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Daryl J Levinson - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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law for states international law constitutional law public law
Harvard Law Review, 2009Co-Authors: Jack L Goldsmith, Daryl J LevinsonAbstract:TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION 1792 II. THE PROBLEM OF UNCERTAINTY 1801 A. International Law 1803 B. Constitutional Law 1808 C. Public Law 1817 III. THE PROBLEM OF Enforcement 1822 A. International Law 1824 B. Constitutional Law 1830 C. Public Law 1840 IV. THE PROBLEM OF SOVEREIGNTY 1843 A. International Law 1845 B. Constitutional Law 1852 C. Public Law 1858 V. CONCLUSION 1862 I. INTRODUCTION The divide between international and domestic law runs deep in Anglo-American legal thought. Domestic law is taken to be the paradigm of how a legal system should work. Legal rules are promulgated and updated by a legislature or by common law courts subject to legislative revision. Courts authoritatively resolve ambiguities and uncertainties about the application of law in particular cases. The individuals to whom laws are addressed have an obligation to obey legitimate lawmaking authorities, even when legal rules stand in the way of their interests or are imposed without their consent. And in cases of disobedience, an executive Enforcement Authority, possessing a monopoly over the use of legitimate force, stands ready to coerce compliance. Measured against the benchmark of domestic law, international law seems different and deficient along each of these dimensions. International law has no centralized legislature or hierarchical court system authorized to create, revise, or specify the application of legal norms, and as a result is said to suffer from irremediable uncertainty and political contestation. Out of deference to state sovereignty, international law is a "voluntary" system that obligates only states that have consented to be bound, and thus generally lacks the power to impose obligations on states against their interests. As a result, the content of international law often reflects the interests of powerful states. And to the extent that international law diverges from those interests, powerful states often interpret it away or ignore it. They are able to do so because the international legal system lacks a super-state Enforcement Authority capable of coercing recalcitrant states to comply. These characteristics of the international legal system have led realists and other skeptics to conclude that, in both form and function, international law is a qualitatively different and lesser species of law--if it qualifies as law at all. Constitutional law, in contrast, has been subject to few such doubts. Conceived as the overarching framework for, and thus inseparable from, the statutes, regulations, and common law rules that comprise the familiar domestic legal system, constitutional law sits securely opposite international law on the domestic side of the divide. Unlike the decentralized and institutionally incomplete international legal system, moreover, constitutional law in the United States and other countries appears closer in form to ordinary, paradigmatically "real" domestic law because it typically features a proto-legislative enactment and amendment process, as well as an authoritative judiciary to resolve ambiguities about meaning and to enforce obligations against government officials. In contrast to the dubious efficacy of international law, constitutional law is generally assumed to serve as an important and effective constraint on government behavior, a meaningful check on the interests of the powerful. The perceived differences between international and constitutional law have taken on a normative cast as well. For centuries, theorists have worried about how to reconcile the legal constraints of international law with the idea, or ideal, of state sovereignty. Sovereignty is supposed to mean that states cannot be subject to any higher Authority; international law and the institutions it creates seem to represent just such authorities. …
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law for states international law constitutional law public law
2009Co-Authors: Jack L Goldsmith, Daryl J LevinsonAbstract:The divide between international and domestic law runs deep in Anglo-American legal thought. Domestic law is taken to be the paradigm of how a legal system should work. International law, by comparison, seems different and degraded. The international legal system has no centralized legislature or hierarchical court system authorized to create, revise, or specify the application of legal norms, and as a result is said to suffer from irremediable uncertainty and political contestation. Out of deference to state sovereignty, international law is a "voluntary" system that obligates only states that have consented to be bound, and thus generally lacks the power to impose obligations on states against their interests. Consequently, the content of international law often reflects the interests of powerful states. And to the extent international law diverges from those interests, powerful states often interpret away or ignore it. They are able to do so because the international legal system lacks a super-state Enforcement Authority capable of coercing recalcitrant states to comply. These characteristics of the international legal system have led realists and other skeptics to conclude that, in both form and function, international law is a qualitatively different and lesser species of law - if it qualifies as law at all. Constitutional law, in contrast, has been subject to few such doubts. But perhaps it should be. This Article argues that constitutional law in fact shares all of the features that are supposed to make international law so distinctively dubious. In mapping out these commonalities, the Article suggests that the traditional divide between domestic and international law obscures what is, for many purposes, a more important and generative conceptual divide between law for states and law by states. The ways in which both international and constitutional law differ from ordinary domestic law follow from the distinctive aspiration of legal regimes for states - or "public law" - to constitute and constrain the behavior of states and the distinctive difficulty these regimes face of not being able to rely fully on the institutions of their subject states for implementation and Enforcement.
Jack L Goldsmith - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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law for states international law constitutional law public law
Harvard Law Review, 2009Co-Authors: Jack L Goldsmith, Daryl J LevinsonAbstract:TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION 1792 II. THE PROBLEM OF UNCERTAINTY 1801 A. International Law 1803 B. Constitutional Law 1808 C. Public Law 1817 III. THE PROBLEM OF Enforcement 1822 A. International Law 1824 B. Constitutional Law 1830 C. Public Law 1840 IV. THE PROBLEM OF SOVEREIGNTY 1843 A. International Law 1845 B. Constitutional Law 1852 C. Public Law 1858 V. CONCLUSION 1862 I. INTRODUCTION The divide between international and domestic law runs deep in Anglo-American legal thought. Domestic law is taken to be the paradigm of how a legal system should work. Legal rules are promulgated and updated by a legislature or by common law courts subject to legislative revision. Courts authoritatively resolve ambiguities and uncertainties about the application of law in particular cases. The individuals to whom laws are addressed have an obligation to obey legitimate lawmaking authorities, even when legal rules stand in the way of their interests or are imposed without their consent. And in cases of disobedience, an executive Enforcement Authority, possessing a monopoly over the use of legitimate force, stands ready to coerce compliance. Measured against the benchmark of domestic law, international law seems different and deficient along each of these dimensions. International law has no centralized legislature or hierarchical court system authorized to create, revise, or specify the application of legal norms, and as a result is said to suffer from irremediable uncertainty and political contestation. Out of deference to state sovereignty, international law is a "voluntary" system that obligates only states that have consented to be bound, and thus generally lacks the power to impose obligations on states against their interests. As a result, the content of international law often reflects the interests of powerful states. And to the extent that international law diverges from those interests, powerful states often interpret it away or ignore it. They are able to do so because the international legal system lacks a super-state Enforcement Authority capable of coercing recalcitrant states to comply. These characteristics of the international legal system have led realists and other skeptics to conclude that, in both form and function, international law is a qualitatively different and lesser species of law--if it qualifies as law at all. Constitutional law, in contrast, has been subject to few such doubts. Conceived as the overarching framework for, and thus inseparable from, the statutes, regulations, and common law rules that comprise the familiar domestic legal system, constitutional law sits securely opposite international law on the domestic side of the divide. Unlike the decentralized and institutionally incomplete international legal system, moreover, constitutional law in the United States and other countries appears closer in form to ordinary, paradigmatically "real" domestic law because it typically features a proto-legislative enactment and amendment process, as well as an authoritative judiciary to resolve ambiguities about meaning and to enforce obligations against government officials. In contrast to the dubious efficacy of international law, constitutional law is generally assumed to serve as an important and effective constraint on government behavior, a meaningful check on the interests of the powerful. The perceived differences between international and constitutional law have taken on a normative cast as well. For centuries, theorists have worried about how to reconcile the legal constraints of international law with the idea, or ideal, of state sovereignty. Sovereignty is supposed to mean that states cannot be subject to any higher Authority; international law and the institutions it creates seem to represent just such authorities. …
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law for states international law constitutional law public law
2009Co-Authors: Jack L Goldsmith, Daryl J LevinsonAbstract:The divide between international and domestic law runs deep in Anglo-American legal thought. Domestic law is taken to be the paradigm of how a legal system should work. International law, by comparison, seems different and degraded. The international legal system has no centralized legislature or hierarchical court system authorized to create, revise, or specify the application of legal norms, and as a result is said to suffer from irremediable uncertainty and political contestation. Out of deference to state sovereignty, international law is a "voluntary" system that obligates only states that have consented to be bound, and thus generally lacks the power to impose obligations on states against their interests. Consequently, the content of international law often reflects the interests of powerful states. And to the extent international law diverges from those interests, powerful states often interpret away or ignore it. They are able to do so because the international legal system lacks a super-state Enforcement Authority capable of coercing recalcitrant states to comply. These characteristics of the international legal system have led realists and other skeptics to conclude that, in both form and function, international law is a qualitatively different and lesser species of law - if it qualifies as law at all. Constitutional law, in contrast, has been subject to few such doubts. But perhaps it should be. This Article argues that constitutional law in fact shares all of the features that are supposed to make international law so distinctively dubious. In mapping out these commonalities, the Article suggests that the traditional divide between domestic and international law obscures what is, for many purposes, a more important and generative conceptual divide between law for states and law by states. The ways in which both international and constitutional law differ from ordinary domestic law follow from the distinctive aspiration of legal regimes for states - or "public law" - to constitute and constrain the behavior of states and the distinctive difficulty these regimes face of not being able to rely fully on the institutions of their subject states for implementation and Enforcement.
Hannah Gill - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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interior immigration Enforcement the impacts of expanding local law Enforcement Authority
Urban Studies, 2016Co-Authors: Mai Thi Nguyen, Hannah GillAbstract:A growing emphasis on interior immigration Enforcement in the US has broadened the legal Authority of state and local law enforcers to investigate and enforce immigration violations, thereby expanding the federal government’s interior Enforcement capabilities. This study investigates how local immigration Enforcement programs, such as 287g, alter the operational priorities of local law enforcers and impact communities in two jurisdictions in North Carolina. Our findings show that despite different jurisdictional implementation styles and contexts, the 287g Program led to increasing fear and distrust of law Enforcement among immigrants and affected police–community relationships in ways that compromise public safety and security. The unintended negative community consequences found in our study suggest that the federal government should be more cautious about authorising state and local jurisdictions to carry out immigration Enforcement.
Mai Thi Nguyen - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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interior immigration Enforcement the impacts of expanding local law Enforcement Authority
Urban Studies, 2016Co-Authors: Mai Thi Nguyen, Hannah GillAbstract:A growing emphasis on interior immigration Enforcement in the US has broadened the legal Authority of state and local law enforcers to investigate and enforce immigration violations, thereby expanding the federal government’s interior Enforcement capabilities. This study investigates how local immigration Enforcement programs, such as 287g, alter the operational priorities of local law enforcers and impact communities in two jurisdictions in North Carolina. Our findings show that despite different jurisdictional implementation styles and contexts, the 287g Program led to increasing fear and distrust of law Enforcement among immigrants and affected police–community relationships in ways that compromise public safety and security. The unintended negative community consequences found in our study suggest that the federal government should be more cautious about authorising state and local jurisdictions to carry out immigration Enforcement.
Steven Shavell - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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optimal law Enforcement with self reporting of behavior
Journal of Political Economy, 1994Co-Authors: Louis Kaplow, Steven ShavellAbstract:Self-reporting--the reporting by parties of their own behavior to an Enforcement Authority--is a commonly observed aspect of law Enforcement, such as in the context of environmental and safety regulation. We add self-reporting to the model of the control of harmful externalities through probabilistic law Enforcement, and we characterize the optimal scheme. Self-reporting offers two advantages over schemes without self-reporting: Enforcement resources are saved because individuals who report their harmful acts need not be detected, and risk is reduced because individuals who report their behavior bear certain rather than uncertain sanctions.