The Experts below are selected from a list of 309 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Gleb A. Koshevoy - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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On the existence of a technical Efficiency Criterion
Journal of Economic Theory, 1991Co-Authors: Andrei V. Dmitruk, Gleb A. KoshevoyAbstract:Abstract In this paper we discover the necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of the technical Efficiency Criterion of inputs usage in production, which ought to satisfy the requirements of homogeneity, strict monotonicity, and at all efficient points be equal to one. We propose, in addition, some new class of quasihomogeneous criteria of Russell-Fare-Lovell type.
Andrei V. Dmitruk - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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On the existence of a technical Efficiency Criterion
Journal of Economic Theory, 1991Co-Authors: Andrei V. Dmitruk, Gleb A. KoshevoyAbstract:Abstract In this paper we discover the necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of the technical Efficiency Criterion of inputs usage in production, which ought to satisfy the requirements of homogeneity, strict monotonicity, and at all efficient points be equal to one. We propose, in addition, some new class of quasihomogeneous criteria of Russell-Fare-Lovell type.
Kemal Yildiz - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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A new ex-ante Efficiency Criterion and implications for the probabilistic serial mechanism
Journal of Economic Theory, 2018Co-Authors: Battal Dogan, Serhat Dogan, Kemal YildizAbstract:Abstract We introduce and analyze an Efficiency Criterion for probabilistic assignment of objects, when only ordinal preference information is available. This Efficiency Criterion is based on the following domination relation: a probabilistic assignment dominates another assignment if it is ex-ante efficient for a strictly larger set of utility profiles consistent with the ordinal preferences. We provide a simple characterization of this domination relation. We revisit an extensively studied assignment mechanism, the Probabilistic Serial mechanism ( Bogomolnaia and Moulin, 2001 ), which always chooses a “fair” assignment. We show that the Probabilistic Serial assignment may be dominated by another fair assignment. We provide conditions under which the serial assignment is undominated among fair assignments.
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A New Ex-Ante Efficiency Criterion and Implications for the Probabilistic Serial Mechanism
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2016Co-Authors: Battal Dogan, Serhat Dogan, Kemal YildizAbstract:For probabilistic assignment of objects, when only ordinal preference information is available, we introduce an Efficiency Criterion based on the following domination relation: a probabilistic assignment dominates another assignment if, whenever the latter assignment is ex-ante efficient at a utility profile consistent with the ordinal preferences, the former assignment is ex-ante efficient too; and there is a utility profile consistent with the ordinal preferences at which the latter assignment is not ex-ante efficient but the former assignment is ex-ante efficient. We provide a simple characterization of this domination relation. We revisit an extensively studied assignment mechanism, the Probabilistic Serial mechanism (Bogomolnaia and Moulin), which always chooses a “fair” assignment. We show that the Probabilistic Serial assignment may be dominated by another fair assignment. We provide an almost full characterization of the preference profiles at which the serial assignment is undominated among fair assignments.
Luc Pibouleau - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Combinatorics of sharp separation systems synthesis: generating functions and search Efficiency Criterion
Industrial & Engineering Chemistry Research, 1994Co-Authors: Pascal Floquet, Serge Domenech, Luc PibouleauAbstract:We give a generating function of the total number of possible separation sequences when only sharp separators with two or three outputs are used and a generating function of the number of distinct complex separators. These results allow us to define an Efficiency Criterion for the solution of the optimal separation schemes synthesis problem
Battal Dogan - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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A new ex-ante Efficiency Criterion and implications for the probabilistic serial mechanism
Journal of Economic Theory, 2018Co-Authors: Battal Dogan, Serhat Dogan, Kemal YildizAbstract:Abstract We introduce and analyze an Efficiency Criterion for probabilistic assignment of objects, when only ordinal preference information is available. This Efficiency Criterion is based on the following domination relation: a probabilistic assignment dominates another assignment if it is ex-ante efficient for a strictly larger set of utility profiles consistent with the ordinal preferences. We provide a simple characterization of this domination relation. We revisit an extensively studied assignment mechanism, the Probabilistic Serial mechanism ( Bogomolnaia and Moulin, 2001 ), which always chooses a “fair” assignment. We show that the Probabilistic Serial assignment may be dominated by another fair assignment. We provide conditions under which the serial assignment is undominated among fair assignments.
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A New Ex-Ante Efficiency Criterion and Implications for the Probabilistic Serial Mechanism
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2016Co-Authors: Battal Dogan, Serhat Dogan, Kemal YildizAbstract:For probabilistic assignment of objects, when only ordinal preference information is available, we introduce an Efficiency Criterion based on the following domination relation: a probabilistic assignment dominates another assignment if, whenever the latter assignment is ex-ante efficient at a utility profile consistent with the ordinal preferences, the former assignment is ex-ante efficient too; and there is a utility profile consistent with the ordinal preferences at which the latter assignment is not ex-ante efficient but the former assignment is ex-ante efficient. We provide a simple characterization of this domination relation. We revisit an extensively studied assignment mechanism, the Probabilistic Serial mechanism (Bogomolnaia and Moulin), which always chooses a “fair” assignment. We show that the Probabilistic Serial assignment may be dominated by another fair assignment. We provide an almost full characterization of the preference profiles at which the serial assignment is undominated among fair assignments.
