Expected Utility

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Edi Karni - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • subjective Expected Utility theory without states of the world
    2005
    Co-Authors: Edi Karni
    Abstract:

    This paper develops an axiomatic theory of decision making under uncertainty that dispenses with the state space. The results are subjective Expected Utility models with unique, action-dependent, subjective probabilities, and a Utility function defined over wealth-effect pairs that is unique up to positive linear transformation.

  • subjective Expected Utility theory with costly actions
    Games and Economic Behavior, 2004
    Co-Authors: Edi Karni
    Abstract:

    Abstract This paper explores alternative axiomatizations of subjective Expected Utility theory for decision makers with direct preferences over actions; including a general subjective Expected Utility representation with action-dependent Utility, and separately additive representations. In the context of the state-space formulation of agency theory, the results of this paper constitute axiomatic foundations of the agent's behavior.

  • subjective Expected Utility theory with state dependent preferences
    Journal of Economic Theory, 1993
    Co-Authors: Edi Karni
    Abstract:

    Abstract This paper extends Savage′s subjective Expected Utility theory to include state-dependent preferences. The dependence of the decision maker′s preferences over consequences on the states of nature is represented by state-specific mappings of the set of consequences onto itself. Within this framework Savage′s postulates are reformulated and it is shown that there exist subjective Expected Utility representations of the preference relation over acts with unique, nonatomic, probability measure on the algebra of all events, and a state-dependent Utility function over the set of consequences. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: D81.

Robert Sugden - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • reference dependent subjective Expected Utility
    Journal of Economic Theory, 2003
    Co-Authors: Robert Sugden
    Abstract:

    Abstract A reference-dependent generalisation of subjective Expected Utility theory is presented. In this theory, preferences between acts depend both on final outcomes and on reference points (which may be uncertain acts). It is characterised by a set of axioms in a Savage-style framework. A restricted form of the theory separates attitudes to end states (encoded in a ‘satisfaction function’) from attitudes to gains and losses of satisfaction. Given weak additional assumptions, the restricted theory excludes cycles of choice, explains observed disparities between willingness-to-pay and willingness-to-accept valuations of lotteries, and predicts preference reversal.

Jack Meyer - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • two moment decision models and Expected Utility maximization
    The American Economic Review, 2016
    Co-Authors: Jack Meyer
    Abstract:

    Two-moment decision models are consistent with Expected Utility maximization only if the choice set or the agent's preferences are restricted. This paper identifies a restriction which is sufficient to ensure this consistency and confirms that it holds in many economic models. The implications for economic analysis are then derived. Two different approaches to representing an agent's preferences over strategies yielding random payoffs are in wide use. Under the mean-standard deviation (MS) approach, the agent is assumed to rank the alternatives according to the value of some function defined over the first two moments of the random payoff, while the Expected Utility (EU) criterion assumes that the Expected value of some Utility function defined over payoffs is used instead. The fact that there are these two competing approaches has generated a considerable literature. Some authors are concerned with the advantages and disadvantages of each, while others deal with conditions under which the potentially different approaches would yield the same results, or at least approximately so. Space does not

David Schmeidler - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • purely subjective maxmin Expected Utility
    Journal of Economic Theory, 2014
    Co-Authors: Shiri Alon, David Schmeidler
    Abstract:

    Abstract The Maxmin Expected Utility decision rule suggests that the decision maker can be characterized by a Utility function and a set of prior probabilities, such that the chosen act maximizes the minimal Expected Utility, where the minimum is taken over the priors in the set. Gilboa and Schmeidler axiomatized the maxmin decision rule in an environment where acts map states of nature into simple lotteries over a set of consequences. This approach presumes that objective probabilities exist, and, furthermore, that the decision maker is an Expected Utility maximizer when faced with risky choices (involving only objective probabilities). This paper presents axioms for a derivation of the maxmin decision rule in a purely subjective setting, where acts map states to points in a connected topological space. This derivation does not rely on a pre-existing notion of probabilities, and, importantly, does not assume the von Neumann and Morgenstern (vNM) Expected Utility model for decision under risk. The axioms employed are simple and each refers to a bounded number of variables.

(june). Papadimitriou, A., & Cai, Y. (2011). What Drives T - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Subjective Expected Utility With Incomplete Preferences
    Econometrica, 2013
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    Abstract:

    This paper extends the subjective Expected Utility model of decision making under uncertainty to include incomplete beliefs and tastes. The main results are two axiomatizations of the multiptior Expected multiUtility representations of preference relations under uncertainty. The paper also introduces new axiomatizations of Knightian uncertainty and the Expected multiUtility model with complete beliefs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]