The Experts below are selected from a list of 159 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Abigail Barr - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
-
trust and expected trustworthiness Experimental evidence from zimbabwean villages
2003Co-Authors: Abigail BarrAbstract:An Economic Experiment involving 24 small, tightly knit communities allows us to distinguish between trusting or trust-like behaviour based on expectational and non-expectational motivations. A model linking trusting behaviour to expectations of trustworthiness explains over half of the variation across communities. However, the estimated parameters are different (while being similarly well defined) for traditional and resettled communities. This is taken as evidence that non-expectational motivations are at work and vary with community type. Both the data and certain stylised facts suggest that altruistic motivations matter less and motivations relating to a desire to 'community-build' matter more in resettled communities.
-
trust and expected trustworthiness Experimental evidence from zimbabwean villages
The Economic Journal, 2003Co-Authors: Abigail BarrAbstract:An Economic Experiment involving 24 small, tightly knit communities allows us to distinguish between trusting or trust-like behaviour based on expectational and non-expectational motivations. A model linking trusting behaviour to expectations of trustworthiness explains over half of the variation across communities. However, the estimated parameters are different (while being similarly well defined) for traditional and resettled communities. This is taken as evidence that non-expectational motivations are at work and vary with community type. Both the data and certain stylised facts suggest that altruistic motivations matter less and motivations relating to a desire to 'community-build' matter more in resettled communities. Trust is valuable. It 'is an important lubricant of a social system. It is extremely efficient; it saves a lot of trouble to have a fair degree of reliance on other people's word' (Arrow, 1974, p. 23). Empirically, trust is associated with higher rates of Economic growth, and the emergence and effective functioning of large-scale organisations, including governments (Knack and Keefer, 1997; Fukuyama, 1995; LaPorta et al., 1997). How, then, can we promote trusting behaviour? The answer to this question depends on how trusting behaviour is motivated. If it is motivated by an expectation of trustworthiness, its dynamics are codetermined with those of trustworthiness and its promotion reduces to the promotion of trustworthiness. But if it is also motivated by other factors, its dynamics may be at least partially independent of those of trustworthiness and it may be appropriate to promote trusting behaviour independently or as a means of promoting trustworthiness. Ultimately the two must grow together - what is at issue here is the appropriate
Joshua M Duke - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
-
an Experimental Economics investigation of the land value tax efficiency acceptability and positional goods
Land Economics, 2018Co-Authors: Joshua M DukeAbstract:This research offers the first Economic Experiment investigating the land tax, where landowners invest under different property tax regimes. A voting treatment assesses the relative acceptability of land value taxation. Results show a land tax produced greater overall welfare in only 37.5% of the Experiment sessions. Systematic overinvestment arises from the positional-good characteristic of residential land investment, but this effect vanishes when the positional-good indicator is removed. The Experiments show that the participants unexpectedly voted in favor of the land tax, suggesting that the efficiency and acceptability of the land tax may be more complex than in nonbehavioral Economics modeling.
-
an Experimental Economics investigation of the land value tax efficiency acceptability and positional goods
2017 Annual Meeting July 30-August 1 Chicago Illinois, 2017Co-Authors: Joshua M DukeAbstract:This research offers the first Economic Experiment investigating the land tax, where landowners invest under different property tax regimes. A voting treatment assesses the relative acceptability of land value taxation. Results show a land tax produced greater overall welfare in only 37.5% of the Experiment sessions. Systematic overinvestment arises from the positional-good characteristic of residential land investment, but this effect vanishes when the positional-good indicator is removed. The Experiments show that the participants unexpectedly voted in favor of the land tax, suggesting that the efficiency and acceptability of the land tax may be more complex than in nonbehavioral Economics modeling. (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
Manfred Milinski - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
-
asymmetric power boosts extortion in an Economic Experiment
PLOS ONE, 2016Co-Authors: Christian Hilbe, Kristin Hagel, Manfred MilinskiAbstract:Direct reciprocity is a major mechanism for the evolution of cooperation. Several classical studies have suggested that humans should quickly learn to adopt reciprocal strategies to establish mutual cooperation in repeated interactions. On the other hand, the recently discovered theory of ZD strategies has found that subjects who use extortionate strategies are able to exploit and subdue cooperators. Although such extortioners have been predicted to succeed in any population of adaptive opponents, theoretical follow-up studies questioned whether extortion can evolve in reality. However, most of these studies presumed that individuals have similar strategic possibilities and comparable outside options, whereas asymmetries are ubiquitous in real world applications. Here we show with a model and an Economic Experiment that extortionate strategies readily emerge once subjects differ in their strategic power. Our Experiment combines a repeated social dilemma with asymmetric partner choice. In our main treatment there is one randomly chosen group member who is unilaterally allowed to exchange one of the other group members after every ten rounds of the social dilemma. We find that this asymmetric replacement opportunity generally promotes cooperation, but often the resulting payoff distribution reflects the underlying power structure. Almost half of the subjects in a better strategic position turn into extortioners, who quickly proceed to exploit their peers. By adapting their cooperation probabilities consistent with ZD theory, extortioners force their co-players to cooperate without being similarly cooperative themselves. Comparison to non-extortionate players under the same conditions indicates a substantial net gain to extortion. Our results thus highlight how power asymmetries can endanger mutually beneficial interactions, and transform them into exploitative relationships. In particular, our results indicate that the extortionate strategies predicted from ZD theory could play a more prominent role in our daily interactions than previously thought.
-
an Economic Experiment reveals that humans prefer pool punishment to maintain the commons
Proceedings of The Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 2012Co-Authors: Arne Traulsen, Torsten Rohl, Manfred MilinskiAbstract:Punishment can stabilize costly cooperation and ensure the success of a common project that is threatened by free-riders. Punishment mechanisms can be classified into pool punishment, where the punishment act is carried out by a paid third party, (e.g. a police system or a sheriff), and peer punishment, where the punishment act is carried out by peers. Which punishment mechanism is preferred when both are concurrently available within a society? In an Economic Experiment, we show that the majority of subjects choose pool punishment, despite being costly even in the absence of defectors, when second-order free-riders, cooperators that do not punish, are also punished. Pool punishers are mutually enforcing their support for the punishment organization, stably trapping each other. Our Experimental results show how organized punishment could have displaced individual punishment in human societies.
Erin L Krupka - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
-
a multimethod approach to identifying norms and normative expectations within a corporate hierarchy evidence from the financial services industry
Management Science, 2012Co-Authors: Stephen V Burks, Erin L KrupkaAbstract:We use an incentive-compatible Economic Experiment and surveys in the field at a large financial services firm to identify the norms for on-the-job behavior among financial advisers and their leaders, and the normative expectations each group has of the other. We examine whistle-blowing on a peer, an incentive clash between serving the client and earning commissions, and a dilemma about fiduciary responsibility to a client. We find patterns of agreement among advisers, among leaders, and between the two groups, that are consistent with company guidelines identified ex ante. However, we also find measurable differences between what leaders expect and the actual norms of advisers. When there is such a mismatch we are able to distinguish miscommunication from ethical disagreement between leaders and advisers. Finally, we show that when advisers' personal ethical opinions do not match group norms, this mismatch is correlated with job dissatisfaction and lying for money in a second Experiment. This paper was accepted by Brad Barber, Teck Ho, and Terrance Odean, special issue editors.
Victor Nee - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
-
entrepreneurs under uncertainty an Economic Experiment in china
Management Science, 2013Co-Authors: Jerker Holm, Sonja Opper, Victor NeeAbstract:This study reports findings from the first large-scale Experiment investigating whether entrepreneurs differ from other people in their willingness to expose themselves to various forms of uncertainty. A stratified random sample of 700 chief executive officers from the Yangzi delta region in China is compared to 200 control group members. Our findings suggest that in Economic decisions, entrepreneurs are more willing to accept strategic uncertainty related to multilateral competition and trust. However, entrepreneurs do not differ from ordinary people when it comes to nonstrategic forms of uncertainty, such as risk and ambiguity.
