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David J. Stump - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Pierre Duhem’s virtue epistemology
    Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A, 2007
    Co-Authors: David J. Stump
    Abstract:

    Abstract Duhem’s concept of ‘good sense’ is central to his philosophy of science, given that it is what allows scientists to decide between competing theories. Scientists must use good sense and have intellectual and moral virtues in order to be neutral arbiters of scientific theories, especially when choosing between empirically adequate theories. I discuss the parallels in Duhem’s views to those of virtue Epistemologists, who understand justified belief as that arrived at by a cognitive agent with intellectual and moral virtues, showing how consideration of Duhem as a virtue Epistemologist offers insights into his views, as well as providing possible answers to some puzzles about virtue epistemology. The extent to which Duhem holds that the intellectual and moral virtues of the scientist determine scientific knowledge has not been generally noticed.

Rodrigo Borges - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Bad Luck for the Anti‐Luck Epistemologist
    The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 2016
    Co-Authors: Rodrigo Borges
    Abstract:

    Anti-luck Epistemologists tell us that knowledge is incompatible with epistemic luck and that epistemic luck is just a special case of luck in general. Much work has been done on the intricacies of the first claim. In this paper, I scrutinize the second claim. I argue that it does not survive scrutiny. I then offer an analysis of luck that explains the relevant data and avoids the problems from which the current views of luck suffer. However, this analysis of luck is of no help to the anti-luck Epistemologist for it uses knowledge to explain luck, making this account of knowledge circular. The main lesson is that the only viable analysis of luck is not suited for the anti-luck Epistemologist's coveted noncircular analysis of knowledge.

  • bad luck for the anti luck Epistemologist
    Southern Journal of Philosophy, 2016
    Co-Authors: Rodrigo Borges
    Abstract:

    Anti-luck Epistemologists tell us that knowledge is incompatible with epistemic luck and that epistemic luck is just a special case of luck in general. Much work has been done on the intricacies of the first claim. In this paper, I scrutinize the second claim. I argue that it does not survive scrutiny. I then offer an analysis of luck that explains the relevant data and avoids the problems from which the current views of luck suffer. However, this analysis of luck is of no help to the anti-luck Epistemologist for it uses knowledge to explain luck, making this account of knowledge circular. The main lesson is that the only viable analysis of luck is not suited for the anti-luck Epistemologist's coveted noncircular analysis of knowledge.

Ian James Kidd - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Pierre Duhem’s epistemic aims and the intellectual virtue of humility: a reply to Ivanova
    Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A, 2011
    Co-Authors: Ian James Kidd
    Abstract:

    Abstract David Stump (2007) has recently argued that Pierre Duhem can be interpreted as a virtue Epistemologist. Stump’s claims have been challenged by Milena Ivanova (2010) on the grounds that Duhem’s ‘epistemic aims’ are more modest than those of virtue Epistemologists. I challenge Ivanova’s criticism of Stump by arguing that she not distinguish between ‘reliabilist’ and ‘responsibilist’ virtue epistemologies. Once this distinction is drawn, Duhem clearly emerges as a ‘virtue-responsibilist’ in a way that complements Ivanova’s positive proposal that Duhem’s ‘good sense’ reflects a conception of the ‘ideal scientist’. I support my proposal that Duhem is a ‘virtue-responsibilist’ by arguing that his rejection of the possibility of our producing a ‘perfect theory’ reflects the key responsibilist virtue of ‘intellectual humility’.

Preston Greene - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • When Is a Belief True Because of Luck
    The Philosophical Quarterly, 2013
    Co-Authors: Preston Greene
    Abstract:

    Many Epistemologists are attracted to the claim that knowledge possession excludes luck. Virtue Epistemologists attempt to clarify this idea by holding that knowledge requires apt belief: belief that is true because of an agent's epistemic virtues, and not because of luck. Thinking about aptness may have the potential to make progress on important questions in epistemology, but first we must possess an adequate account of when a belief is true because of luck. Existing treatments of aptness assume a simple and natural view of luck attribution, according to which the success of a performance is attributable to luck if one of the principal causes of the success is a lucky event. I show that this view is false, and should be replaced. This has major implications for virtue-theoretic accounts of knowledge, as well as the role of luck in epistemology more generally.

Aron Edidin - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • What's an Epistemologist to Do?
    American Philosophical Quarterly, 1994
    Co-Authors: Aron Edidin
    Abstract:

    L'A. defend la legitimite de l'epistemologie analytique contre l'affirmation d'une pretendue mort de l'epistemologie qui repondrait aux desillusions de la tradition cartesienne face aux categories cognitives et au projet analytique

  • what s an Epistemologist to do
    American Philosophical Quarterly, 1994
    Co-Authors: Aron Edidin
    Abstract:

    L'A. defend la legitimite de l'epistemologie analytique contre l'affirmation d'une pretendue mort de l'epistemologie qui repondrait aux desillusions de la tradition cartesienne face aux categories cognitives et au projet analytique