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Sandrino Smeets - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Consensus and Isolation in the EU Council of Ministers
    Journal of European Integration, 2015
    Co-Authors: Sandrino Smeets
    Abstract:

    When and how are member states in a small minority or isolated position able to prevail in the EU Council of Ministers? The Council is known for its ability to avoid vetoes and votes. However, we lack a causal mechanism that explains how such a consensus is commonly reached. We argue that while domestic and normative constraints are necessary elements of an explanation of negotiating success, they are insufficient to solve the puzzle of isolation. We claim that success in isolation depends on the ability to avoid exposure at Council level, which in turn is related to the lower levels’ effectiveness in preventing matters from reaching the ministers. We test this conjecture by means of a process tracing analysis of three cases of isolation. By analysing how the Council has dealt with situations of twenty-six against one, we come closer to understanding the internal dynamics behind the consensus-reflex.

  • unanimity and exposure in the EU Council of ministers or how the dutch won and lost the icty debate
    European Journal of Political Research, 2015
    Co-Authors: Sandrino Smeets
    Abstract:

    How are unanimity negotiations commonly settled in the EU Council of Ministers? Important contributions have been made to our understanding of the ‘consensual’ decision-making dynamics in the Council, but most studies focus on explaining the sheer absence of votes in legislative decision making under the qualified majority rule. This study seeks to explain how vetoes are averted, or curtailed, in unanimity decision making. These unanimity negotiations are explained as attempts to induce or prevent high-level exposure. The degree of exposure in turn depends on the degree of lower level contestation. A process tracing analysis of one prolonged debate is performed from the perspective of one Member State – the Netherlands – which played a very prominent obstructing role. By analysing when, why and where (at what level) the Dutch won or lost, one can come closer to understanding the dynamic interplay between the different Council levels.

  • Unanimity and exposure in the EU Council of Ministers – or how the Dutch won and lost the ICTY debate
    European Journal of Political Research, 2015
    Co-Authors: Sandrino Smeets
    Abstract:

    How are unanimity negotiations commonly settled in the EU Council of Ministers? Important contributions have been made to our understanding of the ‘consensual’ decision-making dynamics in the Council, but most studies focus on explaining the sheer absence of votes in legislative decision making under the qualified majority rule. This study seeks to explain how vetoes are averted, or curtailed, in unanimity decision making. These unanimity negotiations are explained as attempts to induce or prevent high-level exposure. The degree of exposure in turn depends on the degree of lower level contestation. A process tracing analysis of one prolonged debate is performed from the perspective of one Member State – the Netherlands – which played a very prominent obstructing role. By analysing when, why and where (at what level) the Dutch won or lost, one can come closer to understanding the dynamic interplay between the different Council levels.

  • How Issues Move or Get Stuck: Or How to Be Effective in the EU Council of Ministers
    2013
    Co-Authors: Sandrino Smeets
    Abstract:

    Determining the locus and the logic of decision making in the EU Council of Ministers continues to be a major challenge. Insiders and outsiders have difficulty explaining why some issues move swiftly and smoothly through the Council, while others ‘get stuck’ at working party, Coreper or the ministerial level. This paper reconceptualises the internal negotiations as battles between drivers and brakemen, whereby the goal is to keep issues on or off the (ministers’) agenda. It also addresses the follow up question: whether either side has a structural advantage in these procedural battles? It clarifies the working of this mechanism by means of a process tracing analysis of one particular decision-making trajectory: that concerning the opening of accession negotiations with Croatia.

Helena Farrand Carrapico - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

Frank M. Häge - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • The scheduling power of the EU Council Presidency
    Journal of European Public Policy, 2016
    Co-Authors: Frank M. Häge
    Abstract:

    ABSTRACTDoes the Presidency of the Council of the EUropean Union have the ability to direct the political attention of this body by emphasizing and de-emphasizing policy issues according to its own priorities? This study examines this question empirically by relying on a new dataset on the monthly meeting duration of Council working parties in different policy areas between 1995 and 2014. The results of variance component analyses show that a considerable part of the over-time variation in the relative amount of political attention devoted to a policy area is systematically related to different Presidency periods. While not negating the constraints imposed on the Presidency by inherited agendas, programming and co-ordination requirements with other actors, the findings are consistent with the view that the Presidency has substantial scope for agenda-setting by determining what issues are being discussed, when they are being discussed and how much time is devoted for their discussion.

  • The scheduling power of the EU Council Presidency
    Journal of European Public Policy, 2016
    Co-Authors: Frank M. Häge
    Abstract:

    peer-reviewedDoes\ud the Presidency of the Council of the EUropean Union have the ability to direct\ud the political attention of this body by emphasising and de-emphasising policy\ud issues according to its own priorities? This study examines this question\ud empirically by relying on a new dataset on the monthly meeting duration of\ud Council working parties in different policy areas between 1995 and 2014. The\ud results of variance component analyses show that a considerable part of the\ud over-time variation in the relative amount of political attention devoted to a\ud policy area is systematically related to different Presidency periods. While\ud not negating the constraints imposed on the Presidency by inherited agendas,\ud programming, and coordination requirements with other actors, the findings are\ud consistent with the view that the Presidency has substantial scope for\ud agenda-setting by determining what issues are being discussed, when they are\ud being discussed, and how much time is devoted for their discussion.ACCEPTEDpeer-reviewe

  • bureaucrats as law makers committee decision making in the EU Council of ministers
    2012
    Co-Authors: Frank M. Häge
    Abstract:

    Part 1: Introduction and Background 1.The Study of Council Committees 2. The Council's Committee System 3. Existing Research on Council Decision-Making 4.Theoretical Perspectives on Committee Decision-Making Part 2: Quantitative Analysis 5. Sample Selection 6. Describing the Extent of Committee Decision-Making 7. Explaining the Variation in Committee Decision-Making Part 3: Qualitative Analysis 8. Methodological Issues 9. Agriculture 10. Environment 11. Economic and Financial Affairs 12. Summary and Between-Sector Comparison Part 4: Synthesis and Conclusion 13. Discussion of Research Results and Theory Building 14.Conclusion

Mika Widgrén - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • the impact of Council s internal decision making rules on the future EU
    2008
    Co-Authors: Mika Widgrén
    Abstract:

    This paper deals with the voting rules in the EU Council. Both internal and external impact of the voting rules are evaluated. Internal impact affects the distribution of power among the member states and external impact affects power relations between the main decision-making bodies in the EU. One of the main lessons of the analysis is clearly to explain why the design of Council voting rules has required so much bargaining and cumbersome marathon negotiations.

  • winners and losers under various dual majority rules for the EU Council of ministers
    2004
    Co-Authors: Richard E Baldwin, Mika Widgrén
    Abstract:

    This Paper studies some of the many options facing EU leaders when choosing a viable voting system for the EU25+. It provides quantitative estimates of the efficiency and power distributions of the various EU voting schemes that are being considered. It also provides intuition on how various aspects of voting rules affect decision-making efficiency and the implied power distribution. The paper also argues that the two big mistakes the EU has made with respect to voting reform were both due to last-minute ‘surprise’ schemes. This time around, EU leaders should limit themselves to choosing among voting systems that have been thoroughly studied and discussed, if they want to avoid a third mistake on this issue.

  • a priori versus empirical voting power in the EU Council of ministers
    European Union Politics, 2004
    Co-Authors: Antti Pajala, Mika Widgrén
    Abstract:

    Numerous scholarly articles have investigated member states’ a priori voting power in past, present and possible future Councils of the EUropean Union (EU). This article introduces three empiricall...

  • A Note on Matthias Sutter
    Journal of Theoretical Politics, 2000
    Co-Authors: Mika Widgrén
    Abstract:

    In the paper by Matthias Sutter a discrepancy between his results and earlier results on fair allocation of voting weights in the EU Council was found. In this paper, we explain the source of this discrepancy.

  • Voting Rule Reforms in the EU Council: Needs, Means and Consequences
    The Economics and Policies of Integration — a Finnish Perspective, 1996
    Co-Authors: Mika Widgrén
    Abstract:

    The Council of Ministers is the main decision-making body in the EUropean Community. As long as the member states’ governments have influence in the Community’s decision making process national aspects and the balance of national power will play an important role in the decision making process and in the functioning of the EC.

Reinert Maeland - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • constitutional analysis the power index approach
    European Journal of Political Research, 2000
    Co-Authors: Janerik Lane, Reinert Maeland
    Abstract:

    A power index approach to the EU institutions gives a new perspective uponthe EU institutions and their future reform. Using a standard power measure, the Banzhaf index, we show that in a group of states as the EU Council, the voting power of a member state is equal to twice the individual power to block multiplied by the group's collective power to change. Political power of the member states is calculated under alternative constitutional rules for the EU, where cooperative game theory allows the derivation of power equivalences. We suggest that simple majority should be used more often in the EU Council.

  • The EU Parliament: Seats, States and Political Parties
    Journal of Theoretical Politics, 1995
    Co-Authors: Janerik Lane, Reinert Maeland, Sven Berg
    Abstract:

    Voting power in the EU Parliament may be analysed from two perspectives: that of the states, and that of the political parties. The differences in state power reflect the population differences better than in the EU Council. The strength of the left is apparent in the voting power scores for the Parliament.

  • Voting Power under the EU Constitution
    Journal of Theoretical Politics, 1995
    Co-Authors: Janerik Lane, Reinert Maeland
    Abstract:

    Decision making rules in the EU Council of Ministers need to be revised in light of enlargements since 1958. Under the qualified majority rules, the more countries join, the less the voting power of the large states, leading necessarily to coalition-building process, two possible examples of which are described. The situation would be less paradoxical if the EU were to adopt a single rule, the simple majority vote.