The Experts below are selected from a list of 93 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform

Hui Huang - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

Mohamed Tahar Rajhi - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • auditor choice and institutional investor characteristics after the Enron Scandal in the french context
    International Journal of Economics and Accounting, 2011
    Co-Authors: Jamel Azibi, Hubert Tondeur, Mohamed Tahar Rajhi
    Abstract:

    This study examines the association between the quality of audit and the characteristics of institutional investors, using French data. After the Enron Scandal, the perception of the Big 4 by French institutional investors changed. Our first hypothesis focuses on the relation between French institutional investors and the choice of Big 4 auditors. Our second hypothesis deals with the perception of the foreign institutional investors to choose one of the Big 4 auditors due to the lack of investor protection in France and the failure of Enron. We tested our hypotheses on a sample of 144 companies listed on SBF 250, obtained from Worldscope data between 2000 and 2007. Empirical results show a negative and statistically significant link between the choices of one of Big 4 auditor by French institutional investors after the Enron Scandal, whereas there is a positive and statistically insignificant link between the foreign institutional investor and the Big 4 appointment after 2002.

  • Auditor choice and institutional investor characteristics after the Enron Scandal in the French context
    2010
    Co-Authors: Jamel Azibi, Hubert Tondeur, Mohamed Tahar Rajhi
    Abstract:

    This study examines the association between the quality of audit and the characteristics of institutional investors, using French data. After the Enron Scandal, the perception of the Big 4 by French institutional investors changed. Our first hypothesis focuses on the perception French institutional investors to appointment of the Big 4. Our second hypothesis deals with the perception of the foreign institutional investors to choose one of the Big 4 auditors due to the lack of investor protection in France and the failure of Enron. We tested our hypotheses on a sample of 144 companies listed on SBF 250, using Worldscope data over the period 2000-2007. Empirical results show a negative and statistically significant link between the choices of one of Big 4 auditor by French institutional investors after the Enron Scandal, whereas there is a positive and statistically insignificant link between the foreign institutional investor and the Big 4 appointment after 2002.

  • auditor choice and intitutionnel investor characteristics after the Enron Scandal in the french context
    Research Papers in Economics, 2010
    Co-Authors: Jamel Azibi, Hubert Tondeur, Mohamed Tahar Rajhi
    Abstract:

    This study examines the association between the quality of audit and the characteristics of institutional investors, using French data. After the Enron Scandal, the perception of the Big 4 by French institutional investors changed. Our first hypothesis focuses on the perception French institutional investors to appointment of the Big 4. Our second hypothesis deals with the perception of the foreign institutional investors to choose one of the Big 4 auditors due to the lack of investor protection in France and the failure of Enron. We tested our hypotheses on a sample of 144 companies listed on SBF 250, using Worldscope data over the period 2000-2007. Empirical results show a negative and statistically significant link between the choices of one of Big 4 auditor by French institutional investors after the Enron Scandal, whereas there is a positive and statistically insignificant link between the foreign institutional investor and the Big 4 appointment after 2002.

Ruman Rabeet - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • the Enron Scandal and moral hazard
    Social Science Research Network, 2012
    Co-Authors: Muhamad Shoaib, Ruman Rabeet
    Abstract:

    Enron was the 7th largest U.S. Company in 2001, filed for bankruptcy in December 2001. And in a one day Enron investors and retirees were left with worthless stock. Enron was charged with securities fraud (fraudulent manipulation of publicly reported financial results, lying to SEC). Company officials used secret investments and tricky math to make Enron appear stronger than it was. This made the stock price go up and up and up. The insiders, who knew the real picture, sold their stock when the price was high and made millions of dollars And the day come when company fell down.

Tony Hines - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • perceptions of factors affecting audit quality in the post sox uk regulatory environment
    Accounting and Business Research, 2013
    Co-Authors: Vivien Beattie, Stella Fearnley, Tony Hines
    Abstract:

    Global repercussions of the Enron Scandal and particularly the enactment of the Sarbanes--Oxley Act (SOX) in the USA, resulted in significant changes in the UK regulatory regime for audit and corporate governance, including an increased role for audit committees and independent inspection of audit firms. UK-listed company chief financial officers, audit committee chairs (ACCs) and audit partners were surveyed in 2007 to obtain views on the impact of 36 economic and regulatory factors on audit quality post-SOX. Four hundred and ninety-eight usable responses were received, representing a response rate of 36%. All groups rated various audit committee interactions with auditors among the factors most enhancing audit quality. However, International Standards on Auditing (ISAs) and the audit inspection regime, aspects of the ‘standards-surveillance-compliance’ regulatory system, are viewed as less effective. Exploratory factor analysis reduces the 36 factors to nine independent dimensions: economic risk; audit committee activities; risk of regulatory action; audit firm ethics; economic independence of auditor; audit partner rotation; risk of client loss; audit firm size and, lastly, ISAs and audit inspection. Post-SOX regulations have introduced additional dimensions to the factors influencing audit quality. Respondents commented that aspects of the changed regime are largely process and compliance driven, with high costs for limited benefits, a finding consistent with regulatory over-reaction.

  • factors affecting audit quality in the 2007 uk regulatory environment perceptions of chief financial officers audit committee chairs and audit engagement partners
    2010
    Co-Authors: Vivien Beattie, Stella Fearnley, Tony Hines
    Abstract:

    In line with global changes, the UK regulatory regime for audit and corporate governance has changed significantly since the Enron Scandal, with an increased role for audit committees and independent inspection of audit firms. UK listed company chief financial officers (CFOs), audit committee chairs (ACCs) and audit partners (APs) were surveyed in 2007 to obtain views on the impact of 36 economic and regulatory factors on audit quality. 498 usable responses were received, representing a response rate of 36%. All groups rated various audit committee interactions with auditors among the factors most enhancing audit quality. Exploratory factor analysis reduces the 36 factors to nine uncorrelated dimensions. In order of extraction, these are: economic risk; audit committee activities; risk of regulatory action; audit firm ethics; economic independence of auditor; audit partner rotation; risk of client loss; audit firm size; and, lastly, International Standards on Auditing (ISAs) and audit inspection. In addition to the activities of the audit committee, risk factors for the auditor (both economic and certain regulatory risks) are believed to most enhance audit quality. However, ISAs and the audit inspection regime, aspects of the ‘standards-surveillance compliance’ regulatory system, are viewed as less effective. Respondents commented that aspects of the changed regime are largely process and compliance driven, with high costs for limited benefits, supporting psychological bias regulation theory that claims there is overconfidence that a useful regulatory intervention exists.

  • The impact of changes to the non audit services regime on finance directors, audit committee chairs and audit partners of UK listed companies
    2009
    Co-Authors: Vivien Beattie, Stella Fearnley, Tony Hines
    Abstract:

    The banking crisis in the UK has resulted in the re-examination of many aspects of the regulation and reporting associated with the UK banking and financial services sector, including the role of auditors. In 2009 the House of Commons Treasury Committee reported that the Committee had received very little evidence that ‘auditors failed to fulfil their duties as currently stipulated’ (House of Commons Treasury Committee, 2009, p. 77). The Committee, however, reviewed the UK’s auditor independence regime, which was significantly strengthened after the Enron Scandal and the collapse of the audit firm Andersen in 2002. The changed regime introduced widespread restrictions but not a total ban on the provision of non-audit services (NAS). The Treasury Committee expressed the belief that ‘investor confidence and trust in audit would be enhanced by a prohibition on audit firms conducting non-audit work for the same company’ and recommended that the Financial Reporting Council (FRC) should consult on this proposal at the earliest opportunity (House of Commons Treasury Committee, 2009, p. 84). Although the Committee was focussed on the banking crisis, the proposal to prohibit all NAS could apply to all companies and auditors, not just to the banking sector. The Auditing Practices Board (APB), which is part of the FRC, issued a consultation in October 2009, which focuses primarily on NAS for listed companies (APB, 2009 p3). This briefing focuses on the impact of the post Enron regulatory changes to the NAS regime on companies and auditors, principally by reporting relevant findings from a wide ranging experiential questionnaire study which we carried out in 2007. The questionnaire sought views and experiences from finance directors (FDs), audit committee chairs (ACCs) and audit engagement partners (APs) of UK listed companies on recent regulatory changes including restrictions on NAS provision. This briefing provides direct evidence of how the changes to the NAS regime affected key parties actually engaged with the financial reporting and audit process before the economic downturn. There has been no significant change to this regime since 2007 and therefore these results are relevant to the current environment. We first summarise the key changes to the NAS regime introduced from 2002 onwards and briefly review findings in relevant academic studies. We then provide evidence of changes to NAS fee levels since 2002 and then we report relevant findings of the 2007 experiential survey. Our conclusions on the evidence follow.

Jamel Azibi - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • auditor choice and institutional investor characteristics after the Enron Scandal in the french context
    International Journal of Economics and Accounting, 2011
    Co-Authors: Jamel Azibi, Hubert Tondeur, Mohamed Tahar Rajhi
    Abstract:

    This study examines the association between the quality of audit and the characteristics of institutional investors, using French data. After the Enron Scandal, the perception of the Big 4 by French institutional investors changed. Our first hypothesis focuses on the relation between French institutional investors and the choice of Big 4 auditors. Our second hypothesis deals with the perception of the foreign institutional investors to choose one of the Big 4 auditors due to the lack of investor protection in France and the failure of Enron. We tested our hypotheses on a sample of 144 companies listed on SBF 250, obtained from Worldscope data between 2000 and 2007. Empirical results show a negative and statistically significant link between the choices of one of Big 4 auditor by French institutional investors after the Enron Scandal, whereas there is a positive and statistically insignificant link between the foreign institutional investor and the Big 4 appointment after 2002.

  • Auditor choice and institutional investor characteristics after the Enron Scandal in the French context
    2010
    Co-Authors: Jamel Azibi, Hubert Tondeur, Mohamed Tahar Rajhi
    Abstract:

    This study examines the association between the quality of audit and the characteristics of institutional investors, using French data. After the Enron Scandal, the perception of the Big 4 by French institutional investors changed. Our first hypothesis focuses on the perception French institutional investors to appointment of the Big 4. Our second hypothesis deals with the perception of the foreign institutional investors to choose one of the Big 4 auditors due to the lack of investor protection in France and the failure of Enron. We tested our hypotheses on a sample of 144 companies listed on SBF 250, using Worldscope data over the period 2000-2007. Empirical results show a negative and statistically significant link between the choices of one of Big 4 auditor by French institutional investors after the Enron Scandal, whereas there is a positive and statistically insignificant link between the foreign institutional investor and the Big 4 appointment after 2002.

  • auditor choice and intitutionnel investor characteristics after the Enron Scandal in the french context
    Research Papers in Economics, 2010
    Co-Authors: Jamel Azibi, Hubert Tondeur, Mohamed Tahar Rajhi
    Abstract:

    This study examines the association between the quality of audit and the characteristics of institutional investors, using French data. After the Enron Scandal, the perception of the Big 4 by French institutional investors changed. Our first hypothesis focuses on the perception French institutional investors to appointment of the Big 4. Our second hypothesis deals with the perception of the foreign institutional investors to choose one of the Big 4 auditors due to the lack of investor protection in France and the failure of Enron. We tested our hypotheses on a sample of 144 companies listed on SBF 250, using Worldscope data over the period 2000-2007. Empirical results show a negative and statistically significant link between the choices of one of Big 4 auditor by French institutional investors after the Enron Scandal, whereas there is a positive and statistically insignificant link between the foreign institutional investor and the Big 4 appointment after 2002.