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Olivier De Mouzon - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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the theoretical shapley shubik probability of an election inversion in a toy symmetric version of the u s presidential Electoral System
Social Choice and Welfare, 2020Co-Authors: Thibault Laurent, Michel Le Breton, Dominique Lepelley, Olivier De MouzonAbstract:Abstract In this article, we evaluate asymptotically the probability $$\phi \left( n\right) $$ϕn of an election inversion in a toy symmetric version of the US presidential Electoral System. The novelty of this paper, in contrast to all the existing theoretical literature, is to assume that votes are drawn from an IAC (Impartial Anonymous Culture)/Shapley–Shubik probability model. Through the use of numerical methods, it is conjectured, that $$\sqrt{n}$$n$$ \phi \left( n\right) $$ϕn converges to 0.1309 when n (the size of the electorate in one district) tends to infinity. It is also demonstrated that $$ \phi \left( n\right) =o\left( \sqrt{\frac{ln(n)^{3}}{n}}\right) $$ϕn=oln(n)3n and $$\phi \left( n\right) =\Omega \left( \frac{1}{\sqrt{n}}\right) $$ϕn=Ω1n. (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.) (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.) (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.) (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.) (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.) (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.) (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.) (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.) (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.) (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.) (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.) (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.) (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.) (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.) (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.) (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
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the theoretical shapley shubik probability of an election inversion in a toy symmetric version of the u s presidential Electoral System
Post-Print, 2020Co-Authors: Olivier De Mouzon, Thibault Laurent, Michel Le Breton, Dominique LepelleyAbstract:Abstract In this article, we evaluate asymptotically the probability $$\phi \left( n\right) $$ϕn of an election inversion in a toy symmetric version of the US presidential Electoral System. The novelty of this paper, in contrast to all the existing theoretical literature, is to assume that votes are drawn from an IAC (Impartial Anonymous Culture)/Shapley–Shubik probability model. Through the use of numerical methods, it is conjectured, that $$\sqrt{n}$$n$$ \phi \left( n\right) $$ϕn converges to 0.1309 when n (the size of the electorate in one district) tends to infinity. It is also demonstrated that $$ \phi \left( n\right) =o\left( \sqrt{\frac{ln(n)^{3}}{n}}\right) $$ϕn=oln(n)3n and $$\phi \left( n\right) =\Omega \left( \frac{1}{\sqrt{n}}\right) $$ϕn=Ω1n. (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
Thibault Laurent - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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the theoretical shapley shubik probability of an election inversion in a toy symmetric version of the u s presidential Electoral System
Social Choice and Welfare, 2020Co-Authors: Thibault Laurent, Michel Le Breton, Dominique Lepelley, Olivier De MouzonAbstract:Abstract In this article, we evaluate asymptotically the probability $$\phi \left( n\right) $$ϕn of an election inversion in a toy symmetric version of the US presidential Electoral System. The novelty of this paper, in contrast to all the existing theoretical literature, is to assume that votes are drawn from an IAC (Impartial Anonymous Culture)/Shapley–Shubik probability model. Through the use of numerical methods, it is conjectured, that $$\sqrt{n}$$n$$ \phi \left( n\right) $$ϕn converges to 0.1309 when n (the size of the electorate in one district) tends to infinity. It is also demonstrated that $$ \phi \left( n\right) =o\left( \sqrt{\frac{ln(n)^{3}}{n}}\right) $$ϕn=oln(n)3n and $$\phi \left( n\right) =\Omega \left( \frac{1}{\sqrt{n}}\right) $$ϕn=Ω1n. (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.) (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.) (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.) (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.) (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.) (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.) (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.) (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.) (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.) (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.) (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.) (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.) (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.) (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.) (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.) (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
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the theoretical shapley shubik probability of an election inversion in a toy symmetric version of the u s presidential Electoral System
Post-Print, 2020Co-Authors: Olivier De Mouzon, Thibault Laurent, Michel Le Breton, Dominique LepelleyAbstract:Abstract In this article, we evaluate asymptotically the probability $$\phi \left( n\right) $$ϕn of an election inversion in a toy symmetric version of the US presidential Electoral System. The novelty of this paper, in contrast to all the existing theoretical literature, is to assume that votes are drawn from an IAC (Impartial Anonymous Culture)/Shapley–Shubik probability model. Through the use of numerical methods, it is conjectured, that $$\sqrt{n}$$n$$ \phi \left( n\right) $$ϕn converges to 0.1309 when n (the size of the electorate in one district) tends to infinity. It is also demonstrated that $$ \phi \left( n\right) =o\left( \sqrt{\frac{ln(n)^{3}}{n}}\right) $$ϕn=oln(n)3n and $$\phi \left( n\right) =\Omega \left( \frac{1}{\sqrt{n}}\right) $$ϕn=Ω1n. (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
Dominique Lepelley - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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the theoretical shapley shubik probability of an election inversion in a toy symmetric version of the u s presidential Electoral System
Social Choice and Welfare, 2020Co-Authors: Thibault Laurent, Michel Le Breton, Dominique Lepelley, Olivier De MouzonAbstract:Abstract In this article, we evaluate asymptotically the probability $$\phi \left( n\right) $$ϕn of an election inversion in a toy symmetric version of the US presidential Electoral System. The novelty of this paper, in contrast to all the existing theoretical literature, is to assume that votes are drawn from an IAC (Impartial Anonymous Culture)/Shapley–Shubik probability model. Through the use of numerical methods, it is conjectured, that $$\sqrt{n}$$n$$ \phi \left( n\right) $$ϕn converges to 0.1309 when n (the size of the electorate in one district) tends to infinity. It is also demonstrated that $$ \phi \left( n\right) =o\left( \sqrt{\frac{ln(n)^{3}}{n}}\right) $$ϕn=oln(n)3n and $$\phi \left( n\right) =\Omega \left( \frac{1}{\sqrt{n}}\right) $$ϕn=Ω1n. (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.) (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.) (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.) (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.) (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.) (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.) (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.) (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.) (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.) (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.) (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.) (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.) (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.) (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.) (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.) (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
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the theoretical shapley shubik probability of an election inversion in a toy symmetric version of the u s presidential Electoral System
Post-Print, 2020Co-Authors: Olivier De Mouzon, Thibault Laurent, Michel Le Breton, Dominique LepelleyAbstract:Abstract In this article, we evaluate asymptotically the probability $$\phi \left( n\right) $$ϕn of an election inversion in a toy symmetric version of the US presidential Electoral System. The novelty of this paper, in contrast to all the existing theoretical literature, is to assume that votes are drawn from an IAC (Impartial Anonymous Culture)/Shapley–Shubik probability model. Through the use of numerical methods, it is conjectured, that $$\sqrt{n}$$n$$ \phi \left( n\right) $$ϕn converges to 0.1309 when n (the size of the electorate in one district) tends to infinity. It is also demonstrated that $$ \phi \left( n\right) =o\left( \sqrt{\frac{ln(n)^{3}}{n}}\right) $$ϕn=oln(n)3n and $$\phi \left( n\right) =\Omega \left( \frac{1}{\sqrt{n}}\right) $$ϕn=Ω1n. (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
Steven S. Smith - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Political Goals, Institutional Context, and the Choice of an Electoral System: The Russian Parliamentary Election Law
American Journal of Political Science, 1996Co-Authors: Thomas F. Remington, Steven S. SmithAbstract:Theory: Alternative strategic models of party preferences for Electoral institutions are identified. One model provides that legislators and parties define preferences for Electoral Systems over policy outcomes; an alternative provides that legislators and parties define preferences for Electoral Systems over Electoral outcomes. Hypotheses: Based on the results of the 1993 Russian parliamentary elections, members of the Russian State Duma are expected to have favored alternative proposals for the 1995 Electoral System according to their anticipated implications for policy outcomes. Methods: The effects of alternative Electoral laws are evaluated using the outcome of the 1993 elections. That evaluation yields predictions of party positions on the 1995 Electoral law, which are tested against data on the floor behavior of the party factions in the Russian parliament in 1994 and 1995 as the new election law was debated. Results: A policy-based model of party preferences is found to be inadequate. Electoral and other considerations, as well as uncertainty and institutional context, influence parties' choices of new Electoral institutions.
Michel Le Breton - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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the theoretical shapley shubik probability of an election inversion in a toy symmetric version of the u s presidential Electoral System
Social Choice and Welfare, 2020Co-Authors: Thibault Laurent, Michel Le Breton, Dominique Lepelley, Olivier De MouzonAbstract:Abstract In this article, we evaluate asymptotically the probability $$\phi \left( n\right) $$ϕn of an election inversion in a toy symmetric version of the US presidential Electoral System. The novelty of this paper, in contrast to all the existing theoretical literature, is to assume that votes are drawn from an IAC (Impartial Anonymous Culture)/Shapley–Shubik probability model. Through the use of numerical methods, it is conjectured, that $$\sqrt{n}$$n$$ \phi \left( n\right) $$ϕn converges to 0.1309 when n (the size of the electorate in one district) tends to infinity. It is also demonstrated that $$ \phi \left( n\right) =o\left( \sqrt{\frac{ln(n)^{3}}{n}}\right) $$ϕn=oln(n)3n and $$\phi \left( n\right) =\Omega \left( \frac{1}{\sqrt{n}}\right) $$ϕn=Ω1n. (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.) (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.) (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.) (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.) (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.) (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.) (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.) (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.) (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.) (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.) (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.) (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.) (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.) (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.) (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.) (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
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the theoretical shapley shubik probability of an election inversion in a toy symmetric version of the u s presidential Electoral System
Post-Print, 2020Co-Authors: Olivier De Mouzon, Thibault Laurent, Michel Le Breton, Dominique LepelleyAbstract:Abstract In this article, we evaluate asymptotically the probability $$\phi \left( n\right) $$ϕn of an election inversion in a toy symmetric version of the US presidential Electoral System. The novelty of this paper, in contrast to all the existing theoretical literature, is to assume that votes are drawn from an IAC (Impartial Anonymous Culture)/Shapley–Shubik probability model. Through the use of numerical methods, it is conjectured, that $$\sqrt{n}$$n$$ \phi \left( n\right) $$ϕn converges to 0.1309 when n (the size of the electorate in one district) tends to infinity. It is also demonstrated that $$ \phi \left( n\right) =o\left( \sqrt{\frac{ln(n)^{3}}{n}}\right) $$ϕn=oln(n)3n and $$\phi \left( n\right) =\Omega \left( \frac{1}{\sqrt{n}}\right) $$ϕn=Ω1n. (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)