The Experts below are selected from a list of 3867 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Brian Gallini - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
-
equal sentences for unequal participation should the Eighth Amendment allow all juvenile murder accomplices to receive life without parole
Oregon law review, 2008Co-Authors: Brian GalliniAbstract:No court has addressed the constitutional significance of sentencing juvenile murder accomplices who play a minimal role in the underlying killing to life in prison without parole. Indeed, no precedent makes clear whether it is cruel and unusual to impose that sentence on juvenile offenders convicted of first-degree murder pursuant to either the felony-murder doctrine or an accomplice theory of liability, notwithstanding their minimal involvement in the victim's death. To investigate this unanswered question, Part I of this Article explores the imposition of life without parole sentences on juvenile non-killers convicted of murder via either the felony-murder doctrine or accomplice liability. In doing so, Part I attempts to illustrate the problematic nature of imposing these sentences on less culpable juvenile non-killers convicted of first-degree murder by offering examples at the state and federal levels of defendants who received identical sentences yet played different roles in the victim's death. Part II begins by outlining the evolution of the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Eighth Amendment's 'cruel and unusual' clause and continues by examining its application of the clause to juveniles. Part II concludes by evaluating the application by lower courts of the Supreme Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence to juvenile punishment. Finally, Part III asserts that automatically sentencing juvenile non-killers to life in prison without parole renders lower courts unable either to individualize the juvenile's sentence or exercise judicial discretion in an effort to do so. Part III then argues that the Supreme Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence provides no remedy because it is ill-equipped to handle a juvenile non-killer's Eighth Amendment challenge to a sentence of life imprisonment without parole following a murder conviction obtained pursuant to a charge of felony-murder or accomplice liability. Taken together, Part III concludes, these deficiencies allow for further erosion of the ideals underlying juvenile punishment.
-
equal sentences for unequal participation should the Eighth Amendment allow all juvenile murder accomplices to receive life without parole
Oregon law review, 2008Co-Authors: Brian GalliniAbstract:No court has addressed the constitutional significance of sentencing juvenile murder accomplices who play a minimal role in the underlying killing to life in prison without parole. Indeed, no precedent makes clear whether it is cruel and unusual to impose that sentence on juvenile offenders convicted of first-degree murder pursuant to either the felony-murder doctrine or an accomplice theory of liability, notwithstanding their minimal involvement in the victim's death. To investigate this unanswered question, Part I of this Article explores the imposition of life without parole sentences on juvenile non-killers convicted of murder via either the felony-murder doctrine or accomplice liability. In doing so, Part I attempts to illustrate the problematic nature of imposing these sentences on less culpable juvenile non-killers convicted of first-degree murder by offering examples at the state and federal levels of defendants who received identical sentences yet played different roles in the victim's death. Part II begins by outlining the evolution of the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Eighth Amendment's 'cruel and unusual' clause and continues by examining its application of the clause to juveniles. Part II concludes by evaluating the application by lower courts of the Supreme Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence to juvenile punishment. Finally, Part III asserts that automatically sentencing juvenile non-killers to life in prison without parole renders lower courts unable either to individualize the juvenile's sentence or exercise judicial discretion in an effort to do so. Part III then argues that the Supreme Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence provides no remedy because it is ill-equipped to handle a juvenile non-killer's Eighth Amendment challenge to a sentence of life imprisonment without parole following a murder conviction obtained pursuant to a charge of felony-murder or accomplice liability. Taken together, Part III concludes, these deficiencies allow for further erosion of the ideals underlying juvenile punishment.
Scott W. Howe - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
-
The Eighth Amendment as a Warrant Against Undeserved Punishment
William and Mary Bill of Rights Journal, 2013Co-Authors: Scott W. HoweAbstract:Should the Eighth Amendment prohibit all undeserved criminal convictions and punishments? There are grounds to argue that it must. Correlation between the level of deserts of the accused and the severity of the sanction represents the very idea of justice to most of us. We want to believe that those branded as criminals deserve blame for their conduct and that they deserve all of the punishments that they receive. A deserts limitation is also key to explaining the decisions in which the Supreme Court has rejected convictions or punishments as disproportional, including several major rulings in the new millennium. Yet, this view of the Eighth Amendment challenges many current criminal-law doctrines and sentencing practices that favor crime prevention over retributive limits. Mistake-of-law doctrine, felony-murder rules and mandatory-minimum sentencing laws are only a few examples. Why have these laws and practices survived? One answer is that the Supreme Court has largely limited proportionality relief to a few narrow problems involving the death penalty or life imprisonment without parole, and it has avoided openly endorsing the deserts limitation even in cases in which defendants have prevailed. Yet, this Article presents a deeper explanation. I point to four reasons why the doctrine must remain severely stunted in relation to its animating principle. I am to clarify both what the Eighth Amendment reveals about the kind of people we want to be and why the Supreme Court is not able to force us to live up to the aspiration.
-
The Futile Quest for Racial Neutrality in Capital Selection and the Eighth Amendment Argument for Abolition Based on Unconscious Racial Discrimination
William and Mary law review, 2006Co-Authors: Scott W. HoweAbstract:This article begins by discussing the characteristics of current capital-sentencing systems that make racial discrimination in capital selection uncontrollable. It also summarizes the social-science evidence that white-victim bias widely plagues capital selection. The article then develops the two central arguments suggested by its title. First, it provides a detailed explanation of why proposals for federal regulatory reform cannot succeed in achieving racial neutrality in capital selection. Second, it provides a theory to explain why unconscious racial discrimination in capital selection violates the Eighth Amendment and, given the futility of federal regulatory remedies, justifies abolition.
-
The Failed Case for Eighth Amendment Regulation of the Capital-Sentencing Trial
University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 1998Co-Authors: Scott W. HoweAbstract:This article explores Eighth Amendment theories that might justify the effort by the Supreme Court to regulate capital-sentencing trials but explains why they are problematic. The Court typically has asserted that the aim of its capital-sentencing doctrine is to achieve nonarbitrariness or consistency in the use of the death penalty. However, the article shows why the Court's regulatorty efforts have not served that goal, why that goal is unachievable, and, ultimately, why that goal does not comport with the mandate of the Eighth Amendment. The article contends that the better view is that the Eighth Amendment limits the use of capital sentencing through a prohibition on retributive excess. This deserts-limitation principle also better explains the Court's current capital-sentencing doctrine than does the consistency goal. Nonetheless, the article contends that even this alternative principle does not easily justify intrusion by the Court into the administration of capital-sentencing trials. The central difficulty is that the Court is unable to specify a method by which states can accurately determine which capital offenders deserve death Unless the Court is prepared to abolish capital punishment, the article argues that the Court would do best to focus its Eighth Amendment efforts to control the use of the death penalty on doctrines definining which offenders are death eligible rather than on rules governing capital-sentencing trials. The Court's regulation of capital-sentencing proceedings has produced an intrusive and seemingly complex doctrine that seems to accomplish little in the way of promoting fairness in the distribution of death sentences.
Louis D. Bilionis - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
-
Eighth Amendment Meanings from the ABA’s Moratorium Resolution
Law and Contemporary Problems, 1998Co-Authors: Louis D. BilionisAbstract:The American Bar Association’s (“ABA’s”) objection to capital punishment as currently practiced stands as one of the most provocative acts of selfproclaimed Eighth Amendment relevance to occur in many years, ranking with Justice Harry A. Blackmun’s well-publicized renunciation of the death penalty in Callins v. Collins. The ABA insists that its position—that America must institute substantial reforms in the administration of capital punishment immediately or cease executions altogether—is no mere expression of policy preference. To the contrary, the ABA insists that its position reflects, and indeed is compelled by, a proper appreciation of the Eighth Amendment. And it calls upon the nation to come to the same conclusion. Yet the ABA resolution and its supporting report prove decidedly lean insofar as fully articulated constitutional arguments are concerned. The resolution, as is frequently the case with such documents, presents the ABA’s proposals unadorned by any legal argument, and the supporting report concentrates almost entirely on the anecdotal documentation of perceived problems, confining its explicit constitutional references to general assertions of the need for fairness and consistency under the Eighth Amendment and its
-
Eighth Amendment meanings from the aba s moratorium resolution
Law and contemporary problems, 1998Co-Authors: Louis D. BilionisAbstract:The American Bar Association’s (“ABA’s”) objection to capital punishment as currently practiced stands as one of the most provocative acts of selfproclaimed Eighth Amendment relevance to occur in many years, ranking with Justice Harry A. Blackmun’s well-publicized renunciation of the death penalty in Callins v. Collins. The ABA insists that its position—that America must institute substantial reforms in the administration of capital punishment immediately or cease executions altogether—is no mere expression of policy preference. To the contrary, the ABA insists that its position reflects, and indeed is compelled by, a proper appreciation of the Eighth Amendment. And it calls upon the nation to come to the same conclusion. Yet the ABA resolution and its supporting report prove decidedly lean insofar as fully articulated constitutional arguments are concerned. The resolution, as is frequently the case with such documents, presents the ABA’s proposals unadorned by any legal argument, and the supporting report concentrates almost entirely on the anecdotal documentation of perceived problems, confining its explicit constitutional references to general assertions of the need for fairness and consistency under the Eighth Amendment and its
Sharon G. Portwood - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
-
The juvenile death penalty and the Eighth Amendment
Law and Human Behavior, 1995Co-Authors: Catherine A. Crosby, Preston A. Britner, Kathleen M. Jodl, Sharon G. PortwoodAbstract:The present study investigated the Eighth Amendment tests of societal consensus and proportionality as applied to juvenile death penalties. A sample of former jurors ( N =179) voted on whether to execute the defendant in a hypothetical case. Defendant's age (10, 15, 16, or 19) and level of remorse were varied. A large percentage of participants voted to execute the defendant in each condition, but the defendant's age and the participant's attitude toward juvenile culpability significantly predicted the likelihood of execution. Implications for the constitutionality of the juvenile death penalty and future research directions are discussed.
Meghan J. Ryan - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
-
Taking Dignity Seriously: Excavating the Backdrop of the Eighth Amendment
University of Illinois Law Review, 2016Co-Authors: Meghan J. RyanAbstract:The U.S. punishment system is in turmoil. We have a historically unprecedented number of offenders in prison, and our prisoners are serving longer sentences than in any other country. States are surreptitiously experimenting with formulas for lethal injection cocktails, and some prisoners are suffering from botched executions. Despite this tumult, the Eighth Amendment of our Constitution does place limits on the punishments that may be imposed and how they may be implemented. The difficulty, though, is that the Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence is a bit of a mess. The Court has been consistent in stating that a focus on offender dignity is at the core of the Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments, but there has been virtually no analysis of what this dignity requirement means. This Article takes the first foray into this unexplored landscape and finds that the Constitution demands that the individuality of offenders be considered in imposing and carrying out sentences. While this appears to be a simple concept, it raises significant concerns about several modern-day sentencing practices. Punishments rooted in pure utilitarianism, by neglecting the importance of the individual offender, run afoul of this dignity demand. This sheds doubt on the propriety of some judges’ assertions that defendants’ freestanding innocence claims cannot stand because policy considerations like finality are of paramount importance; an individual offender cannot be ignored purely for the sake of societal goals. For the same reason, the importance of individual dignity should lead us to question statutes supporting only utilitarian aims of punishment. While this raises questions about the constitutionality of pure deterrence, rehabilitation, and incapacitation, these purposes of punishment may be reconceptualized to account for the individual offender. For example, rehabilitation could be reformulated to consider not only the offender’s effects on society when he is returned to the community but also whether the offender’s character has been reformed. Finally, the importance of Eighth Amendment dignity raises questions about the constitutionality of mandatorily imposed punishments, which overlook the importance of individualization in sentencing. If we take seriously the dignity core of the Eighth Amendment, then many of these practices must be reconsidered.
-
The Missing Jury: The Neglected Role of Juries in Eighth Amendment Punishments Clause Determinations
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2011Co-Authors: Meghan J. RyanAbstract:A recent study of death penalty cases has revealed that judges, who are ordinarily thought of as the guardians of criminal defendants’ constitutional rights, are more likely to impose harsher punishments than jurors. This may be unsettling in its own right, but it is especially concerning because judges are the individuals charged with determining whether punishments are unconstitutionally cruel and unusual under the Eighth Amendment, and these determinations are supposed to be based on “the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.” The study suggests that judges are out of step with society’s moral norms, raising the question of why judges, rather than juries, are entrusted with resolving constitutional questions of cruel and unusual punishments. This Article argues that juries are better equipped to make these determinations and that charging juries to employ their own moral values to decide these matters is consistent with the underlying purpose and history of the ratification of the Eighth Amendment. This shift in power would also be in line with the Supreme Court’s recent elevation of the jury in criminal cases such as Apprendi v. New Jersey and United States v. Booker.
-
Does the Eighth Amendment Punishments Clause Prohibit Only Punishments that are Both Cruel and Unusual
Washington University Law Review, 2008Co-Authors: Meghan J. RyanAbstract:There is a great struggle in the United States between proponents of the death penalty and death penalty abolitionists who believe that the practice is cruel and even unconstitutional. Although the punishment of death is enshrined in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution, the Supreme Court seems to have followed its moral compass in chipping away at the death penalty because of the cruelty of the practice. The Court's struggle between the text of the Constitution and its moral inclinations in the death penalty context has resulted in an inconsistent and confusing Eighth Amendment Punishments Clause jurisprudence. While attempting to maintain neutrality on the topic and thus relying almost exclusively on assessing the unusualness of a practice through a purportedly objective assessment of state legislative action, the Court seems to have covertly injected into the equation its subjective views as to what punishments are unconstitutionally cruel. This tension between an objective measure of unusualness and a subjective assessment of cruelty has led the Court to make inconsistent statements about whether the Punishments Clause prohibits only punishments that are both cruel and unusual, or rather prohibits both cruel punishments and unusual punishments. This Article goes where no other has, identifying and exploring this important question. After tracing the history of the Eighth Amendment, analyzing the Court's early interpretations of the prohibition on 'cruel and unusual punishments,' and parsing the text of the Punishments Clause, the Article concludes that the Clause prohibits only punishments that are both cruel and unusual and that each of these components of the Clause should thus be independently assessed. While this interpretation may narrow the scope of the Amendment, it allows for further innovations in humane methods of punishment and revives the federalist foundation of this nation that the Court's current jurisprudence has stifled.
-
Does Stare Decisis Apply in the Eighth Amendment Death Penalty Context
North Carolina Law Review, 2007Co-Authors: Meghan J. RyanAbstract:Throughout the past few decades, the Supreme Court has steadily chipped away at the death penalty. It was only recently, however, that courts have confronted what role precedent plays in the Eighth Amendment death penalty context. Surprisingly, few scholars have yet explored this important and complicated issue. Precedent in this area is unique because the law of the Eighth Amendment is always changing and the Eighth Amendment has been interpreted to be applied more broadly in the death penalty context. This Article argues that precedent in the Eighth Amendment death penalty context does not apply in the typical fashion. Instead of applying Supreme Court outcomes as precedent in this context, lower courts should apply Supreme Court rationale. This is consistent with the language of Supreme Court opinions and will afford greater and speedier justice to death penalty defendants.