Expected Payoff

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David Johnstone - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • sensitivity of the discount rate to the Expected Payoff in project valuation
    Decision Analysis, 2017
    Co-Authors: David Johnstone
    Abstract:

    A routine method in business is to value risky capital investment projects by discounting their Expected cash Payoffs at “risk-adjusted” discount rates. Discount rates are purportedly allied to projects in “the same risk-class,” but there is little clarity about what makes a risk class. The capital asset pricing model (CAPM) gives two mathematically equivalent definitions. One is that assets in the same risk class have the same “beta,” and the other is that they have the same ratio of Payoff mean to Payoff covariance (with “the market”). The second depiction, albeit widely unknown, is more interesting in terms of cash flow fundamentals. Its implication is that the “denominator” (risk-adjusted discount rate) depends on its own “numerator” (Expected Payoff). In practical circumstances, the CAPM price-implied discount rate can be highly sensitive to changes in the Expected Payoff, contradicting the convention of discounting an Expected cash flow at some fixed “risk-adjusted” rate regardless of its dollar amount.

Stewart W. Wilson - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Classifier Fitness Based on Accuracy
    Evolutionary Computation, 1995
    Co-Authors: Stewart W. Wilson
    Abstract:

    In many classifier systems, the classifier strength parameter serves as a predictor of future Payoff and as the classifier's fitness for the genetic algorithm. We investigate a classifier system, XCS, in which each classifier maintains a prediction of Expected Payoff, but the classifier's fitness is given by a measure of the prediction's accuracy. The system executes the genetic algorithm in niches defined by the match sets, instead of panmictically. These aspects of XCS result in its population tending to form a complete and accurate mapping X A P from inputs and actions to Payoff predictions. Further, XCS tends to evolve classifiers that are maximally general, subject to an accuracy criterion. Besides introducing a new direction for classifier system research, these properties of XCS make it suitable for a wide range of reinforcement learning situations where generalization over states is desirable.

R.r. Yager - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Decision making with fuzzy probability assessments
    IEEE Transactions on Fuzzy Systems, 1999
    Co-Authors: R.r. Yager
    Abstract:

    We discuss the idea of a fuzzy probability assessment, the association a collection of fuzzy probabilities with the outcomes of a random experiment. Fuzzy probability assessments often result from the linguistic specification of probabilities as provided by human experts. The question of consistency of the fuzzy probability assessment is considered. Finally, the problem of decision-making, selecting a best alternative action, in the face of a fuzzy probability assessment is investigated. Here we focus on the issue of obtaining the Expected Payoff of alternatives in the face of a fuzzy probability assessment. In the course of solving this problem we develop a representation of an effective probability distribution in the face of a fuzzy probability assessment.

Rahul Jain - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • A Two Stage Stochastic Mechanism for Selling Random Power
    2019 American Control Conference (ACC), 2019
    Co-Authors: Nathan Dahlin, Rahul Jain
    Abstract:

    We present a two stage auction mechanism that renewable generators (or aggregators) could use to allocate renewable energy among load serving entities (LSEs). The auction is conducted day-ahead. LSEs submit bids specifying their valuation per unit, as well as their real-time fulfillment costs in case of shortfall in generation. We present an allocation rule and a de-allocation rule that maximizes Expected social welfare. Since the LSEs are strategic and may not report their private valuations and costs truthfully, we design a two-part payment, one made in Stage 1, before renewable energy generation level W is realized, and another determined later to be paid as compensation to those LSEs that have to be “de-allocated” in case of a shortfall. We propose a two-stage Stochastic VCG mechanism which we prove is incentive compatible in expectation (Expected Payoff maximizing bidders will bid truthfully), individually rational in expectation (Expected Payoff of all participants is non-negative) and is also efficient. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first such two-stage mechanism for selling random goods.

Stephen Jewson - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.