The Experts below are selected from a list of 25707 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Christian J. Thomann - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Are Bad Times Good News for the Securities and Exchange Commission
European Journal of Law and Economics, 2014Co-Authors: Tim Lohse, Christian J. ThomannAbstract:There exists a considerable debate in the literature investigating how stock market upswings or downswings impact financial market regulation. The present paper contributes to this literature and investigates whether financial market regulation follows a regulative cycle: does regulation, and consequently investor protection, increase as a result of a stock market downturn (as argued by, e.g., Zingales (2009)) or – contrary to the regulative cycle hypothesis – as a result of an upswing (as claimed by Povel (2007), or Hertzberg (2003)) Following Jackson and Roe (2009), we use funding data on the world’s most important financial market regulator, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), as a proxy for the politically desired degree of regulation. We apply time series analysis. Using more than 60 years of data, we show that the SEC’s funding follows a regulative cycle: A weak stock market results in increased resources for the SEC. A strong stock market results in reduced resources. Our findings underline the downside of regulation as the regulative cycle amplifies the technical procyclicality inherent in regulation.
Anne M. Khademian - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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The Securities and Exchange Commission: A Small Regulatory Agency with a Gargantuan Challenge
Public Administration Review, 2002Co-Authors: Anne M. KhademianAbstract:Multibillion-dollar accounting scandals have brought down Enron and WorldCom, while other corporations continue to revise and restate earnings. The gradual stock market tumble has played havoc with investment portfolios of retirees, parents saving for education, small business owners, and corporate America. All eyes are on the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), a small, independent regulator of the securities markets with a gargantuan challenge. On the one hand, it faces great public expectations for rigorous reform of Wall Street. Politicians have mandated rules and sanctions for cleaning up the practice of outside audits and for improving the veracity of financial disclosures. Yet the public's expectations for a vigorous market recovery are even greater. If sanctions and rules are too severe, though, reform efforts could slow capital accumulation. This special report examines the SEC's regulatory past in order to understand the task it faces today. Management challenges posed by recent legislation are discussed, and recommendations for strengthening the SEC are presented.
Tim Lohse - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Are bad times good news for the Securities and Exchange Commission?
European Journal of Law and Economics, 2015Co-Authors: Tim Lohse, Christian ThomannAbstract:There exists a considerable debate in the literature investigating how stock market upswings or downswings impact financial market regulation. The present paper contributes to this literature and investigates whether financial market regulation follows a regulative cycle: does regulation, and consequently investor protection, increase as a result of a stock market downturn [as argued by, e.g., Zingales (J Account Res 47(2): 391–425, 2009 )] or—contrary to the regulative cycle hypothesis—as a result of an upswing [as claimed by Povel et al. (Rev Financ Stud 20(4): 1219–1254, 2007 ), or Hertzberg 2003 ] Following Jackson and Roe (J Financ Econ 93(2): 207–238, 2009 ), we use funding data on the world’s most important financial market regulator, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), as a proxy for the politically desired degree of regulation. We apply time series analysis. Using more than 60 years of data, we show that the SEC’s funding follows a regulative cycle: A weak stock market results in increased resources for the SEC. A strong stock market results in reduced resources. Our findings underline the downside of regulation as the regulative cycle amplifies the technical procyclicality inherent in regulation.
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Are Bad Times Good News for the Securities and Exchange Commission
European Journal of Law and Economics, 2014Co-Authors: Tim Lohse, Christian J. ThomannAbstract:There exists a considerable debate in the literature investigating how stock market upswings or downswings impact financial market regulation. The present paper contributes to this literature and investigates whether financial market regulation follows a regulative cycle: does regulation, and consequently investor protection, increase as a result of a stock market downturn (as argued by, e.g., Zingales (2009)) or – contrary to the regulative cycle hypothesis – as a result of an upswing (as claimed by Povel (2007), or Hertzberg (2003)) Following Jackson and Roe (2009), we use funding data on the world’s most important financial market regulator, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), as a proxy for the politically desired degree of regulation. We apply time series analysis. Using more than 60 years of data, we show that the SEC’s funding follows a regulative cycle: A weak stock market results in increased resources for the SEC. A strong stock market results in reduced resources. Our findings underline the downside of regulation as the regulative cycle amplifies the technical procyclicality inherent in regulation.
Roger M. White - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Stock Trades of Securities and Exchange Commission Employees
The Journal of Law and Economics, 2017Co-Authors: Shivaram Rajgopal, Roger M. WhiteAbstract:We examine the profitability of stock trades executed by Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) employees. Subject to the considerable constraints of the data (no portfolio information, occupational details, or individual identifiers and an inability to determine profitability of trades), we find that a hedge portfolio mimicking such trades earns a positive abnormal return of about 8.5 percent per year in US stocks, driven primarily by negative abnormal future returns on sell transactions. The SEC claims that this result stems in part from employees being forced to sell stocks in a firm when they are assigned to secret investigations. We question whether this policy is reasonable.
Joel Seligman - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Cautious Evolution or Perennial Irresolution: Stock Market Self-Regulation During the First Seventy Years of the Securities and Exchange Commission
2016Co-Authors: Joel SeligmanAbstract:One of the most significant concepts in federal securities regulation is that of Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) supervision of industry selfregulation.1 As articulated during the New Deal Chairmanships of Landis and Douglas, the necessity for securities industries' self-regulation subject to SEC supervision stemmed primarily from two bases. First, the impracticality of direct SEC regulation of the several thousand broker-dealers and business corporations subject to its jurisdiction, and second, a preference for business, with its greater practical knowledge of its own affairs, to participate in the development and application of SEC rules and reduce the likelihood of unnecessary disruption or inefficiency.2 Far from being a panacea, industry self-regulation subject to SEC supervision generally has been effective in its major applications when the Commission has been willing to threaten or actually use its regulatory authority to create incentives for securities industry self-regulation.3 As a 1973 report of the Senate Subcommittee on Securities memorably stated:
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the transformation of wall street a history of the securities and Exchange Commission and modern corporate finance
2003Co-Authors: Joel SeligmanAbstract:The Transformation of Wall Street is a comprehensive and insightful historical analysis of the Securities andamp; Exchange Commission from the perspective of a leader in securities regulation. The Transformation of Wall Street offers an in-depth look at the history of the SEC's origins, accomplishments, and failings since its creation in 1934. Each chapter in the book takes historical look at the tenure of the various SEC chairmen. The first edition, published in 1977, covered the SEC through the Nixon-Ford presidential administration. A revised edition was published in 1995, updating the book through 1992. Now, the third edition continues the history until 2001, the end of Arthur Levitt's Chairmanship, with a treatment of auditing issues through the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (July 2002). In this revised edition, author Joel Seligman draws on unpublished SEC files and extensive personal interviews to provide a comprehensive examination of the origins, accomplishments, and failings of the SEC and its leaders, from the creation of the SEC in 1934 to the present. The new material, among other things, addresses: The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, which has had a significant impact on private securities litigation after its passage in 1995 The structure of the securities markets (which are in an important transition because of Electronic Communications Networks; decimalization; international competition; and the continuing evolution to greater institutionalization of our markets as well as the growth of several new products, most recently security futures products) Municipal securities markets (which were largely ignored before the recently resigned Arthur Levitt) Several issues with respect to the accounting profession (most notably auditor independence and the independence of accounting standard-setting boards). In addition, this work focuses on Chairman Levitt, whom the author believes was one of the most accomplished of the post World War II chairs, and had the challenge of being a Chair appointed by a Democratic party president during a period when Republicans controlled both houses of Congress as well as a period of extraordinary ferment in the securities market.
