The Experts below are selected from a list of 8601 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Larry Stewart - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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review of Harris, Industrial Espionage and Technology Transfer. Britain and France in the Eighteenth Century
Canadian Journal of History, 2000Co-Authors: Larry StewartAbstract:Macleod reviews "Industrial Espionage and Technology Transfer: Britain and France in the Eighteenth Century" by John Harris.
Edwin Fraumann - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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economic Espionage security missions redefined
Public Administration Review, 1997Co-Authors: Edwin FraumannAbstract:Introduction Throughout history, Espionage has generally been viewed as an activity conducted by spies to obtain the military secrets of an enemy. Some of the most successful and well-known examples of Espionage include England's use of spies to uncover the military information that helped to defeat the Spanish Armada in 1588; the use of spies by the Allies during World War 11 to defeat the Axis powers; and the Soviet Union's use of spies to steal atomic bomb secrets from their former allies, the United States and Britain. In the post Cold War era, however, increasing international economic competition has redefined the context for Espionage as nations link their national security to their economic security. Spying conducted by intelligence services is expanding from its primary focus on military secrets to collecting economic secrets, i.e., to conducting economic Espionage. The United States is particularly vulnerable to the changing focus of international Espionage agencies since so many American corporations and research centers rely heavily on communications systems, computer networks, and electronic equipment to process and to store information. Over 50 countries have covertly tried to obtain advanced technologies from United States industries (U.S. Senate, 1996a). In 1995, the annual cost of economic Espionage to corporate America was conservatively estimated to be at least $50 billion. If intellectual property theft and unrestricted technology transfer are included, the estimate rises up to $240 billion (Perry, 1995, 3). A wide range of federal statutes provide the authority for activities that counter economic Espionage. These activities are undertaken by at least nine federal agencies, including the FBI, which has the dominant role. However, given the extent of the problem, it was obvious that existing initiatives had not been effective in preventing the theft of economic secrets. In recognition of the growing threat of economic Espionage and the inability of existing legislation to deal with it, the Economic Espionage Act of 1996 (18 U.S.C. secs. 1831-1839) was signed into law on October 11, 1996, creating a new federal crime -- the theft of trade secrets. The Department of justice now has sweeping authority to prosecute the theft of trade secrets in the United States. The act, intended to crack down on economic Espionage by foreign and domestic competitors, makes it illegal to steal a competitor's "proprietary" economic information and imposes stiff new penalties for these thefts. Section 1831 of the act addresses economic Espionage provisions and agents of foreign powers. Section 1832 of the act makes it a federal crime for any person to convert a trade secret to his own benefit or the benefit of others knowing that the offense will injure the owner of the trade secret. Although the problem of economic Espionage had become extensive and was the subject of debate in Congress, few people outside of those fighting it and those affected by it were aware of its scope and impact. This article attempts to close this information gap by providing a working definition of economic Espionage and trade secrets, describing the methods that are used to obtain trade secrets from American corporations and research centers, and summarizing the technological capabilities of selected countries to conduct economic Espionage against the United States. The article also addresses public-sector initiatives in the United States to protect its economic interests. Economic Espionage: What Are We Talking About? According to the FBI, "economic Espionage means foreign-power sponsored or coordinated intelligence activity directed at the U.S. Government or U.S. corporations, establishments, or persons for the purpose of unlawfully obtaining proprietary economic information" (FBI, 1995, 2). In Section 1839 of the Economic Espionage Act of 1996 "trade secret" is defined to mean all forms and types of financial, business, scientific, technical, economic, or engineering information, including patterns, plans, compilations, program devices, formulas, designs, prototypes, methods, techniques, processes, procedures, programs or codes, whether tangible or intangible, and whether or how stored, compiled, or memorialized physically, electronically, graphically, photographically, or in writing. …
Fragkiskos – Emmanouil Kioupakis - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Protection Against Industrial Espionage
Industrial Espionage and Technical Surveillance Counter Measurers, 2016Co-Authors: Iosif Androulidakis, Fragkiskos – Emmanouil KioupakisAbstract:In the last chapter of the book, we will be discussing the aspect of protection against industrial Espionage and counter-Espionage methods both on the technical and the nontechnical level. At the same time, we will be examining the protection options that patents and trade secret safeguarding can offer. The book concludes with presenting the methodology for detecting interceptions along with guidelines for selecting the appropriate contractors for that process.
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Industrial Espionage and Technical Surveillance Counter Measurers - Industrial Espionage and Technical Surveillance Counter Measurers
2016Co-Authors: Iosif Androulidakis, Fragkiskos – Emmanouil KioupakisAbstract:This book examines technical aspects of industrial Espionage and its impact in modern companies, organizations, and individuals while emphasizing the importance of intellectual property in the information era. The authors discuss the problem itself and then provide statistics and real world cases. The main contribution provides a detailed discussion of the actual equipment, tools and techniques concerning technical surveillance in the framework of Espionage. Moreover, they present the best practices and methods of detection (technical surveillance counter measures) as well as means of intellectual property protection.
Erik Meyersson - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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industrial Espionage and productivity
The American Economic Review, 2020Co-Authors: Albrecht Glitz, Erik MeyerssonAbstract:In this paper, we investigate the economic returns to industrial Espionage by linking information from East Germany's foreign intelligence service to sector-specific gaps in total factor productivity (TFP) between West and East Germany. Based on a dataset that comprises the entire flow of information provided by East German informants over the period 1970–1989, we document a significant narrowing of sectoral West-to-East TFP gaps as a result of East Germany's industrial Espionage. This central finding holds across a wide range of specifications and is robust to the inclusion of several alternative proxies for technology transfer. We further demonstrate that the economic returns to industrial Espionage are primarily driven by relatively few high quality pieces of information and particularly strong in sectors that were closer to the West German technological frontier. Based on our findings, we estimate that the average TFP gap between West and East Germany at the end of the Cold War would have been 6.3 percentage points larger had the East not engaged in industrial Espionage.
Martin Libicki - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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CyCon - The coming of cyber Espionage norms
2017 9th International Conference on Cyber Conflict (CyCon), 2017Co-Authors: Martin LibickiAbstract:The proposition that cyber Espionage is acceptable state behavior, even as cyber attack is unacceptable, is in question. The United States has raised objections to certain types of cyber Espionage activity, notably: (1) Chinese economically-motivated cyber Espionage; (2) the (feared) transfer of data taken from the US Office of Personnel Management (OPM) and provided to criminals; and (3) Russian doxing attacks, particularly against the Democratic National Committee (DNC). In effect, the United States has been edging towards advocating a new class of norms for cyber Espionage — countries may carry it out, but not use the results for other than traditional intelligence purposes, that is for informing national security decisionmaking. Other forms of cyber Espionage may come to be viewed as unacceptable, notably the uses of cyber Espionage to enable cyber attacks on critical infrastructure. Establishing a norm that holds some forms of cyber Espionage to be acceptable and others not would raise issues. First, can the United States and its friends define such norms in ways that render unacceptable (many of) those practices it finds objectionable, but do not prevent its own practices from being deemed unacceptable? In particular, can there be norms expressed in ways that allow all targets and methods to be used but restrict only what can be done with the information collected? Second, can monitoring regimes be developed to distinguish acceptable from unacceptable cyber Espionage and attribute such actions — not only correctly, but in ways that are accepted widely enough to dissuade further such activity?
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The coming of cyber Espionage norms
2017 9th International Conference on Cyber Conflict (CyCon), 2017Co-Authors: Martin LibickiAbstract:The proposition that cyber Espionage is acceptable state behavior, even as cyber attack is unacceptable, is in question. The United States has raised objections to certain types of cyber Espionage activity, notably: (1) Chinese economically-motivated cyber Espionage; (2) the (feared) transfer of data taken from the US Office of Personnel Management (OPM) and provided to criminals; and (3) Russian doxing attacks, particularly against the Democratic National Committee (DNC). In effect, the United States has been edging towards advocating a new class of norms for cyber Espionage - countries may carry it out, but not use the results for other than traditional intelligence purposes, that is for informing national security decisionmaking. Other forms of cyber Espionage may come to be viewed as unacceptable, notably the uses of cyber Espionage to enable cyber attacks on critical infrastructure. Establishing a norm that holds some forms of cyber Espionage to be acceptable and others not would raise issues. First, can the United States and its friends define such norms in ways that render unacceptable (many of) those practices it finds objectionable, but do not prevent its own practices from being deemed unacceptable? In particular, can there be norms expressed in ways that allow all targets and methods to be used but restrict only what can be done with the information collected? Second, can monitoring regimes be developed to distinguish acceptable from unacceptable cyber Espionage and attribute such actions - not only correctly, but in ways that are accepted widely enough to dissuade further such activity?
