Economic Sanction

14,000,000 Leading Edge Experts on the ideXlab platform

Scan Science and Technology

Contact Leading Edge Experts & Companies

Scan Science and Technology

Contact Leading Edge Experts & Companies

The Experts below are selected from a list of 5607 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform

Muhammad Shahadat Hossain Siddiquee - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • methodological change and bias in Economic Sanction reconsidered
    International Interactions, 2017
    Co-Authors: Peter A G Van Bergeijk, Muhammad Shahadat Hossain Siddiquee
    Abstract:

    ABSTRACTWe investigate the influence of case selection and (re)coding for two vintages of a key resource for research on Economic Sanctions: the Peterson Institute data base reported in Hufbauer et al. (2nd edition in 1990 and 3rd edition in 2007). The Peterson Institute has not reported transparently about these changes that make it more likely to find Sanction success. A multivariate probit analysis establishes upward bias related to modest policy change, duration and cost to target and downward bias for regime change, military impairment, companion policies and cost to the sender.

  • bias and methodological change in Economic Sanction reconsidered
    Research Papers in Economics, 2015
    Co-Authors: Peter A G Van Bergeijk, Muhammad Shahadat Hossain Siddiquee
    Abstract:

    The authors investigate the influence of case selection and (re)coding for two vintages of a key resource for research on Economic Sanctions: the Peterson Institute data base reported in Hufbauer et al. (Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, 2nd edition in 1990 and 3rd edition in 2007). The Peterson Institute has not reported transparently on these changes. At the level of individual case studies the authors uncover a tendency to inflate success scores, reclassifying failures into successes even when the evidence for doing so was not convincing. At the level of the aggregated case studies and general methodology they uncover positive bias (that is: methodological changes that make it more likely to find Sanction success as indicated by a higher success score, either on average or in individual cases): splitting of episodes into cases and the changed definition of Sanction contribution increase the success ratio in general and ultimately the share of Sanctions that are judged to be a success. The authors also show the importance of the reclassification of 'destabilization cases' into 'regime changes'. Their probit analysis shows that the 3rd edition's methodology underestimates the contribution of certain Sanction characteristics, including the positive impact of the costs of Sanctions to the sender, duration of the Sanctions and the sender's companion policies.

Stavnichiy S. Lev - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Supply Chain Strategies in Russia’s Special Administrative Regions: Does It Recover the National Economy?
    International Journal of Supply Chain Management, 2020
    Co-Authors: Andreev A. Viacheslav, Varkulevich V. Tat’ayna, Arnaut N. Marina, Stavnichiy S. Lev
    Abstract:

    Abstract-Due to the Economic Sanction the Russian Federation has taken a vigorous attempt to compensate the risk for the national economy stipulated by restriction with access to the capital markets and supply chain strategy by constraints to compete in international markets. Imposition of the special administrative regions is a respond to the Sanctions by the United States and a few countries in order to minimize possible financial losses. In an uncertain recovery, supply chain operations need to be more scalable and flexible as they anticipate Economic recovery and increase capacity.In practice, a special administrative area appears as offshore financial center. However, its goal is broader – to ensure the repatriation of capital withdrawn off the Russian jurisdiction in 1998-2018. The aim of study is to estimate the capital which will prospectively be returning to Russia until 2025 through the special administrative regimes at Russkiy island and Oktyabr’skiy island in the Russian Federation. The findings show that the capital flight off the Russian economy has amounted to 653.2 billion US dollars for the last 20 years. But viewing the result of Sanction’s pressure, by 2025, the total return of capital from the offshores at Cyprus and the Virgin Islands could prognostically reach 165.55 billion dollars. Special administrative region’s preferences will motivate large foreign holdings, especially those that have fallen under Sanctions, to change their registration to the Russia’s domicile. Therefore, the special administrative regions could prospectively facilitate investment inflow and stipulate recovering the Russia’s economy

Lev S Stavnichiy - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • supply chain strategies in russia s special administrative regions does it recover the national economy
    International Journal of Supply Chain Management, 2020
    Co-Authors: Viacheslav A Andreev, Tatayna V Varkulevich, Marina N Arnaut, Lev S Stavnichiy
    Abstract:

    Abstract- Due to the Economic Sanction the Russian Federation has taken a vigorous attempt to compensate the risk for the national economy stipulated by restriction with access to the capital markets and supply chain strategy by constraints to compete in international markets. Imposition of the special administrative regions is a respond to the Sanctions by the United States and a few countries in order to minimize possible financial losses. In an uncertain recovery, supply chain operations need to be more scalable and flexible as they anticipate Economic recovery and increase capacity.In practice, a special administrative area appears as offshore financial center. However, its goal is broader – to ensure the repatriation of capital withdrawn off the Russian jurisdiction in 1998-2018. The aim of study is to estimate the capital which will prospectively be returning to Russia until 2025 through the special administrative regimes at Russkiy island and Oktyabr’skiy island in the Russian Federation. The findings show that the capital flight off the Russian economy has amounted to 653.2 billion US dollars for the last 20 years. But viewing the result of Sanction’s pressure, by 2025, the total return of capital from the offshores at Cyprus and the Virgin Islands could prognostically reach 165.55 billion dollars. Special administrative region’s preferences will motivate large foreign holdings, especially those that have fallen under Sanctions, to change their registration to the Russia’s domicile. Therefore, the special administrative regions could prospectively facilitate investment inflow and stipulate recovering the Russia’s economy .

Peter A G Van Bergeijk - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • methodological change and bias in Economic Sanction reconsidered
    International Interactions, 2017
    Co-Authors: Peter A G Van Bergeijk, Muhammad Shahadat Hossain Siddiquee
    Abstract:

    ABSTRACTWe investigate the influence of case selection and (re)coding for two vintages of a key resource for research on Economic Sanctions: the Peterson Institute data base reported in Hufbauer et al. (2nd edition in 1990 and 3rd edition in 2007). The Peterson Institute has not reported transparently about these changes that make it more likely to find Sanction success. A multivariate probit analysis establishes upward bias related to modest policy change, duration and cost to target and downward bias for regime change, military impairment, companion policies and cost to the sender.

  • bias and methodological change in Economic Sanction reconsidered
    Research Papers in Economics, 2015
    Co-Authors: Peter A G Van Bergeijk, Muhammad Shahadat Hossain Siddiquee
    Abstract:

    The authors investigate the influence of case selection and (re)coding for two vintages of a key resource for research on Economic Sanctions: the Peterson Institute data base reported in Hufbauer et al. (Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, 2nd edition in 1990 and 3rd edition in 2007). The Peterson Institute has not reported transparently on these changes. At the level of individual case studies the authors uncover a tendency to inflate success scores, reclassifying failures into successes even when the evidence for doing so was not convincing. At the level of the aggregated case studies and general methodology they uncover positive bias (that is: methodological changes that make it more likely to find Sanction success as indicated by a higher success score, either on average or in individual cases): splitting of episodes into cases and the changed definition of Sanction contribution increase the success ratio in general and ultimately the share of Sanctions that are judged to be a success. The authors also show the importance of the reclassification of 'destabilization cases' into 'regime changes'. Their probit analysis shows that the 3rd edition's methodology underestimates the contribution of certain Sanction characteristics, including the positive impact of the costs of Sanctions to the sender, duration of the Sanctions and the sender's companion policies.

Andreev A. Viacheslav - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Supply Chain Strategies in Russia’s Special Administrative Regions: Does It Recover the National Economy?
    International Journal of Supply Chain Management, 2020
    Co-Authors: Andreev A. Viacheslav, Varkulevich V. Tat’ayna, Arnaut N. Marina, Stavnichiy S. Lev
    Abstract:

    Abstract-Due to the Economic Sanction the Russian Federation has taken a vigorous attempt to compensate the risk for the national economy stipulated by restriction with access to the capital markets and supply chain strategy by constraints to compete in international markets. Imposition of the special administrative regions is a respond to the Sanctions by the United States and a few countries in order to minimize possible financial losses. In an uncertain recovery, supply chain operations need to be more scalable and flexible as they anticipate Economic recovery and increase capacity.In practice, a special administrative area appears as offshore financial center. However, its goal is broader – to ensure the repatriation of capital withdrawn off the Russian jurisdiction in 1998-2018. The aim of study is to estimate the capital which will prospectively be returning to Russia until 2025 through the special administrative regimes at Russkiy island and Oktyabr’skiy island in the Russian Federation. The findings show that the capital flight off the Russian economy has amounted to 653.2 billion US dollars for the last 20 years. But viewing the result of Sanction’s pressure, by 2025, the total return of capital from the offshores at Cyprus and the Virgin Islands could prognostically reach 165.55 billion dollars. Special administrative region’s preferences will motivate large foreign holdings, especially those that have fallen under Sanctions, to change their registration to the Russia’s domicile. Therefore, the special administrative regions could prospectively facilitate investment inflow and stipulate recovering the Russia’s economy