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Kathleen Bawn - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • the logic of institutional preferences german Electoral Law as a social choice outcome
    American Journal of Political Science, 1993
    Co-Authors: Kathleen Bawn
    Abstract:

    Institutions determine the results of social decision processes, yet institutions are themselves endogenous products of earlier social choices. This paper explores the hypothesis that participants in the choice of institutions seek alternatives that favor their desired policies. The choice of institutions can be analyzed in terms of bargaining between individuals or parties, where preferences derive from preferences over policy and bargaining is structured by existing institutions. This approach is used to study the choice of an Electoral system in Germany after World War II. The hypothesis that parties choose Electoral institutions to maximize their future policy influence explains both the adoption of proportional representation in 1949 and the switch to a two-vote ballot in 1953.

Valentino Larcinese - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • The real problem in Italian democracy is not the Electoral Law, but Silvio Berlusconi’s continued grip over the country’s media
    2014
    Co-Authors: Valentino Larcinese
    Abstract:

    Italy’s new prime minister Matteo Renzi has made Electoral reform one of his key priorities, with a new Electoral Law currently under consideration in the Italian Senate, having been passed in the lower house of the Italian parliament last week. Valentino Larcinese writes that while Renzi may succeed in his attempts at Electoral reform, the fact that he has relied on the support of Silvio Berlusconi carries its own cost. By offering Berlusconi a route back into frontline politics, Renzi has effectively contributed to the former Italian PM’s political rehabilitation following his expulsion from parliament. Moreover, the preoccupation with Electoral reform has obscured the fact that the foremost problem with Italian democracy still remains: Berlusconi’s grip over the country’s media.

  • the real problem in italian democracy is not the Electoral Law but silvio berlusconi s continued grip over the country s media
    2014
    Co-Authors: Valentino Larcinese
    Abstract:

    Italy’s new prime minister Matteo Renzi has made Electoral reform one of his key priorities, with a new Electoral Law currently under consideration in the Italian Senate, having been passed in the lower house of the Italian parliament last week. Valentino Larcinese writes that while Renzi may succeed in his attempts at Electoral reform, the fact that he has relied on the support of Silvio Berlusconi carries its own cost. By offering Berlusconi a route back into frontline politics, Renzi has effectively contributed to the former Italian PM’s political rehabilitation following his expulsion from parliament. Moreover, the preoccupation with Electoral reform has obscured the fact that the foremost problem with Italian democracy still remains: Berlusconi’s grip over the country’s media.

Jill Wittrock - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • presidentialism and the effect of Electoral Law in postcommunist systems regime type matters
    Comparative Political Studies, 2005
    Co-Authors: Terry D Clark, Jill Wittrock
    Abstract:

    Efforts to test Duverger’s Law in the new democracies of postcommunist Europe have had mixed results. Research argues that mixed systems have an effect on the number of effective parties that is distinct from that of single-mandate district and proportional representation systems. Less attention has been given to the effect of other institutions on the party system, particularly strong presidents. Analyzing election results in postcommunist Europe, the authors find support for Duverger’s Law after controlling for the strength of the executive. They argue that strong presidents substantially reduce the incentive for parties to seize control of the legislative agenda. Hence, the restraint that Electoral systems exercise on the proliferation of parties and independent candidates is weakened. The authors find that a further consequence of strong presidents is that the incentive for majority control of committees and the legislative agenda is weakened.

John Kalokerinos - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

Aj Brown - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.