Embezzlement

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Daniel Treisman - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Embezzlement versus bribery
    Social Science Research Network, 2010
    Co-Authors: Simon C Fan, Chen Lin, Daniel Treisman
    Abstract:

    NBER WORKING PAPER SERIESEmbezzlement VERSUS BRIBERYC. Simon FanChen LinDaniel TreismanWorking Paper 16542http://www.nber.org/papers/w16542NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH1050 Massachusetts AvenueCambridge, MA 02138November 2010We thank Robin Boadway, Kenneth Chan, Avinash Dixit, Rouzhu Ke, Dennis Yang, and seminarparticipants at Chinese University of Hong Kong, City University of Hong Kong, and the 2010 conferenceof the Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory for very helpful discussions and comments. Daniel Treisman gratefully acknowledges support from the UCLA College of Letters and Sciences.The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of theNational Bureau of Economic Research.NBER working papers are circulated for discussion and comment purposes. They have not been peer-reviewed or been subject to the review by the NBER Board of Directors that accompanies officialNBER publications.© 2010 by C. Simon Fan, Chen Lin, and Daniel Treisman. All rights reserved. Short sections of text,not to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit,including © notice, is given to the source.

  • Embezzlement versus bribery
    National Bureau of Economic Research, 2010
    Co-Authors: Simon C Fan, Chen Lin, Daniel Treisman
    Abstract:

    Corrupt officials can use their positions to enrich themselves in two ways. They can steal from the state budget--embezzling or misspending funds--or they can demand extra payments from citizens in return for services--bribery. In many circumstances, Embezzlement is less distortionary than bribery. We analyze the tradeoff for governments in deciding how strictly to monitor and punish these two kinds of bureaucratic misbehavior. When bribery is more costly to economic development, governments may tolerate some Embezzlement in order to reduce the extent of bribery--even though Embezzlement is generally easier to detect. Embezzlement serves as a parallel to the "efficiency wage." This logic appears to hold in China, where misappropriation of public funds by officials appears to be ubiquitous.

Nicole Leepe Piquero - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • exploring white collar crime and the american dream a partial test of institutional anomie theory
    Journal of Criminal Justice, 2006
    Co-Authors: Andrea Schoepfe, Nicole Leepe Piquero
    Abstract:

    Abstract Institutional anomie theory (IAT) suggests that high crime rates in America can be attributed to the commitment to the goal of material success. In this regard, particular emphasis is placed on the motivations derived from the profit goal of economic institutions that dominate the American culture. To date, IAT was only applied to property and violent crime. This study used Uniform Crime Report (UCR) and Census Bureau data to examine the applicability of IAT to a form of white-collar crime, Embezzlement, as defined by the UCR. Results provided mixed support for IAT. Limitations and future research directions are discussed.

Henry N Pontell - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • the savings and loan debacle financial crime and the state
    Review of Sociology, 1997
    Co-Authors: Kitty Calavita, Robert Tillman, Henry N Pontell
    Abstract:

    The savings and loan crisis of the 1980s was one of the worst financial disasters of the twentieth century. We argue here that much financial fraud of the sort that contributed to this debacle constitutes “collective Embezzlement,” and that this collective Embezzlement may be the prototypical corporate crime of the late twentieth century. We further argue that the state may have a different relationship to this kind of financial fraud than to manufacturing crime perpetrated on behalf of corporate profits. In the conclusion, we suggest that an understanding of the relationship between financial fraud and state interests may open up new regulatory space for the control of these costly crimes. Our data come from a wide variety of sources, including government documents, primary statistical data on prosecutions, and interviews with regulators.

  • other s people s money revisited collective Embezzlement in the savings and loan and insurance industries
    Social Problems, 1991
    Co-Authors: Kitty Calavtta, Henry N Pontell
    Abstract:

    This paper compares what is called here “collective Embezzlement” in the savings and loan and insurance industries, tracing this Embezzlement by top management in these two industries to structures of opportunity and risk that are specific to their location in finance capitalism. Using data from government reports, congressional hearings, and media accounts of particular cases, we argue that the deregulation of the 1980s combined with protective insurance and guaranty funds set the stage for this white-collar crime, but that its prevalence is more fundamentally related to a number of other structural factors. Specifically, the primary function of these industries as trustees of other people's money, within the context of a “casino” economy where profits are made from speculative investment, not production, simultaneously expands the opportunities for Embezzlement and other abuses of trust and sets in place structural contradictions that stymy policymakers and regulators and limit the risks of detection and prosecution. Future research should build on the rich literature on white-collar crime, which has traditionally focused on the production processes and market structures of industrial capitalism, to examine the implications of the shift in the late 20th century to an economy increasingly centered on the management and manipulation of money itself.

Olubukola Olugasa - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • is Embezzlement of government funds criminal or breach of trust the nigerian experience
    Social Science Research Network, 2013
    Co-Authors: Olubukola Olugasa
    Abstract:

    Law is generally classified into criminal and civil. This classification, according to Glanville Williams, is artificial. Whether that observation of the learned Professor of Law is sustainable or not is not the issue here. The concern is; which class of law should Embezzlement of public funds be? Should the suspect be prosecuted under criminal or civil law? The implications of either choice are quite different and not equally rewarding. If prosecuted under criminal law and procedure, the prosecution has the task of proving beyond reasonable doubt; the State pays all expenses incurred by the prosecution, takes care of the Defendant if he is in detention produces him in court and also has to get witnesses to court. Where the Defendant is found guilty and jailed, many times the stolen fund is not recovered or a significant part of it is unrealizable. If prosecuted under the law of trusts however, the result is different; the fund is traced and the defendant is made to regurgitate the embezzled sum and account for profit made therefrom. The technicalities of civil proceedings are less and the standard of proof is less stringent. This paper, through doctrinal approach compares the two sides of prosecution and suggests the most economical and more rewarding procedure.

Simon C Fan - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Embezzlement versus bribery
    Social Science Research Network, 2010
    Co-Authors: Simon C Fan, Chen Lin, Daniel Treisman
    Abstract:

    NBER WORKING PAPER SERIESEmbezzlement VERSUS BRIBERYC. Simon FanChen LinDaniel TreismanWorking Paper 16542http://www.nber.org/papers/w16542NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH1050 Massachusetts AvenueCambridge, MA 02138November 2010We thank Robin Boadway, Kenneth Chan, Avinash Dixit, Rouzhu Ke, Dennis Yang, and seminarparticipants at Chinese University of Hong Kong, City University of Hong Kong, and the 2010 conferenceof the Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory for very helpful discussions and comments. Daniel Treisman gratefully acknowledges support from the UCLA College of Letters and Sciences.The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of theNational Bureau of Economic Research.NBER working papers are circulated for discussion and comment purposes. They have not been peer-reviewed or been subject to the review by the NBER Board of Directors that accompanies officialNBER publications.© 2010 by C. Simon Fan, Chen Lin, and Daniel Treisman. All rights reserved. Short sections of text,not to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit,including © notice, is given to the source.

  • Embezzlement versus bribery
    National Bureau of Economic Research, 2010
    Co-Authors: Simon C Fan, Chen Lin, Daniel Treisman
    Abstract:

    Corrupt officials can use their positions to enrich themselves in two ways. They can steal from the state budget--embezzling or misspending funds--or they can demand extra payments from citizens in return for services--bribery. In many circumstances, Embezzlement is less distortionary than bribery. We analyze the tradeoff for governments in deciding how strictly to monitor and punish these two kinds of bureaucratic misbehavior. When bribery is more costly to economic development, governments may tolerate some Embezzlement in order to reduce the extent of bribery--even though Embezzlement is generally easier to detect. Embezzlement serves as a parallel to the "efficiency wage." This logic appears to hold in China, where misappropriation of public funds by officials appears to be ubiquitous.