abstract:

    Ecological Psychology is an embodied, situated, and non-representational approach pioneered by J. J. Gibson and E. J. Gibson. This theory aims to offer a third way beyond cognitivism and behaviorism for understanding cognition. The theory started with the rejection of the premise of the poverty of the stimulus, the physicalist conception of the stimulus, and the passive character of the perceiver of mainstream theories of perception. On the contrary, the main principles of Ecological Psychology are the continuity of perception and action, the organism-environment system as unit of analysis, the study of affordances as the objects of perception, combined with an emphasis on perceptual learning and development. In this paper, first, we analyze the philosophical and psychological influences of Ecological Psychology: pragmatism, behaviorism, phenomenology, and Gestalt Psychology. Second, we summarize the main concepts of the approach and their historical development following the academic biographies of the proponents. Finally, we highlight the most significant developments of this psychological tradition. We conclude that Ecological Psychology is one of the most innovative approaches in the psychological field, as it is reflected in its current influence in the contemporary embodied and situated cognitive sciences, where the notion of affordance and the work of E. J. Gibson and J. J. Gibson is considered as a historical antecedent.

Shaun Gallagher - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Between Ecological Psychology and Enactivism: Is There Resonance?
    Frontiers in psychology, 2020
    Co-Authors: Kevin J. Ryan, Shaun Gallagher
    Abstract:

    Ecological psychologists and enactivists agree that the best explanation for a large share of cognition is non-representational in kind. In both Ecological Psychology and enactivist philosophy, then, the task is to offer an explanans that does not rely on representations. Different theorists within these camps have contrasting notions of what the best kind of non-representational explanation will look like, yet they agree on one central point: instead of focusing solely on factors interior to an agent, an important aspect of cognition is found in the link or coupling between an agent and the external world. This link is fluid, dynamic, and active in a variety of ways, and we do not need to add any internal extra something in the perception-action-cognition process. At the same time, even devout defenders of Ecological Psychology and enactivism recognize that plenty happens inside an agent during cognition. In particular, no one denies that the brain plays an important role. What, then, is the role of the brain if it's not in the game of representing the environment? One possible option is to describe the brain as a resonant organ instead of a representational organ. In this paper we consider the history of resonance in more detail. Particular focus will be placed on two different sets of approaches that have developed the concept of resonance: a representational reading of resonance and a non-representational, dynamic account of resonance. We then apply these accounts to a case study on music performance, specifically in the context of standard tonal jazz. From this application, we propose that a non-representational resonance account consistent with both enactivism and Ecological Psychology is a viable way of explaining jazz performance. We conclude with future considerations on research regarding the brain as a resonant organ.

Harry Heft - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Ecological Psychology and Enaction Theory: Divergent Groundings.
    Frontiers in psychology, 2020
    Co-Authors: Harry Heft
    Abstract:

    Both Ecological Psychology and enaction theory offer an alternative to long-standing theoretical approaches to perception that invoke post-perceptual supplemental processes or structures, e.g., mental representations, to account for perceptual phenomena. They both do so by taking actions by the individual to be essential for an account of perception and cognition. The question that this paper attempts to address is whether Ecological Psychology and enaction theory can be integrated into a stronger non-representational alternative to perception than either one can offer on its own. Doing so is only possible if most of the basic tenets and concepts of Ecological Psychology and enaction theory are compatible. Based on an examination of the role that sensations play within each approach; the manner in which each treats the concept of information; and how each conceptualizes an organism's boundaries, it is concluded that a synthesis of the two approaches is not possible. Particular attention is paid to the concept of sensations, the limitations of which were an impetus for the development of Ecological Psychology.

  • Ecological Psychology in Context: James Gibson, Roger Barker, and the Legacy of William James's Radical Empiricism
    2001
    Co-Authors: Harry Heft
    Abstract:

    Contents: Foreword. Preface. Introduction. Part I: Ecological Theory and Philosophical Realism. William James's Radical Empiricism: A Foundation for Ecological Psychology. Edwin B. Holt and Philosophical Behaviorism. Part II: The Ecological Approach and Radical Empiricism. Perceiver-Environment Relations. Relations and Direct Perception. The Stream of Experience and Possible Knowledge. Part III: Ecological Psychology and the Psychological Field. Gestalt Psychology and the Ecological Approach. Ecobehavioral Science: The Ecological Approach of Roger Barker. Ecological Psychology and Ecobehavioral Science: Toward a Synthesis. Ecological Knowledge and Sociocultural Processes. Part IV: Conclusion. The Scope of Ecological Psychology.

Vicente Raja - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

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